The Ukrainian War Update (Oct. 20, 2025): harsh comments and the thin blue line...

 Much to discuss this week, including on-the-ground battles, the dim prospect of Tomahawks, actual protests in Russia and more.

But first, a quick response to a rather recent "private" letter.

In short, the Corners last Ukrainian War Update (Sept. 28, 2025) was bleak.

At least according to some who got in contact directly, with no less than three different persons quite pointedly lambasting predictions of lost ground in the context of Russia and Ukraine pushing each other to the breaking point.

One friend (and I do hope we are still friends) went so far as to call that post “defeatist.”

Ok. I get it.

And while I hope we do remain friends…

Cry me a river.

Those who have long read this blog will note that I am one of the few (and if we talk about consistency, pretty much the only) blogger, analyst, risk consultant, etc. that actually has not only tracked, but who has also predicted the future of the war. Said predictions go back to the first year of Russia’s attempt to take Kiev during the battle of Gostomel. I’m not going to go through all of these here, but the Pokrovsk focus and then the Pokrovsk to Kupiansk fortress line has been heavily featured (and was heavily featured) long before it became a “thing” for my Western counterparts.

And, as my most particular critic noted, I did state back when the Donald Trump administration “turned out the lights” on Ukraine’s Kursk offensive, effectively blinding them for days, that this would cost Ukraine in Pokrovsk and eventually Kupiansk (a predictions that has, unfortunately, largely proven true.

And two out of three critics (none of whom would like to be featured in letters on the site) also harped on my “Ukraine can still win this” mantra, which I’m also standing by to this day.

If you want to call that being defeatist, so be it. If you want to call that schizophrenia (and one of those critics did), ok. But I calls it how I sees it. And if you can’t see it…

Better stick to snarking from the shadows.

That said, I do understand where you are coming from, this being primary ignorance, which is not all your own fault, as you are being constantly lied to. Here are a couple of examples:

• Casualty figures—for maybe the first 18 months of the war Russian casualties were discussed, very often the total figure was broadcast as ridiculously low and in the range of 150 to 200 Russian casualties per day or 1,100 a week. Literally, month after month the “experts” stated (again and again) that Russian casualties were limited to this range, and Yours Truly managed to go back and find a 2023  Forbes “investigative piece” that asked “Did the Ukrainian Army Kill 1,100 Russians In A Single Day? It’s Certainly Possible.”

Well, yes, it was possible. In fact, it was the norm. (See the article here: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/03/14/did-the-ukrainian-army-kill-1100-russians-in-a-single-day-its-certainly-possible/ )

In fact, 2023 corresponded to a time when Russia continued to pretend that it had suffered casualties below 10,000, but it was only by August 2024 that NATO and US military experts began to state that Russian casualties had reached 1,000 per day. Frankly speaking, estimates from 2022 even to the end of 2024 were appallingly low. The figuring was too widespread and too brutal (and Russian meat waves during two of the past (almost) four years were beyond suicidal. But let’s just consider  the math. Whether you want to consult Wikipedia or ISW the Ukrainian general staff, etc., the figure that is currently agreed upon comes to more than 1,100,000 since the invasion began in February 2022. That puts us at 43 months (and two weeks). Since that figure came out a couple of weeks ago, we’ll call it at 43 months. A bit of simple math reveals that this comes to 25,581 a month.

Granted, that is a monstrous figure—and there were periods in the war where Russian casualties fell (for example, paradoxically, during the Ukrainian successes under former Chief of Staff Gen. Valerii Fedorovych Zaluzhnyi, which saw Russian forces in pell-mell retreat, but still that figure comes to less than 900 per day.

True, the 1,100,000 figure was corroborated by Russian leaks, but Russian stats are Russian stats. At any rate, this figure is too low. Probably, a safe overall figure could be as high as 1,500 per day (bearing in mind that there are doubts as to how Russia counts—or if it counts at all—foreigners pressed into surface or MIA troops), but even if we edge that number down to 1,150 a day (which is probably too low), total Russian casualties would now already run (as of Oct. 19,2025) to more than 1,500,000.

Can I prove that figure? No.

Would I bet on it?

Maybe.

• Now let’s talk current gains. Whether we are talking youtubers, experts, “proven analysts” or standard news casters, the consistent take is that Russia may be grinding forward, but that gains are miniscule. Likewise, within the space of the past two weeks the general take has gone from “Ukraine is doomed” to “Russia’s offensives are completely over and the only progress has been limited to Kupiansk.”

Neither take is true. First, below is an overall map of just the Pokrovsk front from just January 2025.

Here is the current map:

The two maps are all but unrecognizable.

Second, even over the past few days Russia has indeed made gains. Yes, these gains seem to be a product of all but suicidal missions—and Russian attempts to gain ground have seen foot soldiers, quad soldiers, armour and not so long ago, calvary on horseback, wiped out, but the gains are still real, and Ukraine is still under extreme pressure.

It is what it is, which is what I will present in the second half of this blog.

But yes, Ukraine can still win this. Which is what I will present as well.

In Part 2.

Part 2: the thin blue line…

In Part 2 of this week’s update we’ll cover the Russian grind forward, as well as the predicted and dire situation at Kupiansk and Pokrovsk, not to mention along the key points of the fortress line in between.

But first, a few, quick comments on news updates.

As anyone who follows the war by now knows, US President Donald Trump is waffling on Tomahawks. Hopefully, Russian lies will finally anger him or embarrass him into… “allowing Ukraine to buy” these weapons.

Yes, I did write that correctly. There is support, and there is a garage sale, and there is: sorry, your money is no good here in the negative sense.

Right now it’s the last.

By the time of this publications it has again become clear that Trump is not going to allow Ukraine to buy Tomahawks. In fact, when it comes to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Washington, apart from what appeared to be a clearly pre-planned comment regarding Zelenskyy’s admittedly sharp suit… nothing solid came out of that trip… at all.

So we hope against hope, but for now… don’t get your hopes up.

Second, Russian President Vladimir Putin suddenly came out with a "compromise" to end the war. If Ukraine simply gives up Donetsk, then we have a solution.

Erm...

You've got to be kidding.

Yes, Trump immediately seemed to get behind the idea in the role of snubbed Nobel peace prize peacemaker, but this is not going to happen. And if it did?

The Ukrainians of Donetsk would be given up to arrests and torture. Their children would be kidnapped. We've seen this before.

And remember Donetsk is not all under Russian control.

That idea is no less than a perverted joke. Pushing this through is pushing through genocide.

Yes, Ukraine still can lose this war. But no, this deal won't happen.

Third, Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s petroleum sector are a big deal. The sector has indeed been crippled, with estimates ranging as wide as 20 percent to 40 percent or more. Personally, I’m going with more than 30 percent.

Will this tip Russia to the breaking point? One of my long-running predictions is that Russia will hit this during the third year of the war (akin to its fracture during WWI), and while I am quickly running out of time for that prediction to ring true… we are getting there.

For here are a few other factors to bear in mind: Trump has indeed put pressure on India to stop buying Russian oil. That’s a big deal. But a bigger deal may simply be Mother Nature. This year’s forecast is now the dreaded worst winter in 100 years. This will bring misery to the Ukrainian people… but they have been through hard winters with no heat now for years.

And oddly, there is another sub factor that may be getting overlooked. Ukraine is increasingly becoming a military power in its own right. Yes, it lacks men, but it is making up for this with technological advances, smart targeting and even long-range weapons, such as the Flamingo.

Which means that yes, while Tomahawks are a priority... there may come a day when Ukraine can once again handle its own business even in the realm of Tomahawk-type missiles.

In short, US power and Trump's (potential) influence cannot be exaggerated, but if Ukraine develops technological at the current rate...

After all, Ukrainian drones have defeated the Russian navy. Ukrainian drones have also changed Russian battlefield tactics likely forever and wiped out armor and Russia's most highly-skilled special forces. And it is literally blowing up Russia's energy production capacity on a daily basis while also making Russia's hold on Crimea pointless.

So there may come a day where Trump becomes far less of a factor than he believes he should be.

Meanwhile, the Russian citizenry is likely in for a serious wake-up call—and even waiting in gas lines with your car turned off for hours on end is a trial (and yes, hey, I remember this from the gas crisis in the US back when I was a kid).

And finally, Russia is facing not only an upswelling of anger in states under its influence, but a couple hundred insanely brave students actually staged an open protest in… St. Petersburg.

God help these children. Their bravery cannot be underestimated.

Check it out here:

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-protest-st-petersburg-russia-songs-swan-lake-b2847091.html

And no, do not expect this to explode into protests across the country. Too many Russians are cowed—and too many actually support the state (even if they do not want to go to fight themselves). That said, Putin has been forced to effectively mobilize Russian reservists, which is a last-ditch move to avoid another general mobilization.

Things are getting sticky.

Which, yes, means Ukraine can still win this.

But this does not negate the realities of Russia’s continued grind forward. So let’s begin with a “view from space” on the maps.

The first map may seem similar to the map that is typically broadcast with stats indicating that Russia has approximately taken or is holding some 19-20 percent of Ukraine.

That map has changed over time, but here I will not go back to pull maps from 2024. Instead, note the blue marks that roughly indicate the Ukrainian fortress line (although I also noted where Ukraine must eventually stop a hard Russian push toward Zaporizhzhia in the south. Note the blue “dots” between that fortress line and Russian lines. This is territory that is in jeopardy, and which will be increasingly difficult to hold.

Now let’s start at the northern end of that thin blue line in Kupiansk.

Vicious battles in Kupiansk and the “Kupiansk front pocket”

Back during the aforementioned “lights out” episode in Kursk I noted that this would doom both Pokrovsk and Kupiansk. Pokrovsk is still, unbelievably holding out, although it more than two-third’s surrounded.

A glance at the map may fool the casual observer into thinking that Kupiansk is better off, but unfortunately that is not the case.

First, a moon-eyed view of Kupiansk to Borova. Again everything between the blue line and Russian-controlled territory is generally in jeopardy (and for example, it is generally confirmed that battles are already taking place on the edge of Kostiatynivka).

Next a closer look at Kupiansk:

As can be seen above, a very large pocket is forming, and while he eventual water barrier of the Oskil will be difficult for Russia south of Kupiansk, it poses a barrier to retreat. Meanwhile, north of Kupiansk Russian forces have made there play--and it is a frightening reality to observe.

Note that everything to the east of the water way has essentially become a pocket. Also note that the Ukrainians simply will not allow Russia to take the tiny, wiped out village of Synkivka, which is remarkable, as this has been fought over for some 18 months. On a down note, even though I did not highlight this--note the Russian prong from the east and push from the northeast toward Pischane. There are reliable reports that Russia is already knocking on the door here, with some Russian bloggers stating that the settlement has been taken. Bearing the above in mind, we may see Ukrainian troops pull back to the Oskil sooner than later.

This is particularly a likelihood due to the state of Kupiansk itself. See the map below:

A glance at the red zones and the official DeepstateUA markings from Oct. 18 are not as distressing as the gray areas, which should be understood to be highly disputed. Geo-location, as well as multiple blog sources on all sides indicate that fighting is taking place in the center of the city, but indeed well west of Kupiansk, and that the key crossroads in the center, as well as the supply road that leads in from the west and then veers north into the city are impassable. This does not bode well for Ukrainians in the pocket, and I have circled and marked key settlements in that area.

Now with wet weather there are two more factors at play. First, Ukrainian troops can better move despite Russian drone coverage, but Russian troops, which have long worked out moving in small groups to slip past Ukrainian defense, can as well.

As of Oct. 19, Kupiansk was not yet lost. It was, however, highly compromised, and despite statements from the Ukrainian general staff that the Russian summer offensive had failed and was basically over... in real time this offensive has moved well into the fall, and the consequences are dire.

Again, consider the map south of Kupiansk all the way to Kostiatynivka (below). Borova is under pressure, as is Lyman and Kostiatynivka is reportedly fighting for its life. These areas for the most part are too large to be considered immediate pockets (although the Kupiansk pocket should be considered as such), but the outlook is simply not good.

 Russia goes all in (again) at Pokrovsk...

Now let's jump down to the other end of the "fortress line," this being Pokrovsk in the south. As a review, there is that line from the Lyman front to the Pokrovsk pocket, as of Oct. 17.

Here there is a first factor to consider: the Ukrainians are using Pokrovsk to drain the Russians, who in absolute manic fashion continue to throw everything they have at a former logistics hub that is now beyond compromised. No matter, columns of Russian armor have been destroyed again and again. As have soldiers on quads, foot soldiers, supply trucks.

Frankly speaking, it's kind of amazing to see. From a distance, obviously.

That said, Russians continue to slip past Ukrainian positions in small groups of two-to-four , and fighting has been reported in the middle of the city, as well as just about everyone else. That said, a closer look at the city is worth a gander.

First, north of Pokrovsk are the remnants of the much-ballyhooed Russian breakthrough that have been cut off and for the most part utterly smashed by Ukrainian Azov forces. Remember back when Yours Truly stated that while the Russian breakthrough was bad news, it would take weeks to shake out. Well, weeks have passed, and the shaking has been bad for Russian infantry on the ground. Catastrophically bad, as anywhere from 3,000 to 5,000 troops have likely been lost in the sector shown below (if not more).

As of Oct. 18, there were still Russians somehow holding on in those pockets (marked by red "x's"), and there have been varied attempts by the Russians to force themselves back into the picture here. These have not been successful, and in short, this can be billed as a Ukrainian victory that has again proven the difficulties faced by both sides now that drone warfare has taken precedence in battle.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has also, somehow, prevented Russian forces from taking Myrnohrad. Although some Russian bloggers have attempted to state the opposite, the town remains a thorn in Russia's side (although nothing yet rivals the legendary hovel of Synkivka near Kupiansk. This can be seen below:

This is not to say that Ukrainian forces have not taken heavy casualties. Indeed, drone targeting goes both ways, and here the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion and 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion are making their presence felt. Likewise, the intensity of attacks north of Pokrovsk are undoubtedly influencing drives from the south into the city, which are seen below:

Those grey areas indeed may already be under Russian control. And to reveal the dynamics of the situation, the map above is from Oct. 17. The map below is from today (Oct. 20):

Or better yet, a side-by-side comparison (left Oct. 17, right Oct. 20):

Now before panic sets in, keep in mind that, despite drones and glide bombs, this war remains dynamic. And the Ukrainians have proven (despite a lack of adequate international support) that they are incredible defenders. And yes, Russia is running short of men and fuel (although glide bomb attacks have all but tripled over the past week).

In conclusion...

Now what does the above actually mean in the big picture? In conclusion... there still is no conclusion. Nobody is actually telling the truth, whether this be the pro-Ukrainian side stating that the Russian economy will implode tomorrow (it's in trouble, but it's not over yet) or Ukrainian Chief of Staff Oleksander Syrskyi stating that the Russian offensive is essentially over (it's not--and developments toward Zaporizhzhia will be covered in the next update, which are simply not good). Neither are the Trumpians telling the truth when quoting hundreds of billions of aid supplied under Biden (even up to now the total--which certainly did not all go to weapons or even to Ukraine likely is in the USD 125 bln range and not USD 300 bln under Biden alone--and there are very credible sources that would put the figure as low as USD 67 bln ), but you can check out the USD 125 bln figure here: https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-us-aid-going-ukraine

And no, Tomahawks are not on the way. That was never really in the cards. But they were not going to change the war overnight either (although they would have helped).

Still, despite all of the fibbing noted above, remember one very important truth (well, maybe more than one):

Russia is lying about everything.

Every...

Damned...

Thing.

Also, Putin will not live forever.

And finally, it may not be the victory Ukrainians dream of. And yes, there are parts of Ukraine that may never be regained.

But Ukraine can still win this.

Slava Ukrainii.

And yeah, I've tried for years to remain as objective as possible, but...

Russia is a terrorist state.