The Ukrainian War Update/primer for July 10, 2024

As readers are by now well aware, it’s been some time since we’ve released a Ukrainian War Update, which means this week’s version may be more than a bit jarring with regard to Russian gains, our predictions and the current realities on the ground.

It is what it is. Which is genocide.

There, I’ve said it again. Civilian targets continue to be hit. With premeditiation. And no, Russia has no argument with regard to the children’s hospital strike on a day that killed at least 42, injured more than 60 in missile strikes around the country.

This strike will play heavily during this weeks NATO summit—which also coincides with the 75-year anniversary of the organization—and expected is at least another round of aid (some USD 43 bln), with more Patriot air defense systems having been noted in prelim press statements that four more Patriot missile systems have been allocated, and a host of other air defense systems are on the way. Also a chief topic will be NATO membership for Ukraine. Or “a path to it.” This is… sticky. Immediate membership means NATO is at war with Russia. Directly. Statements akin to “Ukraine will be able to join after the war—in part due to current corruption worries” play directly into Russia’s hands. In other words, why end the war (which Russia is currently winning) when 1) this means Ukraine joints NATO and 2) Russia is a) now on a complete war footing b) is producing obscene amounts of artillery shells and other ammunition c) has the support of China and North Korea d) has the support in terms of a monstrously large buyer of Russian oil in India and e) cannot really reverse the war footing economy without facing the music and possibly risking a sharp (and in Russia sharp means sharp) economic downturn that would threaten the powers that be.

As in Putin himself.

Then there are the US elections and the very varied opinions on Ukraine within NATO (which are more varied than one might think).

And, for that matter, within the EU.

But with regard to NATO partners, the Canada discussions will be important to watch. NATO leaders will put pressure on that country to come up with funds for the war—as will a vocal Ukrainian minority. In fact, it will pressure Canada to simply hit the 2 percent GDP allocation, which it is supposed to hit, in order to be a member of NATO. We’ll see.

That said, the general buzz does not bode well for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Expect platitudes and vague statements from NATO (but with a bit of cash). Sure we are hoping for a surprise here, but don’t expect it.

But enough politics. Let’s start in the south.

(One quick point--as seen by the intro map, there are noticeable differences from May in that now the Kharkiv front is featured. More on that in a moment. )

Now... Kherson/Krynki.

Kherson/Krynki

The Kherson front—primarily due to the natural barrier of a river and islands that have been routinely fortified with (in the past) Ukrainian special forces—has recorded perhaps the least amount of real change since our last update (May 2, 2024), and at that time Kherson and Krynky was not even featured due to little changes there. Although Russia went all out in assaults from Krynki in Kherson to Robotyne on the Zaporizhzhia front all the way up to Staromayorske, Russian gains have been perhaps less than expected.

In fact at Krynky—despite a month having gone by—map results are much the same. There in fact has been very little news with regard to the Krynky foothold, which at one time began as a somewhat promising diversion to the primary Ukrainian counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia (almost a year ago to this day), but then later became a stubborn holdout that drew Russian ire, drones, missiles and assaults to the point that the fact that anyone could survive there was staggering indeed. Voices of dissent claimed that the foothold long ago became “hell,” with it often becoming near impossible to relieve or resupply soldiers there. This may also have contributed to rumblings of anger with regard to military leadership. At present, if the current Deepstate UA map is to be trusted (and generally it is), there are still Ukrainian fighters there somehow holding on. This may well be true. What is known is that the islands still do harbor pockets of Ukrainian resistance—and the odd raid is also launched from these same islands.

Those that want a deeper read on Krynky, Ukrainian morale and apparently an eight-month survivor still fighting there (at least at the end of June) should check out this story by the BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjerdw9g159o

An interesting explanation with regard to Russia’s inability to push defenders out of the tiny strip of land that is the Krynky foothold—and to generally hit Ukrainian targets also in Kherson--may well be a combination of Krynky due to a combination of Ukrainian artillery that has better range than does Russian artillery and the diference in elevation height on the banks of the river. But we would rather credit that to Ukrainian doggedness (whether or not Krynky continues to make sense).

 

Zaporizhzhia/Robotyne

Long gone are the days where the Ukrainians had the upper hand—and where they forced drives through the absolutely flattened western edge of Robotyne to attempt to take Novoprokopivka while also threatening to round the edge of defense lines at Verbove (with mobile armour even) and then drive south in what was long known to have been the major focus of the Ukrainian counter offensive last year.

Such was the goal. But again, we must quickly digress, as in hindsight that counteroffensive and the odds of it succeeding does seem more and more far-fetched. Not only were Russian defenses and mine fields very well-prepared, and not only was Ukrainian air superiority non-existent—and not only did Ukraine severely lack adequate tank numbers, but arguably western tanks were indeed (and are) all wrong for Ukrainian needs.

But don’t just trust Yours Truly. Check out the link here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mt5eTXTaBUI

(Yes, it’s The Sun, but this is a good, succinct interview with an expert—it’s worth a listen).

