Ukrainian counteroffensive grinds slowly, but gains noted post Wagner rebellion

While the events of June may have given some hope that the war in Ukraine would see a coup and dramatic reversal, the aborted drive to Moscow by Wagner mercenary and founder Yevgeniy Prigozhin has indicated that for now this is unlikely.

Instead the war appears to be developing into a further grind, with even Ukraine’s top general, Valery Zaluzhny atypically venting frustration over criticism that a victory is not yet in sight, telling the Washington Post that “this is not a show” and also that such criticism “pisses [him] off.” That said, Zaluzhny did indicate that Ukrainian forces are gaining ground on a daily basis—even if in increments--and what follows is a summary of where the offensive probably stands, as of July 4.

Successes after the aborted coup…

Although both the government and the Ukrainian military played down the battlefield effect of Prigozhin’s aborted drive on Moscow, this is a situation that is still shaking out internally in Russia (and Belarus), and quite possibly on the battlefield.

First, according to The Corners’ array of sources, whether or not Prigozhin’s gamble was expected (and there are multiple theories as to how and why this was the case) on the ground Ukrainian forces did move aggressively almost as soon as the coup began. There are two aspects to these indications: first, Prigozhin’s takeover without a shot of Rostov-on-Don and the military headquarters, while not putting a halt to Russian defensive efforts, did appear to impact Russian counterattacks and coordination. This supposedly was not a case of Russian troops suddenly taking orders from Prigozhin, but more of the kind of instant malaise which is typical of what is seen in a fragile and often unmotivated army.

The result was seen with almost immediate successes on the flanks of Bakhmut, with Ukrainian forces ramping up pressure there either 1) because the Prigozhin drive was indeed expected or equally likely 2) because Ukrainian units have from the get-go showed remarkable creativity and flexibility when it comes to reaction times in both defensive and offensive capabilities.

Put simply, when the Ukrainian forces see a vulnerability, they move.

Russian vulnerabilities may also have been worsened by the pullout and redirection of 3,000 Chechen personnel to Rostov-on-Don. While there is much debate as to whether Chechen troops are currently “Tik-Tokkers” or not, any such pullout places tactical demands on forces remaining in a given sector—and the likelihood of Chechen reinforcements bolstering Russians under attack was also lessened.

What now seems to be evident—which has also been reported by the UK Ministry of Defence—is that at least symbolic progress has been made regaining some land in Eastern Donbas, which effectively had been under Russian control since the war began in February 2014. This likely includes the formerly occupied village of Krasnohorivka.

By press time there had also been reports for almost a week that Ukrainian forces had crossed the Dnipro in the Kherson region to gain a foothold, despite at times fierce counter attacks and artillery bombardments, as well as air strikes by Russian forces.

Progress post Wagner rebellion…

The true start of the counteroffensive is still difficult to nail down, with this likely having begun between June 3 and June 8, with many observers believing June 4 was the start date. That said, on June 8 Ukrainian forces moved on Bakhmut with possible gains of up to 1,400 meters, but facing stiff resistance in Berkivka and Haidne.

Over the next 10-15 days, reports of gains near Vuhledar, Bakhmut and, more specifically, the villages of Rozdolivka-Krasnopolivka and Berkhivka-Yahidne, were in terms of 200 meters here or there. Ukrainian officials noted that Russia was reacting with airborne troops and special forces, and, judging by government reports, the mood was somber with Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Maliar confirming a Russian counteroffensive aimed toward Kupiansk and Lyman, as well as, once again, grim reports of “fierce fighting.”

During this time Ukrainian forces focused on Novodonetske near Vulhedar in southern Donetsk and small gains were made in Velyka Novosilka and northwest of Storozheve. Likewise, Ukrainian units targeted  Orikhiv Polohy Raion in Zaporizhzhia, with attacks and counterattacks that had unclear results. That said, the villages of Neskuchne and Makarivka  were liberated.

By June 16 there were noted attempts by Ukrainian forces to cross the Dnieper near Nova Kakhovka, with fighting complicated by the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam.

That said—and even though June 23 statements by Ukraine’s Maliar were somewhat sobering—remarkable progress was noted almost immediately in the wake of the June 23 rebellion, with Ukrainian forces having reportedly taken a Russian bridgehead across the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas canal, with other gains in that sector near Bakhmut. Likewise, during the time of the rebellion Ukrainian army units in Velyka Novosilka, Robotyne and appeared to have broken through the Novodanylivka-Robotyne and Mala Tokmachka-Novofedorivka lines.

Concurrently, Ukrainian forces regained the village of Rivnopil in Southern Donetsk and advances toward Tavirisk and Ocheretuvate were seen by end-June.

Russian reaction has also been indicative in that reserves appear to have been relocated, which may mean that Russia anticipates the loss of Kherson altogether, although at press time Russian counterattacks there were noted as ongoing.

 

The Prigozhin factor... and fallout

Bearing the above in mind, it pays to understand that most gains are still in terms of hundreds or thousands of meters or, in some locations, a score of kilometres at best. Ukraine has lamented a continued lack of artillery, a lack of modern fighter planes (and here it is clear that the military and government have not given up on US-made F-16s), and the country and some members of US Congress are also pushing hard for longer range artillery that could expand HIMARS strike range to up to 200 kilometres.

In the meantime, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has pushed hard for NATO and EU membership. This has met a divided reaction—and also it has prompted the typical doublespeak of Europe with current NATO boss Jens Stoltenberg telling the press that “all agree” that Russia cannot veto NATO enlargement.

This is doublespeak, as this certainly does not mean that NATO members agree on admitting Ukrainian into the fold.

Still, internal disagreement on membership has not managed to overshadow continued US and European support for Ukraine in the war. That said, weapons and ammunition are not coming as fast as Zelenskyy would like, and now even Zaluzhny has cast doubt as to whether a true offensive can even be mounted without proper air superiority. Yet this is literally nothing compared to what may well be an internal Russian purge prompted by the Wagner debacle.

The Wagner question...

By June 24 the Wagner rebellion was effectively over. Through the much-publicized efforts of Belarussian President Alexandr Lukashenko, a deal was struck and Prigozhin and fighters involved in the rebellion (perhaps up to 8,000, but this number remained entirely unconfirmed) were said to have been allowed safe passage and some form of exile in Belarus.

Still, this theoretical exile has prompted much debate, with observers wondering why criminal charges were dropped against Prigozhin, or if they were dropped at all. Reports have gone back and forth on this point, with even Russian bloggers left shocked that Russian President Vladimir Putin would allow the turncoat to remain alive.

Likewise, this bit of “mercy" has  been seen as having weakened Putin’s hold on power, as he no longer appears completely in command, overly ruthless or all-knowing. Combined with Lukashenko’s overt bragging of having saved the day (not a good look for Putin) and Putin’s odd public appearance (including kissing and hugging surprised bystanders in Dagestan and a supposed sighting of Prigozhin in St. Petersburg to pick up personal weapons and cash), and all bets seem to be off.

But it would likely be unwise to assume that repercussions are not on the way—at least within the Russian army. First, top Russian general Sergey Surovikin is likely already a casualty, with Western press, ranging from the New York Times to The Financial Times, alleging that he had prior knowledge of the coup and that is now (at press time) detained by Russian internal security. Further reports have indicated a quiet purge that may include officers and troops in Rostov-on-Don who stepped aside for the Wagners, as well as helicopter pilots or other military personnel who refused to fire on the mercenaries on their drive toward Moscow.

This may or may not bode well for the Russian military. Russia has historically purged competent generals only to pull them back out of prison or exile when in need, and although vicious there is little doubt that Surovikin was competent. On the other hand, there is typically a younger crew of aggressive, more modern thinking junior officers held back by the “Russian machine.” At this point in time there is little indication of how just the Wagner rebellion purge—if a reality—will shake out

There is also little indication as to how Prigozhin’s troops still in Ukraine or those in Belarus will be used. Those who did not take part in the coup have been given the “option” of joining the Russian military.

This will not be appealing, as the promise of having prison records expunged plus better pay plus a contract with an end-date will be erased.

Too bad for them.

Those in Belarus may be facing a different fate. Various sources unconfirmed by The Corners have stated that the Russian FSB has well researched the family members of Wagner personnel. Such FSB research rarely bodes well.

Other theories abound, including the exiled forces being used to open a second front on the Belarussian border. This seems unlikely, as the last thing Lukashenko currently needs is still more unrest in his own country. More possible would be Lukashenko’s use of Prigozhin and his forces to bolster his rule. In the typical mafia fashion often seen in the East, “heavies” can be useful, and Lukashenko will now have a brand-new, well trained guard (that is at least semi-grateful)at his command. These may also be used to target Belarussian partisan groups, which have been increasingly active, and they may also be used by Lukashenko as a bargaining chip for more cash and gratitude when it comes to Putin.

If they are in Belarus at all.

At any rate, the life of a Wagner is unlikely to be all fun and games. The good pay is gone, but then again so is the risk. For now. For in this case--if the Wagners have even made it to Belarus--there will still remain the spectre of a trip back to Russia in locks and chains. To the gulags or worse.

Which brings up a phrase that bears repeating.

Too bad for them.