Of bombs, murder, spies, gas pipelines... and the Hungarian elections

It’s the Monday of the Central European/Polish Easter weekend so let’s talk about the sins of the world.

Now what I’d prefer to discuss was March 2026’s bump in narco-trafficking and organized crime in CEE.

Instead…

Let’s talk Hungarian elections.

Now before you switch off, just trust me on this one, as the intrigue factor is well worth a gander, as it includes an alleged false-flag operation, reported explosives—and, potentially, a modus operandi that goes all the way back to the 1990s.

But let’s keep this chronological and delve into yesterday’s news (as in, literally, yesterday, April 5, 2026), and when it comes to the level of intrigue, you can be the judge.

Part 1—gas pipelines

Whether meant to be symbolic or not, political pundits may have noted that Easter celebrations were spiced with allegations from Serbia that—to quote The Guardian—“explosives of devastating power” were discovered on the TurkStream pipeline, which pumps gas into Central Europe. EU bad  boy and nemesis to Ukraine, otherwise known as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban—who has faced mass protests in his own country and who is in real danger of losing elections that are now only six days away—immediately jumped on the news, stating that an investigation had been launched and calling an emergency meeting of the somewhat recently formed (“recently” meaning the beginning of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine) Hungarian Defense Council.

The allegations immediately raised eyebrows—and real doubt. First, in this day and age a threat to a gas pipeline is nothing new. So allow Yours Truly to digress.

Back in 2022, in the international waters of Denmark and Sweden, multiple explosions caused leaks in the Nordstream 3 and 4 pipelines.  Russia demanded justice, and Sweden, Denmark and Germany immediately began separate investigations.

Shortly thereafter, Italy arrested a Ukrainian possibly linked to the attack, as did Poland. In the meantime, Germany identified seven Ukrainians allegedly involved in the incident.

Somewhat oddly, both Sweden and Denmark closed their investigations with no results. Germany went forward and that investigation is still ongoing.

Yet there were (and remain) signs that the Ukrainian “team” allegedly involved was a false-flag operation to get Ukraine blamed for the attack—by Russia. First, Russian Navy support ships were observed near where the leaks occurred on Sept. 26-27, 2022, and Russan submarines had been seen in the area. Moreover, it was later revealed that there were also Spetsnaz Special forces frogmen on those ships, and a special salvage ship carrying a SS-750 mini-submarine, was in the area, and satellite imagery confirmed that the submarine had been active.

And all of the ship transponders were turned off.

And while now a footnote, Gerhard Schindler, former head of the German Federal Intelligence Service, alleged that Russia launched the attack to claim sabotage and justify its own halting of gas supplies--partly in order avoid penalties for breaking distribution contracts with the West. Finnish journalists pointed out that a similar modus operandi had been seen on the pipeline to Georgia back when that country had begun to apply for NATO membership—and that remote-controlled military-grade charges were used.

But let’s get back to the Ukrainians, the seven-man team under investigation (although one man has since died) and the now impounded sailing vessel, the Andromeda, that some believe was used to carry out the attack.

Well… there are a few holes here.

First, a long list of officials, including Danish Defense Command have either stated or been revealed through Freedom of Information requests to simply disbelieve that a sailing vessel could have been used. First, it would have had to have carried hundreds of kilograms of explosives. Second, the pipeline is just too deep at somewhere between 60-90 meters. Third, is a combination of the two. For many military experts it is near impossible to believe that a team of Ukrainians at that time—even if they’d had Ukrainian government support—could have managed to sort the fake passports, the huge amount of explosives, the boat and then find the pipeline, reach with the appropriate amount of charges, detonate the charges at said depth without killing themselves and then managing to actually escape back to port and hit the road as fugitives without incident.

But near impossible is not impossible. German authorities have claimed that a number of the seven on the Andromeda worked at a diving school and that one was an explosives experts. Likewise, the investigation has alleged that far fewer kilograms of explosives were needed. US papers have claimed that the attack was supported if not organized by Ukrainian military or secret services. Or the CIA. Or all of the above.

Meanwhile, Poland has refused the extradition of at least one alleged member of the demolition team, with the judge in question using the term “just war” in his decision to let a certain Volodymyr Z. go free.

But maybe… a wider “all of the above” is actually true, which does not exonerate Russia from participating in a false-flag operation at all.

Think of it this way:

• The war starts in 2022. Ukraine wants to hit Russia in the wallet so it considers trying to blow up Nord Stream. And it meets with the CIA. The CIA under Biden is… interested, but still, this is a tough, near impossible operation, and Ukraine is not exactly known as a naval power with advanced mini-subs capable of deep-water subterfuge.
• Yet as no gas is flowing due to the war, Russia sees the possibility of killing multiple birds with one stone. Blow up the gas line and blame it on Ukraine—and avoid contractual penalties along the way (while also getting its point home to the West that yes, it does need Russian energy, as after all, pipelines can be prepared.
• Meanwhile, the search was on to find Ukrainians willing to take cash who either are actually pro-Russian or who are actually… pro-cash to sail around on the Andromeda during the run-up to a Spetsnaz frogman/mini-sub operation that maybe was meant to only slightly damage the pipelines... but in the end went a bit too far. And if that sounds far-fetched, check out the following article previously posted on The Corners [https://thecorners.pl/russian-spy-games-in-poland-are-legion-and-dangerous/ ] and consider how many Ukrainians have actually been arrested for taking cash for arson and sabotage in Poland and in Western Europe.
• Or maybe, just maybe, with so may secret services active, the Ukrainians on the Andromeda were on a completely different mission (which would explain the refusal to extradite by Poland]—but not matter the mission, this would have put them in a unique position to be blamed by Russia for a Russian false-flag event whether they took Russian money or not.

Now has Yours Truly ventured suddenly and truly ventured into conspiracy theory? (And am I slightly too subjective and bent in my anti-Russian rhetoric)? Very likely. But also bear in mind that a source who spoke to The New York Times—in an article that suggested Ukraine was behind the attack (check that out here: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/07/us/politics/nord-stream-pipeline-sabotage-ukraine.html) stated that around the time of the incident that there were 45 ships in the area with their transponders turned off—and that about 450 kilograms of explosives were used in the attack.

So let the conspiracy theory breathe a little because at this point it does appear that nobody outside of the world’s top secret service or naval brass really knows what was going on.

And a 50-foot sailing yacht manned by diving school types just does not make a lot of sense.

But now back to now, modus operandi, explosives and the Hungarian elections.

 

Part 2—Hungary and… Russia?

Once again, we now have six days to go before Orban (potentially) faces the music in the upcoming elections to be held April 12. On one side there is Orban and Fidesz, which ostensibly want to blame anything and everything on Ukraine, and on the other are the Tisza and Magyar parties who are actually sick of populist blame games in the face of rising prices and increasingly tough economy.

Now bear in mind 1) Orban has long been trailing in the polls 2) he has been at the helm for 16 years—and he very well may have reason to worry about his own future should he lose power 3) he is quite tight with Serbian President (and strongman) Aleksandar Vucic and Orban has long been unafraid to make Ukraine his whipping boy in an effort to stir up resentment as a long-term play to remain in power.

But yes, there is more—for it appears to have turned out that Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto (also not a fan of Ukraine) was caught in leaked phone conversations stating that he has been no less that a person at “the disposal” of none other than Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, roughly since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

True, in CEE saying you are “at the disposal” is a rather common way to end a conversation with a client…

But to be honest… those are the cheat notes. A far more detailed explanation is featured on frontstory.pl (a Polish-based investigative news site that is doing great work). Here is the link, as it’s worth checking out: https://frontstory.pl/hotline-z-kremlem/

True, this is Polish only, but here are a few of the highlights:

• Russian Foreign Minister (and long-time bully of the town, region, world) called up Szijjarto because he wanted the sister of Russian oligarch (and favourite of Vladimir Putin) Alisher Usmanov off the EU sanctions list. Szijarto promised to help sort it out—and to submit a formal application “together with the Slovaks” to get this done.
• They then both commiserated over “Europe’s Biden” (the and former EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, whom Lavrov used to call “much more reasonable.”

[Ed. note—actually, as far as Russia is concerned, he may have a point, as Yours Truly remembers Borrell describing Russia as a “reliable energy partner” even in the face of the first gas cutoffs to Ukraine—and de facto to Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and even Italy—back in the mid-2000s. Needless to say, he told this to me directly in a phone interview at the time, and I repeated the question more than once… after a long pause of utter disbelief.]

• Szijjarto also was in awe over Gazprom’s headquarters prior to the “I’m always at your disposal quote.”
• But here is the kicker: that was one of many conversations between 2023 and 2025… and Usmanov’s sister was removed from the sanction list.
• Actually, no, the real kicker is that, according to Frontstory, Szijjarto revealed details discussed in a EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting.

Hmm…

Ugly stuff.

But there is more: Ukraine has since pushed for an investigations, claiming (and it is not the only one) that Hungary has been shooting insider information on EU meetings to Russia, and based on the full, taped convo, it does sound (at the minimum) as if Szijjarto was functioning as lobbyist on Lavrov’s behalf.

Of course, Szijjarto has since pushed back, stating that the real scandal was that a phone tap had taken place on a foreign dignitary… and that the leak actually took place a week prior to the Hungarian elections.

After all, high-level conversations between foreign representatives should remain secret.

After all, it’s a matter of trust.

Especially, when (to paraphrase the Lord of the Rings), you are invited to a sensitive meeting of EU ministers…

And Lavrov is not.

!!!

But the collective We is going to assume that you already knew at least some of the above. And possibly you also know the wider background in that halted oil supplies are hardly Hormuz anymore—and in fact they never were. For in fact, Hungary and Slovakia have berated Ukraine for an oil cutoff, which took place because Russian struck the Druzhba pipeline (after all, there is a war going on). Hungary, in particular, has demanded rather bizarrely that the pipeline be repaired, but Ukraine has responded that this is impossible because… after all, there is a war going on.

This has resulted in Hungary and Slovakia halting diesel shipments to Ukraine and also phasing out gas flows as of March 25.

But no, that’s not all. Some may remember Hungary’s decision to seize two armoured cars carrying some USD 82 mln in cash and gold back in early March. The vehicles were actually owned by the Ukraine state-controlled Oschadbank and were carrying funds from that bank in Vienna to Ukraine. Hungary detained the vehicles, the drivers and bank employees and “impounded” the cash, ostensibly to perform a proper investigations. Ironically (although this was still good news), the employees and drivers were released—which is an odd way to conduct an investigation with regard to potentially millions in laundered or ill-gotten gains. But again, at least they were released.

In fact, right at the end of March, Hungary also released the vehicles.

But the money and gold? Odd. Seems like Hungary is going to hold on to that.

But there is still more…

Which brings us back to explosives, past false-flag operations and, yes, the actual Hungarian elections.

(And yes, finally, I’m getting to the point.)

Part 3—if you need a modus operandi, use what works

Remarkable as it seems—and bearing in mind the Russian-Georgian pipeline bombing, the Nordstream attack, the new Serbian pipeline allegations and the apparent use of false-flag bombings to churn support—there appears to be yet another precedent. Multiple news sites, led by the investigative Hungarian site Atlatszo.hu (see the story link here:  https://english.atlatszo.hu/2026/03/12/convicted-hitman-confessed-to-have-committed-bombings-to-help-fidesz-win-election-in-1998/) have now released the maybe not-so-surprising claims by Hungarian former hitman Jozef Rohac, who stated that in the 1990s  he was tasked with setting off bombs in front of Fidesz-leader homes in order to… generate sympathy and popularity for Fidesz. More specifically, the goal was to improve Orban’s and Fidesz’s chances in the then-upcoming 1998 elections.

Now that may seem like it was quite some time ago, but there is much to break down here. First, maybe it’s only the old dogs who remember, but Fidesz at one time was not the powerhouse that has dominated Hungary during Orban’s rule. Orban over the 1990s went from being the leader of a liberal-nationalist semi-youth movement (and, ironically, a big admirer of Poland’s Solidarity) to a right-wing leader who was in desperate need of a boost… which he apparently got.

Notably, he also better and better understood how to harness the anger of the masses—and some may remember the violent Fidesz protests of the mid-2000s as he basically bullied his way into power.

Now consider the following: It is now Orban’s Szijjarto decrying foul play so close to an election. (And let’s just ignore the government’s attacks on the press and the rather convenient… cooperation with business that is rather apparent in Hungary).

And if we want to dwell on the past (hey, why not?), Rohac did not just set off purposely harmless bombs. This is a guy from the past who at the time already had a past. For example:

• Rohac a.k.a. “The Rat” actually kidnapped Slovakian Health Minister in 1985 (ye, it was a bit happenstance) in order to attempt to “negotiate” a way out of the country during the height of the Iron Curtain. And yes, shots were fired at the police.
• He was then sentenced to 15-years in Ilava prison, and he became the first-ever inmate to escape from said prison—although he was recaptured. Then he started writing poetry.
• !!!
• Maybe it was his new career in poetry, maybe it was alleged beatings suffered at Leopoldov, but by 1990 Rohac was getting mean. He organized a prison mutiny in 1990, took further beatings—and later became an explosive expert, first killing former police officer and then head of the Bratislava mafia Robert Remias, who was tied to a former secret service agent, Oskar Fegyveres, who himself was linked to the kidnapping of the son of Slovakian President Michal Kovac Jr. (with that kidnapping allegedly linked to Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar an Slovak Secret Service Director Ivan L. That said, charges against Rohac were dropped.
• In 1996 Rohan shot and killed Slovak businessman Jozse Prisztas—a fact he admitted (which is quite interesting) to Hungarian police.
• Rohac then killed Kosice mafia boss Robert Holub, in 1997 (also likely with the backing of the Slovak secret service), but not before kidnapping and torturing Holub’s brother, Jan and then organizing a shoot-em-up that say an Holub associate shot and Holub also hit four times. Holub was rushed to the hospital. So Rohac actually climbed a latter and shot Holub four more times through a window.
• In 1997 Rohac allegedly used five kilograms of dynamite—using a remote control-- to kill Bratislava mob-king wannabe Eduard Dinic. The bomb formed a crater several meters deep and sprayed human tissue as far as 150 meters, with Dinic’s hand found 100 meters away. That investigation was also cut short.
• Dinic’s brother wanted revenge, but he was also killed in 1998 when Rohac and an accomplice took him out with submachine guns (while also killing Dinic’s bodyguard).
• In 2008 Hungarian police charged him with the attempted killing of Zoltan Seres in 1997 (that bomb failed to go off), and he did two years of prison.
• He also allegedly tried to kill Hungarian media mogul Janos Fenyo in 1998.
• In 1998 Rohac allegedly used a car bomb to kill yet another mafia boss, this being Tamas Boros, who headed the local mafia in Budapest. That bomb killed not only Boros, but also three civilians while also injuring other Hungarians and foreigners who just happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time. That investigation also got nowhere.

• In 1999, Johac allegedly killed Daler Hlavačka, member of Ukrainian mafia also tied to the Dinic brothers. That same year he also was allegedly involved in the killing of Slovak mafia leader Jozef Kucmerko.

• Likewise, he was allegedly tied to the murder of Roman Deak (also linked to the Dinic brothers).
• In 2004, at the height of the Bratislava mob wars, Rohac allegedly tried to kill mob boss Ivo Ruzic—again using a large amount of TNT. Ruzic survived, but six people were injured and 20 cars were damaged.

And now Rohac has come clean, admitting to setting off bombs back in 1998 to help convince the Hungarian voters that Orban and his supporters were under threat. Which arguably helped Orban get elected.

Which, all things considered…

(And there are a lot of things…)

Makes you wonder…

About the past, the present, the future…

And ask still more questions…

Such as…

Did the EU actually have a vetting process?

Or…

Does anything ever really change?

Or…

Will the 1990s ever end?

Or…

Birds of a feather?

Or maybe I’m just reading too much into all of this.

Maybe it’s just me.

Preston Smith is a licensed investigator based in Gdansk, Poland. He can be reached at query@cddi.pl.

Photo credit: © European Union, 1998 – 2026, Attribution, via Wikimedia Commons