Ukrainian counter-offensive grinds slowly; Russia hits back at Avdiivka

By Preston Smith

The results are in when it comes to the Ukrainian 2023 spring offensive, and unfortunately, they are not pretty.

Despite putting up a valiant fight and pushing forward on various points of the front--primarily at Robotyne, Staromajorske in the villages south of Bakhmut--attempting to surmount incredibly challenging fortifications and a determined Russia has proved a daunting task, especially without the element of surprise.

And air cover.

And timely supplies from the West.

In fact, the counter-offensive gamble, which some believe to have come in part due to pressure from the West on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, may in hindsight be seen as the turning point in the war. Despite punishing Russia in various theatres—including within the all consuming epic drama that is Russia vs. Ukraine PR—there is much to suggest that the age-old Russian strategy of wearing down an enemy through a combination of attrition and a willingness to give up land for time has, at least for Russian President Vladimir Putin paid, dividends.

And this was already clear prior to a mid-October Russian counter-offensive clearly meant to offset spring Ukrainian gains--not to mention the game changer that was Hamas’s attack on Israel and the resulting Israel invasion of Gaza.

Flying in the face of gospel…
Following last year’s surprising Kherson and Kharkiv counter-offensive, which not only gave Ukraine hope but also arguably gave the West a very false sense of optimism, there were jokes that Russia not only did not have the most powerful army in the world, but in fact that it had only the second-most powerful army in Ukraine. Taking into account Russian bungles, a lack of elasticity and difficulties adapting to the bizarro world of drone warfare, this was perhaps—for a time—partially true.

That said, what was also true was that various Western pundits underestimated Russia’s ability to simply find bodies while also surviving economic hardship and revamping an entire economy to focus on the war. In short, critics who claimed Russia was nothing more than a massive (and decrepit) petrol station with a dictator on top grossly missed the mark. Said dictator could still find buyers for oil—and he could also call all of the shots. Moreover, if Russian polls are to be even slightly believed, Putin even now has remarkable public support (in part due to the ability to control the Russian media).

“There is the idea that Putin is in grave danger—that at any minute he is ready to be toppled,” said a US former military officer who now works for an international consultancy. “For the briefest of moments there was hope that this would indeed be the case, but now we are in October, and clearly Putin has proven us all wrong.”

The advisor, who requested anonymity due to his company’s current advisory role on Ukraine, admitted that he has never been as optimistic as the many hawks in the West and even in Ukraine.

“There was a very troubling period for me in the early spring,” he said. “At that time Ukraine was swamped with Americans, Germans, Brits—endless consultants or even real estate types—eager to get in on the rebuild of Ukraine. Some of the true believers are still there, but I would guess that their optimism has been somewhat curtailed.

“At that time I heard that Russia was beat—that it was only a matter of when,” he added. “This I thought to be premature.”

This advisor noted that ingrained in modern Western military strategy is both the need for a three-to-one advantage in terms of troops and heavy armour as well as the ever vital need for air superiority. “Ukraine had none of this,” he said. “In fact, by the spring the Russians had already caught up and arguably begun to surpass the Ukrainians with regard to drones and jamming technology, which has greatly hampered the Ukrainian counter-offensive."

Charging ahead…
There appear to be few who believe Zelenskyy was ignorant of the above. His constant plea for modern weaponry—and his complaints that it was being delivered too slowly—are proof that he did understand the risks. That said, he also faced a negative trivecta that seemed to worsen by the day. First, it was well-known that Russia was hurriedly (and effectively) strengthening the vaunted Surovikin line—a barrier of defenses that combined trenches, dragons teeth, layers upon layers of mines and still more trenches and mines galore.

Second, talk of tank deliveries, as well as deliveries of modern fighter aircraft remained—especially when it came to aircraft—simply talk.

Yes, Germany did deliver some of the promised Leopard tanks (but primarily Leopard 1s), and the UK and the US did come through with Bradley fighting vehicles, Challenger tanks and most recently the Abrams, but just as Zelenskyy supposed, such support was coming too slowly, too late--and even today EU promises of one million artillery shells have only been 70 percent fulfilled. .

Third, it appears that he quite rightly when he also guessed that Western support was fleeting—even while Russian determination was not.

The results have been no less than an agonizing slog, punctuated by local—if albeit improbable successes—that for a time promised a mechanized breakthrough.

That said, a true breakthrough has not yet come, the weather is getting worse, and Russia has of late mounted an insanely bloody counter-offensive of its own.

A game of stats…
Nothing has put this into perspective like… the Western press. A New York Times article reverberated around the world in September with the cold hard truth: By then Russia could boast gains of 331 square miles in 2023 while Ukraine had 143 square miles in the same period.

As various publications were wont to point out, the total Russian gain was about the size of a large city. Like New York.

As various publications failed to point out, these gains were stretched thin along the long front that runs from the Black Sea and Kherson to Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Svatove and Kupiansk. Virtual-chronological maps that show gains and losses over time by the summer—unless examined very, very closely—appear to show almost no change at all.

This is not to knock Ukrainian efforts on the ground. The ability to break through the first line of the Surovikin defenses at Robotyne were no less than remarkable. Closer, in fact, to epic. As were successes in Staromajorske, Verbove and Andriivka and Klishiivka south of Bakhmut.

Likewise, an equally fascinating combo of intelligence plus drones, sea drones and UK-supplied rockets has all but run the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of the Black Sea (and killed and maimed not a few Russian officers along the way).

Still, as stated recently by Politico, Plan C may be upon Ukraine—this being negotiations—although these simply may not be an option, thanks to what has been a hellish October in terms of international events.

Time keeps on slipping…
Despite some publications (such as Time Magazine—and even Politico in June) claiming in September that Ukraine was winning the war, a number of other publications ranging from Foreign Affairs to the Irish Times were calling on Ukraine to negotiate by July of this year.

This might have come as surprise to some, as truly Ukraine had only launched its counter-offensive in June. That said, there is always the logic of pushing for negotiations when the enemy is on its heels—and despite a lack of heavy armour and air dominance, Ukraine’s sheer ferocity across multiple fronts was making its case.

At the time, the infamous Wagners were… upset to the point that eventually Wagner leader Evgeniy Prigozhin attempted his aborted coup on Moscow. Russian generals were complaining out loud—as were Russian bloggers—which meant some were simply being hustled off to jail. Ukrainian press releases were proud, pointed and far more effective than anything else coming out of the east.

Meanwhile, life appeared to return to a semblance of normality in Ukrainians cities further from the front. By all accounts, Kyiv was simply in bloom.

And when the first layer of Russian defenses were breached in Zaporizhzhia… optimism reigned.

For a time.

The fact was that through sheer, stubborn determination, Ukraine had managed to break through the first lines of defense at both Staromajorske and Robotyne in Zaporizhzhia. But while the Staromajorske front seemed to hold promise, this soon became a stalemate, likely due to a Russian build-up of up to 200,000 troops in the northern Svatove and Kupiansk fronts.
Interestingly, those Russian offensives also went nowhere, as Ukrainian pressure in Robotnye and a growing threat to hit Verbove and then angle for Tokmak---and perhaps change the entire Crimea region--forced Russia to send its best trained troops from Kupiansk to Zaporizhzhia.

Here--again mainly in September--the Ukrainians continued to threaten a breakthrough both in Verbove and directly south of Robotyne at Novoprokopivka. Meanwhile, Ukraine also toyed with crossing the Dnieper at Kherson, or more specifically at Kozachi Laheri and then at Krynnki and Pishchanivka. At press time, these moves showed some promise, but more as an attempt to distract Russia and perhaps influence a Russian counter-offensive at Avdiivka in the Cherniv Oblast. .

The Avdiivka factor...
The Russian Avdiivka counter at first did not garner much press. But here the situation has become critical for Ukraine. This is reminiscent of the Bakhmut meat grinder of 2022--only it is worse.

