Trump, Putin, Pokrovsk... and the fallout to come
Expect this to be a controversial post.
In part because (as you surely by now know) Yours Truly rarely agrees with anyone.
But primarily because yes, I'm going to double down on my previous message--even in the face of the Anchorage face-off between US President Donald Trump and Russian President (or body double) Vladimir Putin. And by this I will again repeat that yes, US President Donald Trump has shown signs of being human.
And yes, Ukraine can still win this.
And I do truly believe that both of the above are true.
This may seem somewhat ironic, as not for the first time also noted that the Pokrovsk collapse that I predicted back when the Trump administration shut off the lights in Kursk was coming to fruition.
And yes, practically speaking, this is also true.
And if that is not enough, here are a a few more statements that will likely raise hackles among many if not all: Putin may have scored points in the "gotcha" world of partisan press coverage, but he also may have made yet another critical strategic mistake in terms of war, gamesmanship and, yes, Trump.
Finally, the US (led obviously by Trump) has proven dangerously unpredictable, but there are plenty of European leaders that remain consistently duplicitous. In other words... don't think that they are not ready for some sort of land swap. Which means that public persona and opposition to Trump is not always sincere.
The thin blue line...
But let's begin at the beginning. I've harped for near on two years that Russian priorities were the Pokrovsk to Kupiansk supply line. Nothing has changed (and I did state that it was quite unlikely that Pokrovsk would hold forever. That said, this line was key, and while sources told me more than a year ago that no, Pokrovsk itself would not fall (which remains true), the key was never Pokrovsk as city but holding this "line" (which could roughly be considered a logistics line) and keeping it both usable and intact was key. As a quick review, here is the "line" as I noted it a year ago (end-August 2024). The first map depicts Pokrovsk and the Ukrainian blue logistics line to Konstiatynivka, then back northwest to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. The second map depicts the line up to Borova to Kupiansk and the lasdt map is primarily focused on what the defense of Pokrovsk looked like at that time.
Those who have truly followed the war will remember the disastrous developments at Ocheretyne (seen at the east edge of the map), which saw troop replacements go bad and which led to a substantial breakthrough that eventually put Pokrovsk at risk. This was a situation in which hardened troops were replaced in very awkward fashion by green troops--which cost Ukraine dearly.
Hold that thought, as we will come back to it in a moment.
Russian goals...
Now at that time essentially the Russian goal was to carve out the entire territory east of that blue line. Why did I consider Pokrovsk key? It was a major logistics hub and disrupting that hub would cripple Ukrainians defenses up through the north. Admittedly, this is Yours Truly simplifying the "story of the fight," but think of it as a view from space in order to predict the following months of the war.
You will also remember the rather wild days of the Ukrainian Kursk offensive, the remarkable ability of Ukrainian soldiers to hold that foothold for far longer than expected and how various pundits debated the sense and usefulness of the offensive to begin with. Clearly, the goal at that time was to take pressure off of Pokrovsk. And this worked. And clearly--as Yours Truly stated back when it happened--the brief days that the US turned out the lights on the Ukrainians in Kursk was enough to crumble that salient and enable Russia to focus back on Pokrovsk. Which I did point out was a critical, critical moment in the war.
Now let's flash forward to the current. Below is a rough map noting the Ukrainian blue "logistics"/defense line. Remember, this is a concept (and I am not claiming to state that this is an exact line just as I am not endeavoring to give the game away for the Ukrainians). The point is that Russia is still quite clearly attempting to coordinate its offensive at Pokrovsk with that at Borova and Kupiansk--a strategy that simply has not changed over the past two years--and a strategy that could eventually cost Ukraine everything east of that blue line.
The Pokrovsk-Kupiansk "front" as of August 17...
Obviously, none of this is news to the Ukrainians, and sources have indicated that civilians have been under evacuation (although Ukrainians--especially the elderly--do not always evacuate) for at least two weeks. That said, there also have been no indications that Ukraine is willing to give up an point on the above line without a costly fight. But before we get into that and the Ukrainian counter at Pokrovsk, below are two maps that bring us to the present.
