Fico gamble on "legal reforms" riles Slovaks, charts shaky path in the EU

It didn’t take long for the Robert Fico-led SMER coalition government to create unease both abroad and at home.

First, there were the much-reported statements that Slovakia would not support military aid to Ukraine.

Or at least such statements were quick to grab headlines abroad. Back home domestic machinations to protect SMER politicians under the much abused phrase of "legal reform" began almost as soon as Fico (again) returned as prime minister.

Which meant that potential sentences for corruption were to be reduced; the apparatus to prosecute corruption would be weakened; that SMER loyalists would have positions waiting for them whether or not they had ever been charged with a crime…

Sure, there were some who doubted during late 2023 that Fico and SMER would truly have the gumption. After all, Fico and SMER lost power in the wake of mass outrage over corruption and the allegedly linked killing of journalist Jan Kuciak and his partner Martina Kusnirova. That was back in 2018, but in theory—at least among some Slovakia watchers—was that minor “reforms” might well be passed, but that not even Fico would risk mass protests yet again.

They were wrong.

Call them “reforms”…

The current Fico-led coalition indeed voted through reforms late last week, protests be damned. And these reforms include—and yes, this is almost unbelievable—1) shutting down the Slovak Special Prosecutors Office 2) the creation of “conditional punishment” for bribes equal to up to EUR 250,000 3) putting an end to protections for whistle-blowers 4) generally reducing the severity of sentences for the diversion of funds and 5) cutting the statute of limitations for corruption and white collar crime to only… five years.

Even the absolute layman can see that the above “reforms” are absurd. And that they must have been created to protect friends of the lawmakers who passed them through. We’ll get to that in a moment. For what may well escape the casual observer is the double-edged sword of “conditional punishment.”

Yes, this means that in fact a state official could take a bribe of EUR 49,999.99 (probably best watch that exchange rate) and face only four years in prison. Yet it could also mean that an opposition politicians could face the same over something as innocuous as an undisclosed Christmas gift.

But now let’s consider the true motives behind the above.

Murders and more…

Kuciak and Kusnirova were gunned down in their apartment on Feb. 21, 2018. Immediately, then Slovak National Police Chief Tibor G. leapt into action, stating that it was likely that the double hit had come as a result of Kuciak’s aggressive investigative work.

In truth, he was probably right. Although suspicion first fell upon alleged members of the Italian Ndrangheta, who were active in Slovakia at the time, later official fingers were pointed at Marian K., who had already run afoul of the law in a corrupt bid to take over TV Markiza.

To its credit, before the investigation had hardly begun the population of Slovakia hit the streets, voiced outrage and soon Fico stepped down as prime minister. For in fact, Slovaks had had enough. Years of scandals ranging from clearly bent privatizations to corrupt deals to the Gorilla tape scandal (which highlighted the above) had been plenty to bear, but the murder of a journalist and a young woman for exposing sleaze (and getting it right) was simply beyond the pale.

So in came Ol’aNO and Ol’aNO founder Igor Matovic—determined to purge dirty officials and charge bribe-paying business persons at all levels. This effort proved controversial (and the reign of Ol’aNO and Matovic ill-fated), and predictably officials linked to SMER took the brunt . These included Tibor G.; former National Police Chief (and anti-mafia legend) Milan L., who committed suicide in jail; Slovak-Hungarian oligarch Norbert B., implicated for money laundering in the Dobytkar investigation; Former secret service boss Peter T.; Former National Crime Agency (NAKA) operative Branislav Z.; Penta board member (and private equity legend) Jaroslav H.; Special Prosecutor Dusan K.; former intelligence Frantisek B. (who also committed suicide); former Justice Minister State Secretary Monika J. (who attempted suicide) and also (among still others) alleged chronic tender-rigger and oligarch Jozef B. Charges were also filed against SMER Deputy Speaker Robert K. and even against Robert Fico himself, although those have since been dropped.

What do many in the above list have in common—illegal records pulls and surveillance on journalists that directly or indirectly went back to the Kuciak investigations. Yet somewhere along the way there was also the COVID pandemic—and whether or not the Matovic government was simply too focused on the purge or simply overwhelmed—things did not go well. Scandals ensued over vaccination bungles, and not surprisingly—and in the wake of such high-profile suicides and suicide attempts (not to mention the very loud and galvanizing Fico)-- the Matovic-led government imploded.

Which eventually led the way for the great rehabilitation (without actual rehabilitation) and the return of Fico and SMER.

Which is to say that the tables have turned.

First there is Tibor G. himself. SMER wasted no time in nominating the controversial cop to take over has head of the secret service—and this despite the fact that 1) not only is he related to the aforementioned Norbert B., but he was also entangled in the Kuciak case, allegedly having illegally pulled police records on Kuciak while also having ordered the bugging of politicians and also facilitating bribes.

But even if these accusations have been featured repeatedly in the Slovak press, the press's impact has apparently been marginal... as the tables have just kept on turning, as SMER and even Tibor G.  called foul on past governments and claimed that prosecuting corruption was tantamount to human rights abuse. The powers that be have even gone so far as to include the Kuciak murder in said arguments, with coalition politicians mixing calls for harsh punishment for killings and stating that these should take precedent over a focus on white-collar crime.

But this provokes a very relevant question: has Fico—the very definition of a Teflon prime minister—grossly miscalculated with reforms? In fact, it is too early to say. Teaming up with Hungary’s Viktor Orban now appears to have been a case of appealing to his home base but also testing the political winds. With US funds still stuck and the EU apparently unable or unwilling (and we suspect the latter) to deliver on promised ammunition and equipment, the likelihood of a forced compromise with Russia in Ukraine grows higher by the day. Equally tenuous is now Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s hold on power. Which brings back to the fore the ugly political truth that it pays to appear the winner. Or at least to be able to say: “I told you so.”

Yet Fico is taking perhaps a greater gamble than it appears--perhaps the last great gamble of a hazardous career. For there is now no doubt that the powerhouses of the EU have finally grown unsettled by Russia and the long-term goals of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Poland has it’s agro disputes with Ukraine, but the Polish-Hungarian venture is now over with the ouster of Poland’s Law-and-Justice (PiS) and the return of the Polish left and coalition leader and once-again Prime Minister Donald Tusk.

Which also means money—or lack thereof. During the long reign of PiS in Poland, the EU grew both willing and adept when it came to cutting funds to both Poland and Hungary, and bearing the above mentioned “legal reforms,” Fico should expect the same.

Moreover, considering that tens of thousands of Slovaks began protesting even prior to the passage of said reforms—and that spring (or protest season) is coming as early as ever—the going is going to get rough.

In short, Fico has played his hand by eliminating punishment for friends in business and politics and thus banking on the strength of business-political structures (and conditional punishments) to carry him through. What this means for the future of Slovakia will be on his shoulders, but such a playbook is typically followed by “conditional punishments” for those who oppose such a leader. Even more so when such punishments are already de facto registered as law.

Of course there are words for republics that go this route. They range from regressive to prodigal to "black sheep" to repressive and finally, despotic.

But the term “banana” also does come to mind.

Slovaks have in the past shown that they are willing to say "enough is enough"--as seen by 2018 protests over government corruption in the wake of the killings of Jan Kuciak and Martina Kusnirova. Photo credit: Wizzard, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons.