The Ukrainian War Update (and current primer)--April 15, 2024

Reader be warned: this round the news is generally all bad. Perhaps the Russians are indeed losing 1,000 personnel a day, but, as goes the mantra, an endless supply of men and ammunition has the Ukrainians on their heels.

 

Which is in part, undoubtedly, true. For the situation is dire. Just how dire is the question and this very level of "dire" is in fact the subject of this week’s Ukrainian War Report.

No more, no less. Again, reader be warned. This is not meant to be defeatist or anti-Ukrainian. If you take it this way, also be warned: I really don't want to hear it.

Instead take this report as a primer but also as a long list of reasons as to why the West needs to put up or shut up. Pretending the plight of Ukrainians cannot grow worse or even that the status quo will be somehow be maintained is at best... disingenuous. At worst, it is criminal, and there is plenty of culpability to go round.

But first,  Ukrainian politics and the shortage of troops. Much has been made of the Ukrainian government’s ratification of a new draft law that lowers the draft age to 25 from 27. Just how many bodies this will provide remains a mystery, however, as Ukraine keeps a tight reign on such information (as well as battlefield losses). Yet the answer is likely “not enough” as is evidenced by decision not to include a new measure that would have allowed long-term, front-line servers to finally rotate out for serious rest (if not out altogether). In short, despite the fact that some have served since the beginning of the war—and despite the commonly held belief that 15 months is about as long as front-line servers are likely to last (which is probably about 13 months longer than novice troops hitting the front line), relief is not happening now.

Then there is the question: just how many fresh troops are needed. At first, the number 500,000 was voiced, but then this number was mumbled down to… something also unknown. The facts of the matter are that 1) Ukrainians did not want a lowered draft age in the law even if they also do not want to cede Russia land (and certainly not the war) and 2) it is extremely difficult to believe that if a few hundred thousand troops were suddenly mustered to the front that Ukraine actually has the ability to provide weapons and kit for even half that number without long delayed US arms and cash.

And finally, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is under pressure on all sides—so much so that he actually did for the first time earlier this month concede that without "promised" USD 60 bln in aid (by the Biden administration, but not by Congress) Ukraine may actually lose the war.

Make no mistake, Ukrainians understand what this means. Bucha brought this reality home, and their have been Bucha incidents all over a sizeable portion of Ukraine. But possibly this has to a point finally hit home in the US…

Or somewhat. The Republican center has long supported a Ukrainian arms package, while more right-wing Republicans have wanted to tie arms to stopping the flood of immigrants on the southern border of the US. And then there are some that simply would like to stop supporting foreign wars altogether. Yet simultaneous with the realization that Donald Trump’s hard-to-believe statement that he could “end the war in a day” amounts to nothing but forcing Ukraine to capitulate and to give Russia pretty much whatever it wants there also came testimony by Gen. Christopher Cavoli, head of U.S. European Command, and Celeste Wallander, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, who stated that without aid Ukrainian will soon be outgunned 10-1—and in truth, have no real ability to defend itself.

Meanwhile, Russian glide bombs have pounded Ukrainian infrastructure, including destroying the Trypliska thermal power plant near Kyiv, and increasingly Kharkiv where many fear the next Russian offensive will come, is being targeted, with villages in the district already being evacuated under orders from the Ukrainian military.

Still, a glance at Ukraine as a whole would seem to imply that not much has changed over recent months.  Unfortunately, glances can be misleading. What follows are current updates and comparative maps, courtesy of DeepstateUA that tend to bring the seriousness of the current state of the war home.

But first a quick review…

The Ukrainian counteroffensive is generally agreed to have been launched in June 2023, although there was much discussion at the time, as the first moves appeared to be small forays or probing attacks. The Ukrainians gave it all they had, and this may well have resulted in 15,000 casualties per month, which jumped to possibly 25,000 in August.

It is now quite well known that Russian regiments south of Robotyne, as well as southeast of Staromayorske and in and around Avdiivka and Bakhmut. Yet little real ground was taken, and now in hindsight a glaring mistake appears to have been made in that the Ukrainians did not dig new trenches or fortify positions in the rear in case the counteroffensive fizzled out.

Of course, “fizzle” is not an aptly descriptive word. Russia has estimated vaguely equal numbers when it comes to Ukrainian casualties, which could be believable as armies on the attack do tend to lose more men. At any rate, as Ukrainians lost vehicles and burned through ammunition it became increasingly evident that more men were going to be hard to find—and that more money and arms could become scant indeed.

Flash forward to December 2023 and the offensive was deemed all but over, and rumors of a rift between Ukrainian’s president and Chief of Staff Valerii Zaluzhnyi were rife—with this having come from Zaluzhnyi’s statements regarding a “stalemate” and a need for more soldiers.

By February Zaluzhnyi was out, a forced and somewhat foggy evacuation of Avdiivka was under way—and there has been little good news since.

Which, with a bit of a skip forward, more or less, brings us to the present.

Kherson/Krynki

There was once a time when the foothold at Krynki seemed to hold promise. Russia appeared caught off guard, special forces operations were conducting one-off raids along the coast and Russian forces seemed to be unable to deal simultaneously with the Krynki incursion while conducting fierce battles on the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk fronts. Yet the Krynki experiment gradually lost impetus, and stories of the hellish situation of Ukrainians stuck on the far side of the river seemed more and more believable. Indeed, they  refused to give up the foothold, but first there came drones and then the full focus of Russian artillery and reinforcements determined to wipe out Ukrainian units, force them back into the boggy island footholds or back into Kherson itself.

Just how bad did it get? Difficult to say—although even the Western press spoke of discontent in the military over Krynki, and, perhaps sensing this, perhaps lying or perhaps telling the truth, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu claimed that only in Krynki and only in February Ukraine lost 3,300 men.

Below--the Krynki foothold in December [grayish-pink area contested]:

And while it may be mind-boggling… the foothold still somehow exists. In fact, it would appear that not a great deal has changed over the past months, yet the Russian military claimed to have cleared the village of Krynki (and granted, this was a tiny village and pretty much nothing is left of it) in February of this year. That said, remarkably, Ukrainian forces still retain a foothold to the southeast, and they continue to land and reinforce soldiers there.

This has been confirmed by artillery strike footage, drone footage and bloggers on both sides of the war.

In short, the defenders of Krynki are beyond heroic.

This is the current situation, according to DeepStateUA mapping:

Zaporizhzhia/Robotyne

The primary focus of the summer offensive was indeed Robotnye (although there were moments when this appeared to be Staromajorske or the territory south of Bakhmut during the brief, better days of the offensive). Hard ground was won, but minefields six-miles deep, combined with a lack of air support, tanks and the possibility that Russia was well aware that the offensive would take place. That said—and as can be seen by a DeepStateUA map from even December (and forget the heady days of July), the Ukrainians were once in position to press hard to the south of Robotnye to Novoprokopivka, while also there were still the fading dreams of reinvigorating the push to Verbove and rounding the corner to drive hard for Tokmak.

In hindsight, that window was probably closed forever by August, as not only did Russian reinforcements rush in, but Tokmak, which was discussed by news sites and blogger on both sides of the war ad nauseum was bolstered and further entrenched. The current defense lines at Tokmak can be seen below:

This de facto means that the aspiration of taking Tokmak, and completely destabilizing Crimea not only is over, but it would likely highly difficult to achieve even if Nato forces suddenly rolled into the Zaporizhzhia front to start a conventional war in earnest.

Worse, while there does not appear to be a true Russian focus on Robotyne or the Zaporizhzhia front at this time, Russian attacks remain constant, Robotyne is now a blight (and the same issues of supplying point troops at the edge of Novoprokopivka remain, and hard fought gains have been lost, as can be seen by comparative maps even from December 2023 an now.

December 2023:

Current situation in Robotnye:

Zaporizhzhia/Staromayorske

There was the brief hope—also back mid-summer 2023—that the Ukrainians would break through at Staromayorske, especially following an impressive strike to the northeast of the town through the Urohaine, but once that drive burned out (for primarily the same reason as have others), that was pretty much it. The hope was that Ukrainian forces could cross into Zavitne Bazhannia—not much unlike the attempt to fight into Novoprokopivka south of Robotyne, but here the Ukrainians faced the natural barrier of a small river, the Mokry Idu, and it appears that this was enough to keep them at bay. Here it should be said that Russian attempts to regain land have met with fierce resistance, and the Ukrainians have generally held firm since the summer.

Map from December:

Current map:

Donetsk front/Marinka/Staromykhailivka/Krasnohorivka/Avdiivka

The Donetsk front south of Bakhmut was for some time a point of pride for the Ukrainian military. While Russian pressure was constant at Marinka, Staromykhailivka and Avdiivka, the Ukrainians held firm south of Avdiivka, and in Avdiivka controlled the city and at once point put tremendous pressure on Russian forces that there were musings that this could spawn a breakthrough, although just what this would mean strategically (in other words, to where would the Ukrainians drive) remained a mystery.

By September, however, the tide was turning. To the veritable shock of many Western analysts, the Russians reverted to World War II era strategy and assaulted the Ukrainians on all fronts at Avdiivka with waves upon waves of zombie attacks.

And we do mean waves.

There was much anecdotal reporting at the time, but The Corners (a la Yours Truly) spoke to two different soldiers who served at that front, and what they described was beyond hellish. First, the Russians came forward almost as if drugged. Second, Russians did not bother attempting to retrieve bodies. One soldier described the waves of Russians as rising up out of the ground to stumble forward “without haste or fear” as if they were all numb. Once that wave was killed, others would follow.

Yet the Ukrainian success at Avdiivka posed a threat to their own forces. As has often been the case in this war, cities and towns become utterly destroyed. Beyond destroyed, in fact. Which means that there is a point where wreckage is even so flattened that it stops serving as cover, and armies wind up holding essentially fire pits that cannot be held and which also pose a supply issue.

Such was the case at Avdiivka. Ukrainian fighters held out in the extreme southeast of the city in the industrial district. This was death trap for Russians, but there was the question of supply. The Russian counter was to attack from further north (and from the north) of the city and to eventually take (at terrible cost) the Terrekon mine tailings hill that gave whoever held it a field of fire advantage as the battle raged on. Once the Ukrainians lost this, the supply line that ran into the city and to the industrial zone was a goner.

That said, the Ukrainians held tight… until they didn’t. Unfortunately, at almost the same time that Zaluzhnyi lost his position to be replaced by Oleksandr Syrsky a full pullout was in order.

The true stats behind the pullout are not known. Reports that soldiers were left behind coincided with stories of special forces sent in to guarantee a corridor out. Likely, Russian bloggers very much overexaggerated Ukrainian losses of what actually appears to be a remarkably well-conducted retreat under extraordinarily difficult circumstance.

That said, from the Russian point of view, the victory in Avdiivka served as a critically needed shot in the arm—despite likely monstrous losses—and the “victory” likely also bolstered Putin prior to the Russian presidential elections.

When it comes to actual casualties… again, these are unknown. For the Russian side rough estimates have ranged between 20,000 and 40,000, although at press time Yours Truly would estimate that 50,000 to 55,000 is a more believable number.

Map of Avdiivka from December:

 

Map of Avdiivka now

 

 

Yet these are apparently men the Russians can afford to lose. Meanwhile, what has been ignored in the press is that south of Avdiivka, the Russian army also made progress taking Marinka and Staromykhailivka, with ongoing battles now at Krasnohorivka. Worse, Avdiivka has been lost, but the Russians have not stopped pushing forward, and at press time, after fierce battles it appears that Russia has taken Pervomaiske, which also appears confirmed on Deepstate UA maps. That said, again remarkably, northeast of Avdiivka the Russians still have not been able to take the little town of Berdychi, which has effectively been a goal since September.

Still further north (yet south of Bakhmut) a similar Ukrainian stubbornness has been seen at Andriivka and Klischiivka, where Ukrainians in the summer had minor breakthroughs that were seen as a blow to Russian morale. Since that time no less than seven Russian regiments have attempted to turn the tide there, and yet they have been held off, although Ukrainian forces have taken horrific shelling and lived under constant drone strikes—much like other, still lesser known towns, such as Kalynivka and Chasiv Yar. Multiple reports have noted never-ending Russian assaults on Chasiv Yar and Ivanivske as well as the fall of Bohdanivka, which although denied by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, does look to have fallen under Russian control. Likely, Chasiv Yar and Ivanivske will be next.

Map of Klischiivka, Chasiv Yar, Bohdanivka and Ivanivske:

The Kupiansk front

Interestingly, further north similar stalemates have continued all the way to the Kupiansk front, where the Ukrainians have simply refused to give up Synkivka and thus the town of Kupiansk itself.

This is though-provoking, and it also reveals Russian limitations. Just prior to the serious push at Robotyne during the summer, the Russians allegedly built up a 300,000 man army to push forward on this front. This included battled-hardened forces and even special forces, but these were diverted (and likely used up) to stop Ukrainian advances in Zaporizhzhia.

Kupiansk/Synkivka now:

Kharkiv and the realities of weapons supplies

Now a similar number of forces is supposedly being assembled to assault Kharkiv—and, as has been well-publicized in the press, Russian glide bombs have punished that city, and the threat of a Russian offensive is real enough to have forced Ukraine to demand the evacuation of civilians from settlements near the front in in Kharkiv, Bohoduhiv and Izyum.

Soldiers interviewed by The Corners expressed confidence that Kharkiv cannot be taken—and considering that Russian conscripts are now trained even less than in previous months, this is quite believable. But equally believable is that Kharkiv is a real target and that Ukrainian forces are increasingly stretched. And now with the US increasingly diverted by the Israel, Hamas and… Iran, the likelihood of billions in US weapons simply does not seem high.

Lest there be any doubts, over the weekend Ukraine’s chief of staff, Syrsky, acknowledged that Ukraine’s situation has deteriorated over the past days, and Russian tanks will likely soon be on the move en masse with better weather. Lyman (primarily Kupiansk), towns on the Bakhmut front and Pokrovsk are already facing armored attacks.

Meanwhile, as mentioned, Russia has targeted power infrastructure and this is expected to continue. While this may come as a surprise to some—weather is warming and the spectre of freezing Ukrainian civilians has largely passed—no power a.so means crippled domestic production of Ukrainian weapons (read drones).

In short, this appears to be no longer the same Russian military that has for two years relied almost solely on zombie waves of conscripts (including criminal conscripts) and hard-to-control Wagner “elites.” Methods have entered the madness—while still using waves of men, Russians have shown far better battlefield tactics of late—and it is very possible that Putin’s purge of dissenters following the ill-fated Evgeniy Prigozhin uprising has allowed younger, more talented (while also morbidly pragmatic) officers to move up in the ranks.

In short, this does not bode well for the short- or long-term for Ukraine.

But while the US remains consumed in partisan politics—and dithers—real worry does seem to finally be brewing among Ukraine’s European allies. The US has sent seized Iranian guns, which is… something, yet once again there has been a PR scramble to “stand with Ukraine,” but this appears more akin to using the occasional band aid than help of true significance.

That said, NATO in early April agreed to “scout arsenals,” according to the Associated Press, for air defense to send to Ukraine, and Germany has announced it will send a US Patriot system “immediately.” NATO has also agreed to come up with a long-term plan for Ukraine’s defense, and once again there has even been talk of Ukraine joining NATO.

Yet talk is cheap and weapons are expensive. To put this in perspective, as has been repeated again and again (even in this summary), Ukraine desperately needs USD 60 blin in “planned” US aid. Yet it has long also needed the million shells promised in 2023 (and if Czech President Peter Pavel had not come up with a plan there would still be no hope of reaching this goal even now). To put this further in perspective, below comes from an actual statement on the official page of the government of Germany, which describes military aid to Ukraine in detail.

As a slight caveat, these are highlights, focusing on heavy armour and total aid—and it does pay to scroll through the following link:

https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992

As a reality check, it was Germany, which promised 88 Leopard tanks to Ukraine back in February 2022—prior to the failed Ukrainian offensive.

Yet this is where the figures stand with regard to heavy armour now (tanks in bold):

“Around 5 billion euros (2023) and 1.6 billion euros (2022) have already been spent on military assistance for Ukraine. Another 2.9 billion euros were earmarked in the first two years of the war for deliveries to be made between 2025 and 2028 […]

“Delivered military support to Ukraine

“(Changes compared to the previous update in bold)

“Armoured fighting vehicles

• 10 All Terrain Tracked Carrier Warthog (command vehicle)* (before: 9)
• ammunition for LEOPARD 2 A6 (from Bundeswehr and industry stocks*)
• 5 All Terrain Tracked Carrier Warthog (repair and recovery vehicle)*
• 66 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC)*
• 73 tracked all-terrain vehicles Bandvagn 206 (BV206)*
• ammunition for main battle tank LEOPARD 1*
• 90 infantry fighting vehicles MARDER with ammunition and spare parts (from Bundeswehr and industry stocks*)
• 30 main battle tanks LEOPARD 1 A5* (joint project with Denmark)
• 138 MG3 for LEOPARD 2, MARDER and DACHS
• 18 LEOPARD 2 A 6 main battle tanks with ammunition and spare parts (German share in joint project with further LEOPARD 2 operators)
• 50 MRAP vehicles DINGO
• 54 M113 armoured personnel carriers each with 2 MG and spare parts* (systems of Denmark, upgrades financed by Germany)”

To be sure, Germany is not alone and should not be considered to be solely responsible among European nations when it comes to arming Ukraine. In a sense, it is simply quite easy to criticize, as promises were made, German stats are transparent and, no 30 Leopard 1s is just  not the same as 88.

That said, these stats can be considered all but symbolic. Eurasia (Russia and China) is on a war footing. Europe is not. The US is focused on the southern US border, Trump or not to Trump and the Middle East. Russia and China are focused on the here and now, which for Russia means Ukraine and perhaps further ambitions and for China means weakening the West by supporting Russia, setting its sights on Taiwan (with Africa always in the mix) and generally playing everyone (including Russia) for a fool.

Which leaves Ukraine decimated on all levels and the West in denial (and this, remarkably, does include the countries “Old EU”. For we are all in this together.

Whether we like it or not.

Photo credits:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy courtesy of President.gov.ua, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons.

Former Chief of Staff Gen. Valerii Zhaluznyi couresty of ArmyInform, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons.

Photo of current Ukrainian Chief of Staff Gen. Oleksander Syrsky courtesy of Mil.gov.ua, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons.

Maps courtesy of Deepstate UA.