The War in Ukraine Update (July 16, 2024)

Although the plan was to run with a typical spy/crime update today, dramatic changes on the front in Ukraine necessitated an early war update--or at least earlier than foreseen.

First a few quick bullet points on relevant news, and then we will run through the fronts.

• Remember the Czech plan to find 800,000 shells at a time last year when the EU was falling woefully behind on a promise made to deliver one million shells in 2023? Well, the Czechs, led by hawkish President Petr Pavel, are coming through and on track now to deliver 100,000 shells a month.
• Russia is only making life tougher on dissenters (or even non-dissenters) at home by hitting more and more individuals with treason charges. According to the Associated Press there are possibly 200 treason charges on going at this time.
• Meanwhile, declaring organizations “undesirable” has also become even more fashionable under Putin. News sites, such as Radio Free Europe/RTE have long been on this list, but the Moscow Times—published abroad—has also now been designated as the same. This means that sources or interviewees cooperating with the above run the risk of… well, treason charges, or at least being accused of cooperating with foreign agents. Cases in point: in early July Russia put Yulia Navalnava, the widow of Alexei Navalny, on a terrorist list. And although Navalnava has been through plenty… she is simply not backing down.
• Meanwhile, decisions by the West to seize Russian assets and funnel them back into the war will undoubtedly make life more difficult for Western businesses that have quietly attempted to remain active on both sides of a Cold War getting hotter by the minute. Couple this with the EU (and not only) going public on Russian spy games… and the time to finally pick sides is upon us. And these spy games are nothing minor, either. Apart from attempts to literally burn warehouses (and in the past blow up ammo dumps), Russia has now been accused of attempting to kill the German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger. German authorities also previously reportedly arrested two Russian agents who planned to attack US military bases in Germany. Russia continues to deny all such reports.
• Germany, however, appears to not be backing down, and now reports have surfaced that it has quietly sent to Ukraine more Leopard tanks, with a new military package to include 39 tanks, HIMARS rocket systems and other armoured vehicles. Those 39 tanks, however, are not part of the promised 80 tanks that… are still on the way. Hmmm.
• The Russian spy effort has reached even… Australia, with a naturalized Australian solider and his wife having been detained for spying. Russia again aggressively denied the charges, but Australia’s prime minister, Anthony Albanese, responded by telling Russia to “back off” and adding that it has “no credibility.”
• More flip-flopping on Ukrainian's right to strike targets within Russia took place even since last week's NATO summit. On one hand, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in an interview with the Kyiv Post that his position is that Ukraine does have the right to hit legitimate military targets in Russia. On the other hand, the US has unequivocally barred Ukraine from hitting targets deep within Russia (with the definition of "deep" remaining unclear). Meanwhile, Poland weighed the option of hitting Russian missiles heading in Poland's direction while still over Ukraine (which would clearly give latitude when it comes to targeting--and which a first was believed to be tantamount to creating a 25-kilometer no fly zone near the border), but this was nixed by Stoltenberg. Zelensky has since countered that NATO will need to protect gas storage near the border if only for the sake of Western European heating needs while adding that he needs some 25 Patriot systems to prevent air strikes in Ukraine. In fact, this is a high number of Patriot systems, and serious outlay no matter who is funding the bill (last week Zelensky was promised four), but unconfirmed strikes on trains carrying NATO weapons and armour, as well as questions with regard to landing fields and repair for coming F-16s may help Zelensky's cause.
• Yet more bad news appears to be on the way. With US President/candidate for a second term Joe Biden having stumbled in debates and interviews--all the while refusing to step down--and with candidate for a second term himself Donald Trump now ironically benefiting from an assassination attempt and a photo-of-the-decade that some believe assures a win in the upcoming elections, there is trepidation with regard to continued support for Ukraine in the form of cash and weapons. It pays to remember that Ukraine has been here before, with house Republicans shutting down billions in aid last year--ironically after arguably having pressed the Ukrainian government in to a summer counteroffensive that was simply not supported by air power or promised tanks and weapons. Worse, immediately after the assassination attempt Trump chose his candidate for VP, J.D. Vance, who is not a proponent of further backing the war, stating previously that Ukraine does not have the manpower and not even the US has the wherewithal to supply Zelensky with enough weapons to win the war.

The above is much to consider. Zelensky has in the meantime responded by wishng Trump well; by stating that he is not afraid of a Trump presidency and that he would like to see a second peace conference in November, but that this time Russia should attend. The Russian government has rather shrugged this off, and it appears unlikely that it will come to the table eager to negotiate as long as it continues to grind forward on the ground

Or does it? Russia has been estimated to have lost more than 560,000 troops since the 2022 invasion. Likewise, although it now has plenty of ammunition, credible sources point to a coming tank shortage and that now even Russia is beginning to feel the manpower squeeze, with endless "meat waves" in Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar (but not only) having taken their toll.

So we will ponder. And in the meantime, we will also keep an eye on developments on the ground, which for the most part are still, albeit painfully, grinding Russia's way.

Now starting in the south:

Kherson/Krynki

Here there is nothing substantial to report at this time.

Robotyne

No real update here, although it is clear that Russia is pushing from the south and east, according to Deepstate UA maps, with some six regiments and one brigade directly involved in fighting.

Staromayorske

Only last week I noted that in some spots Ukrainians had held gains made during last summer’s counter-offensive, remarkably for an entire year. Unfortunately, this situation has changed in several locations only over the past few days. The Urozhaine foothold at Staromayorske now appears completely lost, with Russians having overrun those positions literally over the weekend.

Notice the extensive "gray" areas, which indicate that there is more ongoing than what is seen just by the key arrows that represent Russian attacks. Recent and believable reports indicate that Urozhaine was very much overrun and that preliminary engagements are already ongoing directly north as far as Blahodatne. This is under the radar in most news reports, which have focused primarily on the Avdiivka front. On this point, such sudden losses of ground have been seen before (the Ocheretyne rotation is a good example), but at this point it is not known if this has come from a combined glide-bomb and overwhelming attack or simply a worn-down Ukrainian troop presence or rotation “mistake” or all of the above. That said, Russian sources noted heavy assaults with a collapse at Urozhaine coming after some 18 assaults. Other reports indicated that Ukrainian units there (which were once key units used in the counter offensive) indeed were so worn down or debilitated that they had little chance against Russian vets that have survived, learned on the job and who did not have limits with regard to ammo or even newbies to send forward to identify fire points.

Again, probably all of the above.

Avdiivka front and… Pokrovsk

Although last week I noted that Russia would push for Pokrovsk, as well as other key logistics points all the way up to Borova in Svatove, this appears to also be moving faster than expected. As a reminder, see the map below, which shows in our humble opinion key Ukrainian cities/logistics points being targeted by the Russians:

A glance at the map below, however, would seem to indicate that Pokrovsk is not in immediate in danger, although there is intense activity across the Avdiivka front (and the Niu York developments are also of great interest).

That said, even Western news coverage has indicated that the Ukrainian general staff itself has reported intense attacks in the “area of Pokrovsk,” with the actual locations somewhat unclear. Those noted, however, include Novooleksandrivka, Prohress, Lozuvatskyi, Novoselivka Pershoya and Yasnobrodivka and Novoselivka. These are noted on the map below, and again, considering the distance to Pokrovsk, there seems to be no reason (yet) for panic, although it is noteworthy that the Ukrainian general staff is itself highlighting “Pokrovsk” as the name of that front. Below is a closer focus on the northern section of that front.

Now, allow us to back up and take an even wider bird's eye view that includes the southern offensives from Vulhedar back up to  Ocheretyne.

To no surprise, this closer examination from south to north of the Avdiivka/Pokrovsk front is troubling. In the south gone are the days where we are even talking about Staromykhailivka. Krasnohorivka is being hit hard from the south by at least two regiments and a battalion, and half of that town (which is fairly leveled) is believed to have been taken. In fact, although some Western sites claimed that Russia has made little progress there, five days ago minimum Russian forces were confirmed to have made advances into the northern part of that city, and the Deepstate UA map seen below is unfortunately likely out of date (and this already shows have the town having been occupied).

Further north, Russia is prodding at Vodiane/Karlivka, but intense battles are taking place at Novoselivka Persha. At the time of publication it appeared that at least part of Novoselivka Persha has been taken (probably just the edge), but this poses a grave danger to Ukrainian forces defending in Novoselivka Persha as well as those assumed to be in the pocket south of that city but de facto between the front line and the Vovcha body of water/reservoir and Russian advances south of that at Karlivka.

Noteworthy is that a Russian breakthrough here would likely mean a drive toward Zavitne, which is allegedly already happening. This would also mean that Ukrainian forces would need to scramble to escape that pocket and stop such a drive. Please note that the "green Ukrainian" arrows below are theoretical and only there to show how difficult it would be for Ukraine to pull front line troops out of a potential cauldron. That said, this is a highly dangerous situation, but various blogger sources due indicate that Ukraine is pumping in reinforcements to stop the bleeding here.

Now back to the post-Avdiivka bulge in the north and the potential drive toward Pokrovsk. While that offensive appears to be a primary focus by the Russians, note further northeast at the Niu York and Toretsk fronts, where again, Ukrainian troops may be trapped in a pocket. The following three maps are indicative of the danger here, and now there are reports of new Russian advances at Zalizne (seen in the third map).

 

 

Bakhmut front/Chasiv Yar

This leads to further trouble as we head north toward Chasiv Yar (once primarily known as the Bakhmut front. Russia spent months and incredible resources to take Chasiv Yar, and on the upside, despite clear orders from up top to take Chasiv Yar months ago, they have still not been successful. That said, the most recent confirmed information (as of July 5) is that, following attacks by Russian heavy glide bombs that decimated the eastern edge of the city, Ukrainian troops pulled out of that part of the city simply because there was no reasonable cover yet. Yet there is also little reason to believe that Russian attacks have slowed, and it is assumed that the Kramatorsk and Sloviansk points are still their (potentially viable) goal.

What has also been confirmed since July 5 is that the Klischiivka line (that I lauded only last week) has at least partially given way.

This is also noteworthy, as now practically all substantial gains from last summer's counter offensive (Robotyne, Staromayorske/Urozhaine and later Klischiivka--although maybe not yet Andriivka) are gone.

Svatove

The last point in the theoretical logistics/defensive line that is assumed to be a current goal is Borova. Yes, I brought this up almost a year ago when there were large Russian troop concentrations (possibly up to 300,000 in Svatove and Kupiansk, but the more experienced of these troops were diverted at that time to Robotyne and Staromayorske. Now the push is back on with reports that Makiivka has fallen. This is unconfirmed, but also note that not highlighted on the Deepstate UA map below are credible reports of Russian attacks or even small advances at Stelmakhivka, Berestove, and Pishchane.

 

Likewise, still further Russian forces have continued attacks south from Lyman Pershyi and fierce fighting was reported at the edge of Synkiivka.

 

Kharkiv

We will delve further into the Kharkiv front in the next update, as Ukraine has appeared to have stopped that offensive (which came at great cost to the Russians), although both sides noted small gains over the past week.

That's all for today. Slava Ukrainii and God bless.

 

Preston Smith is a licensed investigator/detective based out of Poalnd. He can be reached at query@cddi.pl or through the CDDI website at www.cddi.pl

Maps are all courtesy of Deepstate UA.

Photo credit: The defense of Chasiv Yar (photo taken in March 2024) Подробиці, CC BY 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons.