The Ukrainian War Update/Primer 2 (and more) for April 26, 2024
Yes, this has been a big week, and no, you probably do not need to be told the No. 1 story on the minds of anyone following the war in Ukraine is that yes, the money is finally coming—or actually the weapons are finally coming.
Of this, approximately USD 1 bln worth should be there in days, but we’ll get to that, as there is much to absorb, much to celebrate, but yes, as always, there are questions… and the current realities on the ground, which are worriedly changing fast.
But first—this is going to be quite a long update. Frankly, there have been massive amounts of information to absorb, massive amounts of fact to separate from fiction, hope to divest from despair, reality from fantasy, etc.
So here is a teaser of what is in store:
1) Spy news
2) US aid to Ukraine
3) European aid to Ukraine
4) The front line update
Yes, it’s a lot. And not all of it is positive, but there is a change in the wind that goes beyond the US aid package. But first, spy news, as early April has been all but notorious.
Spy news--i.e. the EU has had enough…
It’s election time in Bulgaria (as generally speaking, it almost always is), and whether we are talking elections in Central Europe, the Old EU or the US, there are invariably questions of Russian meddling. Considering that Bulgarian parliamentary elections generally, chronically and all-but-unavoidably create concerns with no outside help whatsoever, a bit of extra Russian spice thrown in the mix is likely to burn.
And European Parliament has noticed, specifically calling out Russia for election interference late on Wednesday, April 24, when it passed a motion also condemning Russian interference in European elections, stating that it “firmly denounces all attempts, especially by the Russian Federation, to undermine the functioning of European democratic processes and stresses that these tactics must be met with consequences; calls on the political leadership of the EU and its Member States to finally address these Russian efforts with the necessary sense of urgency and resolve; reiterates its call on the Member States to further develop and fine-tune the sanctions packages adopted against the Russian Federation to more effectively limit its ability to wage its war of aggression and to close loopholes in the enforcement of the restrictive measures currently in force; reiterates its call to introduce a sanctions regime against perpetrators engaging in malign foreign information manipulation and interference…”
But that’s not all, folks, and any of you critics thinking that Yours Truly gets into conspiracy theory mode, well, there is a long list of specific points noted officially in the motion, which include:
· That Russia has “systematically maintained contacts with far-right and far-left parties, and other personalities and movements to gain support from institutional actors within the Union in order to legitimise its illegal and criminal actions” and that MEP Miroslav Radačovský was “paid by Russian sources to observe the parliamentary elections in Russia in 2021;”
- That Hungarian Fidesz party has been spreading pro-Kremlin messages and propaganda;
- That “certain MEPs and candidates in the upcoming European elections have received payment from the Russian Government or its proxies to spread propaganda and disinformation and to influence the elections to the European Parliament in various European countries;”
- That in late March a “pro-Russian network” was uncovered that was “attempting to conduct influence operations with implications for Czechia and the EU, via the Prague-based ‘Voice of Europe’ news site;”
- That “the Czech foreign ministry announced that it had sanctioned Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, for running a Russian influence operation from Czech territory using this news site, along with a middleman called Artem Marchevsky;”
· That in late March “Poland’s Internal Security Agency announced that it had conducted searches as part of a collaborative investigation with other European security services into alleged Russian espionage linked to ‘Voice of Europe’, recovering large sums of cash and leading to charges against a Polish citizen suspected of Russian espionage; whereas according to the Internal Security Agency, this individual is believed to have been embedded within Polish and EU parliamentary circles, carrying out tasks commissioned and financed by counterparts from Russian intelligence;”
- That also in late March “Austrian authorities arrested a former Austrian intelligence officer on multiple charges, including allegedly providing mobile phone data of former high-ranking Austrian officials to Russian intelligence, involvement in planning a burglary at a prominent journalist’s apartment, and drafting ‘suggestions for improvement’ following a Russian-ordered killing in Germany; whereas the arrested former Austrian intelligence officer was in close contact with far-right politicians from the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in the country’s parliament and government;”
- That on “16 April 2024 media reports circulated that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had questioned German MEP Maximilian Krah, the lead candidate of Alternative for Germany (AfD) for the European elections and member of Parliament’s Committee on International Trade and Subcommittee on Security and Defence, last December in New York over suspicions that he was receiving money from Kremlin agents” and that “Krah had been arrested on suspicions of spying for China, showing a pattern of cooperation with malign foreign actors seeking to undermine European democratic values and processes;”
- That on “18 April 2024, the German authorities arrested two suspected saboteurs in the German state of Bavaria who were allegedly spying on military installations for possible bomb or arson attacks on behalf of a Russian intelligence service, allegedly to sabotage German support for Ukraine in the war against Russia; whereas the arrests indicate that Russia’s secret services are evidently entering new dimensions, which include attacks on military facilities, in addition to disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;”
- That a “Czech media outlet claims that the Czech secret services have audio recordings confirming the payment of money of Russian origin to Petr Bystron, a candidate for the European elections, member of the German Bundestag and foreign policy officer for AfD; whereas according to German newspaper Der Spiegel, the money was handed over either in cash at covert meetings in Prague or via cryptocurrency;”
- That a “vast disinformation campaign” titled “Portal Combat” has been at work disseminating pro-Russian information and that the “Stars of David found painted in several locations in Paris were part of a destabilisation operation tied to a pro-Russian businessman from Moldova;”
- That there is “credible evidence” that “in 2020, Peter Pelligrini, then Prime Minister of Slovakia, requested the help of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to obtain support from the Kremlin ahead of Slovakia’s 2020 parliamentary election…”
Etc., etc.