Here we will go from north to south.
Below reveals a concerning (and long-running) development at Kupiansk. Mirroring what has happened in Pokrovsk, Russian troops chose to partially bypass the defenses at Kupiansk and cut to the north, and Russian forces continue to press north of Dvorichna.
Further south, Russian fores continue to push toward Borova, although note that north of Borova the Oskil waterway has proven a difficult barrier to cross.
Now Pokrovsk. Below the Russian advance is seen as having been "pincered," with various reports claiming that Russian troops that have been cut off have been decimated, but with other reports claiming that Azov units behind the pincer movement also suffered extreme losses. Not that--as opposed to what has been depicted in the press--this fight is ongoing. The outcome is no yet clear, and it likely will not be for weeks.
Now a few explanations re the "artwork" of Yours Truly. First, note the below the disrupted line between Pokrovsk and Konstiatynivka. Second, note the two-pronged Russian attack north of Pokrovsk, the Ukrainian Azovs who cut off the more northern Russian troops, but also the pressure on Pokrovsk itself.
Finally, note the "retreat" arrows out of the Pokrovsk pocket.
This retreat is not confirmed. It is logical, what I currently believe is at play or likely at play or soon to be at play, but I'll be the first to write that this may simply not yet be happening. Again, this will be made clear over the next few weeks.
Now an even closer view of the Russian advance. \
So what did happen? Was this the massive breakthrough billed by Russian bloggers, MAGA Youtube types, would be analysts and all of the pundits in between? Or was it a simply a few hundred Russians on quads who managed to surface 17 kilometers to the north?
It's a bit of all and a bit of none--in the humble opinion of Yours Truly, of course. But no, the danger has not yet passed. No for Ukraine. And not for Russia either.
Which means the bad news first--and then we get to the bright side.
The breakthrough could be termed severe even if there was only a small amount of Russians on foot. In truth, this is not believed to be a small amount, but a matter of Russians doing what Russians normally do not do--i.e. taking an advantage of a sudden weakness and capitalizing on it. Yet there is a precedence--this being Ocheretyne--as once again it appears that Russia took advantage of relative green Ukrainian troops during a difficult but necessary rotation. The key Ukrainian defense lines were breached (which in itself is a massively disconcerting fact, although they were possibly unmanned), and yes, at first, it appears that suicide quads and soldiers on foot poured in. Yet these were hardly the first attempts near Pokrovsk, with Russian special forces attempting to infiltrate and also hitting Ukrainian vehicles and supplies for weeks.
Somewhat unlike past Russian scenarios (apart from, yes, Ocheretyne), Russian higher ups reacted quickly to the breach, acted without hesitation and pumped in quad soldiers, limited armor and then attempted to funnel in thousands of reinforcements, which fueled a chaotic drive north of Pokrovsk, which up until now has been essentially a nut too tough to crack.
Here is when I held off on coverage, as I was banking on the still stunning flexibility shown in the past by Ukrainian forces to plug the gaps. And also why I held back on the doom and gloom was the mutually consistent inability of Russian forces to feed and arm troops that do happen to make sudden progress.
At any rate, Ukraine high command did effectively react with Azov troops having pulled off pincer movements (quite possibly double pincers) that has likely resulted in close to 1,000 Russians dead and the loss of eight tanks. How many Russians remain cut off is a question of much debate. How many Azovs have been killed is as well. At the time of this blog, fighting remains vicious and the drone wars and artillery apparently all but apocalyptic.
Which means the good news noted within the bad above remains... delicate. And in all honesty, potentially quite bad--as Ukraine simply does not have skilled troops to lose.
And there is worse news, this being that 1) the lines were penetrated--even if practically unmanned, and while regained, the Ukrainians hold there may well be tenuous. Also, 2) let there be no doubt that the Pokrovsk to Kupiansk "line" has long been completely disrupted. Likewise, much like Pokrovsk, Russia has attempted to veer north in Kupiansk (although there have been attempts to turn back south into Kupiansk itself).
This means that over the long term, everything east of that thin blue line I mapped is under horrific threat. As in the threat that this territory could eventually be lost in battle is real.
But not today.
Which is the basis of the silver lining that I keep repeating: Ukraine can indeed still win this. And the debacle in Alaska actually proves the point.
Zelenskyy's plight and Russia's failure..
This has been a long post. Perhaps quite controversial. But let the controversial rage on with the quick talking points (to think about) below:
1) Putin has played his hand (and yes, maybe that was a double).
There is little doubt that Trump's big beautiful meeting in Anchorage did not go according to plan. He is no closer to being nominated for a Pulitzer than he was years back when a previous president ridiculed him at a Washington dinner. That said, Putin... has not won this war. In fact, he has likely made a tremendous mistake of overconfidence, and like it or not, his time is running out.
Now five days prior to the meeting it did appear that Putin was riding high (or his body double, which is quite possibly a reality, as it is nearly impossible to believe he would have overcome fears and traveled to the US, former Russian possession or not) was riding high. Clearly Russia's summer offensive at Pokrovsk (and not only) was an all out gamble to gain as much territory and hammer home a "story of the fight" that Ukraine is losing and losing fast. Yet even though Russia has massed troops and thrown itself in 2025's version of meat waves into the fight, this is not sustainable--and Trump's threats to sanction key Russian partners is no idle threat. Then there is Armenia, Turkey--and even China. In short, the war has gone on too long. For everyone.
2) Trump is now backed into a corner--and likely embarrassed. And human.
I pointed out in he last post that Trump's attitude on Ukraine seemed to change at about the time he had a very human exchange with a Ukrainian female journalist whose husband is still at the front. Cause or causation asisde, he also, around this time, began to voice real dissatisfaction with with Putin's games. And here is yet another curiosity. He has also voiced tales about how First Lady Melanie Trump has prodded him (and perhaps "needled" is the best word) over Putin's duplicity. But a second curiosity is that Lady Trump supposedly handed Putin (or his double) a letter that needled the Russian leader (or his double) directly over the close to 20,000 Ukrainian children kidnapped since the 2022 invasion. And Putin (or his double) made a show of reading said letter.
Now I personally have zero confidence that such a letter will impact the conscience (if it exists) of Vladimir Putin. But the first lady's move reveals again that 1) Trump is as human as the next husband of an apparently determined female and 2) the letter might as well have been a high level mind game, incidental or not. For oddly, incidentally, but perhaps not inconsequentially has put Putin in the odd position of possibly affronting (a very prickly) US president's wife.
3) The Article 5 angle is... a win.
Much has been made of "Article 5-like security guarantees" as part of a deal that would include land swaps with Russia. As distasteful (and possibly impossible) as land swaps may be, Putin agreeing to Nato-like security guarantees for Ukraine--with this backed by the US--is a major concession that gives the game away for Russia. Russia is under pressure--and this is a concession of quiet desperation. True, there is the argument that the US will not in the future walk the walk (i.e. something akin to a lack of effort to step in according to guarantees that followed agreements that forced Ukraine to give up nuclear weapons), but Russia backtracking here is a victory. Especially considering that the war ostensibly began due to US influence in Ukraine and Ukraine's talk of eventually joining NATO for security guarantees.
And why would Putin (or his double) agree to anything like Article 5? More than one million casualties and counting. The war cannot go on forever--and as of now, approximately 80 percent of Ukraine still remains free.
4) Ukraine's EU allies are quietly not ruling out land swaps...
As boorish as US policy may seem, European duplicity is a real thing. And it never ends. While an entire team of EU leaders has reportedly headed to Washington to back Zelenskyy in a meeting with Trump, signals have surfaced for weeks that a deal was closer than thought--and said signals came from EU leaders, not only Trump. And as reported, said EU leaders are currently in Washington to determine, according to CNN), "to glean more information from Trump on what Russia might concede as part of a peace deal, including what role the US would play in providing security guarantees going forward."
The second half of that sentence is indicative. What will the US commit to in the form of security guarantees "going forward."