But back to Robotyne. Remarkably on that western edge not much has changed—a credit to the tenacity of Ukrainian forces now gone over to defense (especially since that edge and supply line has been blasted for a year by Russian positions not only to the south but also to the west--and from everywhere, really. Yet the Verbove salient—if it could ever be called that—is long gone—and Russian brigades are pushing hard from multiple directions. Note the “fire circles.” These are a relatively new addition to Deep State UA maps, and although they are only indicative (fire is fire, and it moves with the wind), said fires may in a fashion reveal the focus of Russian attacks, whether by drown, rocket or artillery. Assuming that Ukrainian holdouts are indeed in those locations, the lack of Russian progress at the key focus point north of Novoprokopivka is understandable. Likewise, it is assumed that last year’s offensive buildup did leave at least the Zaporizhzhia fighters somewhat better supplied than in other locations of the many fronts, and a threat of a Russian breakthrough here is not seen as high (although there is always risk that such pockets of resistance could be eventually cut off).

Map as of May 2:

Current map of Robotyne:

Closer current map (July 9) of Robotyne/Verbove:

Staromayorske

At a distance the Pryiutne-Staromayorske front would not seem to have changed a great deal (seen below).

That said, a closer look at Staromayorske notes that the hard fought gains seen last year are long gone, as was the tiny dream of driving for Zavitne Bazhannia, with the exception of resistance at Urozhaine, which fairly defines what is left of all gains made last summer. Again, there may be indications of at least remnants of better-trained Ukrainian forces and better supplies, as there is little indication that Russia can weed the Ukrainians out of these footholds at this time. That said, Russian forces appear to be advancing at incremental levels to the northwest of Staromayorske, and over time the Urozhaine salient will become more and more difficult to hold.

Current Staromayorske front map:

Staromayorske-Urozhaine map:

Avdiivka front

From Vulhedar to Marinka up to the lower edge of the Avdiivka section of the front has seen consistent Russian activity, but few gains. This is seen below.

That said, the Avdiivka section itself has seen massive changes since the now infamous Ukrainian rotation mistake at Ocheretyne. This has since led to (relatively) massive gains that have long left key defense points such as Pervomaiske in the south and Berdychi behind. Now Russian forces appear to be probing hard at Karlivka in the south and Russian forces have also attempted to drive west from Umanske and souh from Novoselivka to create a new pocket that will be difficult for Ukraine to defend over the next weeks. Further north, Russian forces have consistently attempted to make gains at Novooleksandrivka.

The current Russian goal here appears to be the key logistics center of Pokrovsk, which could cripple supply lines further north. This will be shown in more detail shortly.

Directly north of Avdiivka another worrying development has taken place at Niu York, with Russian forces driving north from there at the same time that they are aggressively targeting the town of Toretsk. Russian sources have claimed that Russian forces are at the edge of the city. This creates a small pocket that may well endanger Ukrainian defenders there, although nothing is known with regard to numbers or the status in that location of Ukrainian defense.

Bakhmut/Chasiv Yar

Interestingly—and again the trend is visible when it comes to past Ukrainian localized advances still holding out—south of Bakhmut at Klishiivka and Andriivka, Ukrainian forces have been holding fast—despite pressure from the Russian 83^rd Air Assault Brigade.

That is the good news. But the bad news on the Bakhmut front is similar to regard to that seen at Avdiivka. With regard to Bakhmut, hat city has long been occupied by Russia, despite two years of back and forth in what was once termed as an inconsequential city with regard to strategy. Yet strategy changes with losses and gains, and Russia may have been playing the long game with Russian President Vladmir Putin supposedly having had ordered the taking of Chasiv Yar months ago. News that Ukrainian forces had pulled out of part of the city under heavy artillery and massive glide-bomb attacks is foreboding, with Ukrainian commanders simply stating that there is nothing left to hide behind and said glide bombs have flattened areas to the point that they could not longer be defended.

This likely means that Russian forces will target the key cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. It should also be said that the combined push for Pokrovsk further south in linke with Kramatorsk and Sloviansk north are seen currently to be key threats to Ukraine over the next few months—and possibly far longer should Russia succeed.

Svatove

Almost a year ago, this writer pointed out that Russia had its eye on Borova in Svatove. At this point, Russia’s clear goals of targeting Ukrainian logistics points/key cities along a northern axis from Pokrovs to Kramatorsk, Sloviansk to Borova is clear. This—combined with Russia’s willingness to use troops, armor, artillery, etc., despite heavy losses to stretch Ukrainian resources—will be difficult to slow down, as there are still months of relatively dry “offensive” months left. Russia may well have difficulties putting together a major offensive drive, but a second breakthrough or additional breakthrough, for example, toward Pokrovsk or Kramatorsk is difficult to rule out.

Kupiansk

Little has changed at Kupiansk since the May update, with Russian forces unable to make significant gains, for example, at Synkivka.

Kharkiv

Correspondents for The Corners have long said that Kharkhiv could not be taken—and this appears to be the case. While Russia appears to be set on attempting to use glide bombs and artillery to push civilians out and create Putin’s buffer zone, sources have also noted that on the ground Russian troops have proven less vigorous than only a month or two past. In that sense, that offensive may have somewhat burned out. On another positive note, Ukrainian counterattacks have been noted to have been successful, with both Russian and Western sources noting that Ukraine has retaking Hlyboke, north of Kharkiv.

 

That’s that for today. Further updates planned for early next week, as the results or fallout of the NATO summit will then be known.

Slava Ukrainii and God bless.

 

All maps courtesy of Deepstate UA.