In short, as this investigator has been trying to tell you for years…
You just can’t make this sh__ up.
The US aid package… and still more intrigue
Now on to billions for Ukraine. Approximately USD 61 bln, in fact, as this is the portion of a USD 95 bln aid package meant for Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel that was passed by the Senate and sent to US President Joe Biden, who immediately signed. This bill also came down hard on Tik Tok, basically forcing a sale and also it “effectively legalized” the selling off of the assets of Russian oligarchs, due to the war.
For Ukrainians in dire need of weapons and ammunition—and for US Democrats, Biden and centrist Republicans—that’s the good news.
And in fact, there is more good news. Approximately, US 1 bln in ammunition and weapons is basically already nearby and ready to truck (think Poland and Germany). Said ammunition, weapons and armour cannot come too soon.
Now for the bad news: it’s arguably too late to “win” the war by retaking all lost Ukrainian ground. Russia has fully mobilized and it is clearly attempting to take as much ground as possible across all fronts before said aid can reach Ukraine and even up the odds. This is especially true at Avdiivka, but more on that in a moment.
But now for the good news (and yet still more intrigue).
Somehow there was a bit of a jump start on aid, with now Reuters having confirmed that key, long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS) had already been delivered and used (and it appears at least twice) in the war. This is intriguing for a number of reasons. The 300-km range o ATACMs mean the Ukrainians will be able to hit just about any target necessary in occupied Ukraine—and finally Ukraine will have it’s own tit-for-tat answer to Russian glide bombs (which, as opposed to Ukraine have been also used against civilian targets).
Whether or not Biden will catch flak for having effectively jumped the gun is a question for the future. Is this important? Maybe, as that USD 61 bln is going to go fast, but we’ll discuss that momentarily.
Which brings us back to the US mechanics of the bill. Yes, Ukraine aid passed, but this was not without a bitter fight within the US Republican Party, which has seen a right-wing group of Republicans—who bizarrely have completely forgotten Republican Party Icon, the late President Ronald Reagan, and who have promised to ouster Republican Speaker Mike Johnson for engineering the deal. (Curiously, former President and troubled candidate Donald Trump may have heard some sharp words from some traditional conservative donors, as at the last minute he appeared to back Johnson, generally, but also when the heat was on.
But what does this mean? Again, this means that there is certainly no guarantee of further rounds of aid once this USD 61 bln is burned up. Moreover, while pundits favouring the Democratic Party may be correct in blaming a hard-right Republican faction in holding up aid, that ignores the long-running problem on the US’s southern border and the unwillingness of much of the party to take this seriously.
Yep, I said it. Democrats can be culpable too.
Which will bring the question of aid packages back around soon. Very soon. For ammo and missiles will burn up fast. And this war is not going to end soon. Some have estimated it will last one year.
Some have estimated it will last two years.
An estimate from the crystal ball of Yours Truly? Russia has geared up, committed fully and the China factor is real. So three years minimum.
But more likely… There will be eventually a hot stalemate. So five or more.
If the military aid packages do not stop, that is. If the US economy does not crash. If the Trump-Biden election…
Ugh. Too many ifs. But take Donetsk as a precedent. And keep in mind that that part of the conflict began… in 2014.
The ammo question, intrigue in the halls of Brussels… and European aid
Little birdies have chirped and flown for more than a month. Some of this came against the background of the failed European promise to deliver 1 mln rounds of ammunition to Ukraine in 2023. Europe missed that mark. And it missed the extended mark of March 2024.
In fact, it really has not come close. Then, as previously mentioned on the blog, Czech President Petr Pavel drummed up support to gain support for ammunition and source it from… somewhere. By March 7, 2023 that plan, which was slated to provide 800,000 shells, was “fully funded.”
Great. But oddly, the shells may have been delivered, may not have been delivered or may simply still be on the way. The last is more correct, as even the Czechs have said that the shells will be delivered… by the end of the year.
Which (and not knocking the Czechs) is the kind of statement that the Ukrainians have seen a lot of. But in fact, a revealing statement by Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur March 24, as quoted by the Estonian news outlet Postimees, noted something even more revealing, in that Pevkur highlighted that the shells were “actually available”—although European press has claimed that the primary reason behind the shell shortage is that they are not. Meanwhile, Postimees’ sources noted that one million shells and Grad rockets have “been found,” and that this “package” would cost EUR 2-3 bln. And they are trying to raise money.
Yet there is an upside—and yes, changes in the wind: back in early March French President Emmanuel Macron seemed to catch the entire world off guard and suggest that Western troops could eventually fight in Ukraine. This appeared at first to be the type of unilateral, loose-cannon statement that does sometimes burst out of French politics, with Macron suddenly flipping his long-time stance of finding a diplomatic solution with Russia and telling Europe to… stop being cowards. But what caused the flip? While there has been much talk of “hybrid attacks” on France (think political meddling, propaganda, bots, etc.), much goes back to economics and influence. France has been taking a beating in Africa. The illusion that French companies (or any Western companies) will be able to continue to function, make money and suck that money out of Russia as profit is coming to and end.
And maybe Trump will be elected and Europe will suddenly be on its own.
And simply put, the rumours are that while Macron may have been the most vocal… he’s not the only one who has been doing some serious thinking. Still, the rumours have also been that MEP types were waiting to see if the US aid package came through. After all, bandwagons are easier to explain to voters.
But this means that suddenly Europe may finally be getting serious. For apart from the US 61 bln, Europe did agree in early March that it had allocated EUR 5 bln in military aid—and there is finally a believable time-line for F-16s coming out of Denmark and Holland (at least when it comes to the former, with Denmark stating that this would happen in the second quarter of 2024). Which, in fact, when it comes to Denmark’s F-16s, means this summer. In the meantime, the UK has suddenly (once again) come to Ukraine’s aid with a GBP 500 mln injection that should include 400 vehicle and four million rounds of ammunition.
That the above has come concurrent with the MEP condemnation noted above—and at the same time that Polish President Andrzej Duda has said that Poland is willing to host nuclear weapons—simply is no coincidence.
But when it comes to Germany?
Still lagging. Decidedly so.
And when it comes to the German Leopard tank question. Too little, too late.
But there is a final twist that indicates not just the Germans moved far too slowly. At the time when the US was pressing for the Ukrainian 2023 offensive to attack with heavy troop concentrations and armour (but without air cover) vaunted Abrams tanks were still not on the scene. True, there were only 30 on the way, but the complexities surrounding them—and also their advantages—meant that training was not simple. Now it appears that the 10 Abrams that were actually seeing service have been pulled back from combat. Why?
They are very heavy. And very visible. And war has changed.
Which means, once again, that drones are a real problem.
Which also should be a lesson for the allies. If aid is coming, it needs to come quick. Even top-of-the-line weapons may be out of date tomorrow. And at any rate, if there was actually ever an opportunity to make a “tank run” against Russian forces in Ukraine, it would seem that this window has passed.
The front lines…
What the above means is that Ukrainian soldiers have reason to celebrate. They have likely been outgunned at a ratio of 10-1, and the counteroffensive of 2023 has become a dig-in and hold-as-long-as-possible defense, which has not gone well.
Yet manpower is an issue. Ukraine has now issued a directive to consulates abroad to stop providing services to Ukrainian men of combat age. Which means that yes, they will start getting deported. And at least Poland and Lithuania appear to be set to stop allowing (or to start the deregistration) of citizen services, such as health benefits, work permits, etc. for identified Ukrainians of combat age in both countries. In other words… passive encouragement.
This means no health services, no Possibly, this will bolster the lines. Possibly.
But let’s have a quick look at the here and now. Much has changed since even the past primer/update, and no, it’s not good, when it comes to the key front lines in Ukraine.
Kherson and Zaporizhzhia…
Nothing of note is happening on the Kherson front apart from possible Wagner or former-Wagner sightings at Krynki, which may or may not be true. In the meantime, hope of a breakthrough is long gone, as resupply and evacuation must be undertaken, as has been the case from the start, by the use of small boats under the cover of bad weather or night. Now it’s mostly going to be limited to night. God help the Ukrainians at Krynki or in the river islands there. This sounds awful… and it is.
Meanwhile, the battle for Robotyne on the Zaporizhzhia front has changed since even the last update. Please note the previous map below:
Now have a glance at a map from Robotyne from April 25 (courtesy, DeepState UA). Russian forces have made a dent (or are attempting too) north of Novoprokopivka. They are also pushing from the direction of Verbove. These are not big changes, but unofficial maps indicate that the push up from Novoprokopivka has gone deeper than what is shown below. That said, this puts the Russians in the same no-man's land of death that has slowed the Ukrainians since last summer.
Again, there was a time when Ukrainian armour (read Bradleys and Challengers) threatened o drive into Verbove and then turn the corner and head for Tomak. Today, as seen below, Tokmak has been well-reinforced and it seems a million kilometers away.
Zaporizhzhia/Staromayorske
This front has changed little, although Russian probing attacks are increasing. [Generally, there is the sense that Russia is attempting to make gains as quickly as possible—that is before US weapons and ammunition arrives.] The greyish pink area is seen as contested. The Ukrainians are on the defensive, and anything within the actual town of Staromayorske or Urozhaine has long been flattened. At this time the Ukrainian drive toward Zavitne Bazhannia and through Urozhaine is all but ancient history.
Below is the previous map.
The map from April 25.
South of Avdiivka
The above maps do not indicate major changes. Yet, the closer to Avdiivka, the more intense the fighting. Intense shelling has taken place at Vulhedar, which may be an attempt to soften up Ukrainians prior to a major attack, and Staromykhailivka has seen hard fighting with Russian forces (likely the 10th Tank Regiment) pushing out of the settlement and south of local waterways toward Konstiatynivka. Russian attacks have also intensified at Heorivka and Krasnohorivka.
Previous map:
Current map:
Donetsk Avdiivka front
There was perhaps some hope after Avdiivka fell (the retreat took place officially on Feb. 17) that the Russian would settle in to regroup. This has not been the case—and it probably should never have been believed, as Avdiivka (unlike Bakhmut) has been seen as a strategic key to the region. In fact, ever since the pullout Russian forces have pushed from the south to the north, and troops have continued to flood in. A glance at that map reveals a higher concentration of “diamonds,” which signify regiments, brigades, battalions or divisions on Deepstate UA maps. Generally speaking, a Russian Battalion has 700 men, 10 tanks and 40 vehicles. A Russian regiment may comprise up to six battalions. And a Russian brigade may comprise of two to eight regiments—and may run as large as 8000 troops. A division may run from 12,000 to 24,000 troops. As of April 25, Deep State UA maps documented in Avdiivka no less than:
· 11 brigades
· Eight regiments
· Five battalions
· Two divisions
True, it is difficult to say, for example, if these are two full divisions, and exactly how many personnel they comprise, but to say the Ukrainians are outgunned and outnumbered here is a vast form of understatement.
That said, nothing is fair in love and war, and the Avdiivka front has gone from emergency (but smart) pullout to hold-the-line to cause-for-worry to dammit-this-is-a-problem fast.
First, below is the Avdiivka front from the last update.
This is the Avdiivka front as of yesterday (April 25, 2024).
Yes, the arrows represent Russian advances, but the primary cause for alarm comes from the sharp jab in the north at Ocheretyne, where Russian forces, reportedly backed by former Wagners, are not only pushing forward fast but threatening a true breakout. This is in spite of the fact that stemming the tide on the Avdiivka front is and has been a prime focus for the Ukrainian General Staff.
At present, multiple unconfirmed reports now state that Ocheretyne has in fact all but fallen, and that Soloviove is gone. Worse, this places Ukrainian defenders to the south at great risk (more on that in a moment) and still worse, the 20-some-kilometers of territory between the battles at Ocheretyne and the key Ukrainian headquarters/logistics hub of Pokrovsk are allegedly undefended or weekly defended.
In fact, the collapse at Ocheretyne should never have happened, as it had previously been bolstered by the battle-hardened Ukrainian 47th Mechanized Brigade… until it wasn’t.
Some may remember the past weeks’ reports of how front-line units have been fighting without a break for two years—and how plans to pull such units off the line for a much needed break were not included in new legislation to lower the Ukrainian draft age to 25. This was controversial within the Ukrainian armed forces and without, but at the time the Ukrainian chief-of-staff, Gen. Oleksandr Syrski alluded to the ability to “rotate” soldiers off of the line, which implied that troop weariness was under control.
Well, there are politics and there is reality. For as soon as the 47th was rotated out, the Russians struck and struck hard. And they have been on the move ever since.
And no, the 47th did not get a much needed break, as it was forced to immediately reverse course to try to stop the Russian juggernaut that is practically a full Russian army group when regiments, brigades and divisions in the sector are counted as one. Add to this a far more coordinated use of artillery, drones and now glide bombs, which are being used to blast defenders prior to attacks, plus the return of elite Wagner units, and the fight is difficult indeed.
And if you don’t believe Yours Truly, check out the Forbes article here (which should be considered remarkably incisive war journalism, btw):
Yet even within the bad news the bravery is remarkable. Somehow the Ukrainians long held on to Berdychi, despite intense pressure there and in the pocket just below (in the pocket that can be seen between Ocheretyne to Umanske). According to Deepstate UA mapping, Berdychi has likely already fallen, but Russian progress there remains stumped.
Those who have followed the blog and previous vlogcasts will know that Yours Truly cast Berdychi as an incredibly important settlement for months, as a collapse there would have cut off supply lines into Avdiivka back when it was still in Ukrainian hands. The Ukrainians continued to hold the “Berdychi axis” despite the fact that yes, the Russians clearly also understood its importance, and they continued to hold it as of press time.
Donetsk/Bakhmut
More hard fighting—and Russian advances (or attempts to advance) are taking place at the Bakhmut front. South of Bakhmut, Russian brigades are still attempting to overrun the Ukrainians at Klischiivka, and the Ukrainians there are still somehow holding on. The true focus now, however, appears to be at Chasi Yar, further to the north, and Syrski has stated that he believes Putin has given his generals a deadline to take that town by May 9.
Kupiansk/Kharkiv
Fighting has reportedly resumed in earnest at Synkiivka on the Kupiansk front, but Russian progress is not known. There ae signs that in this sector the Ukrainians dug in fast and hard and it will be difficult to get them out. Kharkiv, which has been surmised to be the real target of a massive offensive in May continues to be hit by glide bombs in what appears to be a concerted effort to terrorize the civilian population into abandoning what is Ukraine’s second-largest city.
Of course, there is another word for this: genocide. But we’ve said that before.
Final realities…
News that the USD 61 bln aid package finally passed appears indeed to have driven Russia into full, desperate offensive mode. And on many fronts Russia is gaining ground. That said, this rush to gain ground also comes at a cost. First, Ukrainian official estimates now put Russian losses at 462,980, and despite Ukrainian retreats, anecdotal reports indicate that losses continue to be extreme. Officially, they also include more than 7,000 tanks and close to 14,000 armoured vehicles. But also they include close to 12,000 artillery systems and close to 16,000 other vehicles.
This last stat is highly important. Russia has long shown difficulties moving forward, and Ukrainian counter attacks over the past few days have hit flanks and targeted the close-support logistics that Russia needs. While Russian advances are dangerous (far beyond being merely unsettling) it is quite possible that so many advances along so many fronts will leave infantry highly vulnerable, especially as US HIMARS artillery will soon again be a factor. That first USD 1 bln tranche is basically already hitting the field. Another USD 6 bln tranche is moving. No doubt that the next 10 days will be critical, and a Kharkiv offensive sometime in the next weeks could change the war. That said, The Corners sources believe that Russia simply cannot make a serious run at Kharkiv, and Yours Truly is betting on the Russian forces running out of steam—and a failure to drive for Pokrovsk at Avdiivka becoming evident by the end of next week, with this matched by Ukrainian stiffened resistance blunting the Russian attempt to take Chasiv Yar.
Or so we hope.
US President Joe Biden/Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy file photo from 2023 courtesy of Wikimedia Commons/usembassykyiv, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.
French President Emmanuel Macron photo Agência Senado from Brasilia, Brazil, CC BY 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
All maps courtesy of DeepState UA.