Bear in mind that Ukraine simply does not have the troops or offensive capability to take back Luhansk, occupied Donetsk or Crimea. Thus it can be assumed that Europe's delegation knows exactly that that means. And the proof has long been in the pudding. Ammunition was not delivered in time. Tanks were not delivered in time. European F-16s were not delivered in time (yes, this was blamed on the US, which is indeed also at fault, but Europe was not exactly pushing--but on yet another side note, why did the US refuse even a meager amount of supposedly obsolete A-10s?). Back to the point, there were endless rounds of European sanctions simply because Europe did not want to step of and initiate hard-hitting and all-encompassing sanctions to begin with. Additionally, there is little indication that the citizenry of Germany or France (or the UK) truly wants to step up and fund this war, and there is no indication (apart from occasional outbursts from France's Emmanuel Macron) that any country from the West is willing to send any actual men to Ukraine's aid.
What this means is in the end exactly what Trump has previously stated. This will in the end be Zelenskyy's call. Or more accurately, it will be made to look like Zelenskyy's call. Which means... behind the scenes expect a European lobby to also work on Zelenskyy to "face reality" and agree to give up Luhansk and at least the occupied portions of Donetsk (and to forget about Crimea) in order to stop the carnage.
In retrospect, this is not much different than the war in Iraq. Europe made a show of the US's mistaken intelligence and the search for weapons of mass destruction that did not exist when in fact... European intel was apparently quite aligned with that of the US until late in the game (and countries such as Germany were quite happy to participate in the US's highly controversial "rendition" program).
Or put simply, Europe is lining up in part for show. Point fingers at Trump, opine on Zelenskyy's tragic situation and all while attempting to mask the fact that Europe is as culpable as the US--that yes, it would rather get back to "peace in our time" and business prior to 2022--that it never wanted the gas and oil to stop flowing; that there are rampant deals behind the scenes IN RUSSIA to "re-acquire" businesses that are currently simply held temporarily by Russian caretakers, with all sides longing to make a buck at the end of the war.
5) But Ukraine can still win this...
True, trying to imagine reinstatement of the Ukrainian borders of old is... quite difficult. To say the least. For no, Ukraine does not have the offensive capability or the men (for now) to march back into Luhansk or to retake Crimea or the occupied territories of Donetsk. But leap back in history, and Russia is strangely consistent, at least prior to World War II, in that it has a history of burning out. And of imploding. In dramatic fashion. And this history was also repeated in the lead up to the fall of the Berlin Wall. And in review, the signs are all there for one more, quite typical implosion. The economy is under incredible pressure (and Ukraine's long-range strikes on oil are impacting this), manpower is lacking, Putin (and his double) is getting older and the oligarchy that once propped up Putin himself has been weakened, targeted, financially debilitated and sometimes... killed.
In short, the teeter is real, and it is not all under Putin's control. For once again Trump (unlike Putin and his double) has appeared remarkably human. And unpredictable, as illustrated by his entire second term in office, including recent decisions (which seemed to come out of nowhere), such as "making Washington D.C. safe again," tariff wars, relations not with Mexcio but with... Canada, and yes, his grumpy public outbursts (including one in which he stated that Putin had "gone crazy").
Which should keep Putin up at night. For a stroke of the pen could hit... India hard. Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to be at the forefront of thinking out side of the box, which includes drone technology, and new developments, such as AI drones and hyper-long range fiber-optic drones mean that Russian jump off points for further offensives will simply be pushed further and further back.
Which in summary means that yes, Ukraine can--even if it is unlikely--still win this. But more importantly, it also means that Russia simply can't.
And if the above message regarding Russian futility finally sinks in with Trump--whether through Zelenskyy or the EU contingent or the First Lady herself...
Putin is in trouble indeed.
Preston Smith is a licensed investigator based in Gdansk, Poland. He can be reached at query@cddi.pl.
Maps courtesy of DeepstateUA.
Image of Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump released by the United States Department of Defense with the ID 250815-D-LS763-1030, courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.