The ferocity of the Russian counter at Avdiivka may well also have caught the Ukrainians by surprise, as, following the failed Wagner coup and then the subsequent demise of Wagner leader Evgeniy Prigozhin, the Russian military seemed disorganized to the point that it was in complete disarray. Meanwhile, Ukraine punished the Russian Black Sea Fleet, not only with sea drones, but also by hitting headquarters in Sevastopol and killing a number of high ranking officers

But despite a difficult August—and reports that Russia was short of ammunition and begging for a deal with… North Korea—there were other very ominous signs. New troops—even if badly trained—continued to appear on various fronts. And the build-up of 200,000 in Svatove and Kupiansk still threatened--despite the presence of green or unskilled Russian troops. Meanwhile, in Robotnye, drones and specifically the Russian KA Alligator helicopter began to harass advancing Ukrainians, and although Ukraine made some progress in both Robotnye and south of Bakhmut in Donetsk, little of strategic value was achieved.

But the Ukrainians had managed to frustrate Putin. By September it is clear that Putin had had enough, and he publicly ordered Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerassimov to stop the Ukrainian counter-offensive and get results.

This manifested itself in October in the form of Russians counters along the entire line and a decision to move Russian paratroopers to the lines in Robotnye.

Still Ukraine continued to make minimal progress, but then came the near suicidal Russian counter to the south and north of Avdiivka.
While at first unnoticed by the Western press, it was clear that Gerassimov was content to throw in waves of essential cannon fodder (primarily convict troops) but also tanks and armoured vehicles.

By Oct. 28, the Russian pincer move at Avdiivka was worrying, and Russian troops had taken the important high ground/mine tailing dump of Terrekon north of the city, giving Russia fire control.

At press time, Ukrainian troops increasingly had only a small avenue of escape should they attempt to retreat from Avdiivka and surrender the city. Worse, reports surfaced from both Ukrainian and Russian sources indicating that even Leopard 2 tanks were being destroyed by Russian drones--a development that likely will impact the strategy of modern war.

Worse than the loss of Leopards may well be the loss of Terrekon. At press time, which was Oct. 31, 2023, Russian forces were less than two kilometers from cutting off the one avenue of supply and retreat into and out of Avdiivka. A success here--which was (again at press time) ever more likely due to the capture of the Terrekon mine-tailings hill--would likely mean the loss of Avdiivka, the success of the Russian pincer movement and the capture or annihilation of Ukrainian troops still holding the center and a battle lost that could very well impact the entire course of the war.

This may seem exaggerated--especially in a war that has seen such dramatic changes of fortune since 2022. Yet this is not 2022, and the loss of Avdiivka would not only symbolically, but qualitatively mean that the Ukrainian 2023 counter-offensive has failed.
And it's unlikely that yet another counter-offensive is possible or likely to come.

The Time magazine factor...
With the pressure building, Ukraine is now facing three stark realities, all of which are converging at the very wrong time. There are, as mentioned, battlefield and supply realities. Then there are world events.
Then there is the... press, but more on this in a moment.

With regard to the first points, it is no secret that the country's top and most patriotic troops have taken huge losses. Likewise, although brief advantages due to Western technology--such as the thus far highly effective US ATACMS, which have shown the ability to devastate Russian air bases--these have had a tendency to provide real advantages only for limited time frames. Russian has shown the ability to adapt and overcome drone disadvantages, jamming disadvantages and while still clinging to cannon-fodder tactics on the offensive, defensively Russian troops have dispelled the long-running mantra that they would lose the will to fight.

What this means is that essentially Ukraine has lost the initiative--and that this can very arguably be blamed on the West. It now appears clear that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was put under great pressure to begin the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring, despite the fact that Ukraine completely lacked air superiority and that it also did not have anything close to three-to-one superiority in terms of manpower on the ground.

Likewise, there was no element of surprise, as the Zaporizhzhia front was the very evident target.

Meanwhile, Western promises of military support have not been fulfilled. While the US and the Joe Biden administration attempted to commit to yet another round of massive aid, meeting fierce resistance by Republicans in US Congress, it has also let leak concerns over Ukrainian corruption risk even when some insiders have rightly pointed to how huge "outflows" of aid to Ukraine never reach Ukraine at all, but are instead spent in the US on "military consultants, contractors and exorbitant logistics costs."

Ukrainian pilots are receiving training with F-16s, but at press time reports indicated that they have only now moved from the simulation stage--and considering recent losses in the air in Ukraine (at least eight war planes in the last 10 days of October), there is much doubt with regard to whether 10 or 20 F-16s could now seriously impact the course of the war.

Then there is the press. In the final days of October Zelenskyy endured yet another blow with a tell-al, behind-the-scenes article that appeared in Time Magazine, but which was repeated world-wide. The magazine highlighted insiders in Ukraine who claimed that 1) the president would not brook talk of a negotiated peace with Russia without reclaiming lost Ukrainian territory; that 2) Zelenskyy was angry with the allies for the slow pace of weapons delivery and 3) that Ukraine simply does not have the manpower to take advantage of weapons delivered by the West.

This was not dishonest journalism. In fact, the same could have been written months ago--even during the early summer when Time Magazine was claiming that Ukraine was winning the war. Which means that honest or not, this was also not a "scoop," and in fact, many will now rightfully question the timing of the article, as well as of the sources that chose to spoke now when the going has gone absolutely rough.

With regard to weapons deliveries, Zelenskyy has ever right to fume. Intended or not, the allies have fulfilled Putin's snide remarks that they are willing to fight until the last Ukrainian soldier. Likewise, drip-feeding weapons--including ATACMS with greater and greater range--would seem to complete a very callous strategy that one Brussels correspondent, who spoke The Corners repeatedly over the past month, described as an effort not to help Ukraine win the war, but simply to "bleed Russia militarily and economically," although he was in fact referring not to the Biden administration, but to the leaders of the EU itself.

There have also long been rumours that specifically German and France have pressed Zelenskyy to trade lost territory for peace. These rumours--while always denied--are quite easy to believe. Finally, there is no denying the manpower shortage--although there seems to still be creative reporting with regard to Ukrainian casualties, which are commonly leveled at total of 100,000 military personnel since the beginning of the war.

This is too low. The figure is likely at least twice this number, and put simply, the outlook is not optimal for Ukraine. The Ukrainian counter-offensive has been incredibly costly in terms of troops, equipment and capability in the eyes of the West. The Bakhmut sector counter-offensive has bogged down to a stop (although some minor gains were indicated even on Oct. 31), as essentially has the counter-offensive in Robotyne, and it is highly doubtful--if not altogether fanciful--that Tokmak, much less Melitopol, Mauripol or Berdyansk is now a feasible objective.

For his part, Putin has played land for time, as is the Russian tradition, and he has also publicly aligned Russia with Hamas and Iran--which is a conflict that will continue to divert US resources and EU will away from the stalemate that is Ukraine.

Both the US and Europe would be mistaken to allow this to happen. For this will not forever remain a stalemate. The Russian war machine is creaky but still gearing up. It is also absolutely immoral, with Putin still willing to throw even unarmed conflict troops into key battles in order to make gains at all costs.

This has become starkly evident at Avdiivka, where convicts, possibly under ex-Wagner overseers--have been forced to carry supplies and ammo while unarmed toward Ukrainian lines in what are essentially "find-your-weapon-among-the-dead" suicide runs.

These have been remarkably effective, as supplies are moved forward, Ukrainians are pushed back due to a constant bludgeoning and weak spots are identified for first artillery and drone strikes and then for assaults with veteran, combat-ready troops.

Ukraine has no such luxury. Although madly brave and exemplary for the past two years on the battlefield, numbers and world events are taking their toll. Zelenskyy knows this all to well. But this is a man who has pulled a brave face during some of the most dire moments of

Ukrainian history and somehow always managed to pull the rabbit out of the hat in the face of what is still a massive and murderous superpower. God help him, as despite ensuing stages of shameful western abandonment, he now increasingly will have no choice but sue for peace...

Or by some miracle do it again. .
.

Photo: There is little left of Bakhmut, which became a meat grinder in 2022, but then saw the Ukrainians pushed out, but then push back in over the course of 2023. That said, there has been little real progress, although south of Bakhmut in Ukraine has punished Russian forces, especially near Klischiivka. That said, little has been gained by both sides. Photo by Dpsu.gov.ua, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons.