Ukrainian War Update: enough good, bad and ugly for all...

BLUF: Russia's 2025 summer offensive has been "disrupted" rather than defeated. Ukraine has bottled up the infamous breakthrough north of Pokrovsk but remains overstretched and at risk of losing the remaining territory east of the Pokrovsk-Kupiansk fortress/logistics line by winter's end--if not sooner--unless Western (primarily US) support increases. 

All right...

Let's tell the truth.

And I mean everyone... let's tell the truth.

But first, a bit of background (and hold off before you decide just who is lying): On Sept. 26, 2025, Ukrainian Commander in Chief Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi more or less confirmed much of what we had hoped--that the Russian summer offensive has come to grief and proved ineffective.

Ok, not exactly, but he did state, according to Reuters, that the spring and summer offensive had "effectively been disrupted," adding a few nuggets that... effectively confirm statements made by Yours Truly over the past months.

Key among these was the statement that Russian advances have been based on a relatively new strategy termed "a thousand cuts" in which endless groups of four to six soldiers infiltrate as deep as possible--implying gaps in Ukrainian lines. As was described previously by sources for The Corners, these small groups gradually accumulate into larger groups that effectively create chaos on front lines. If such group builds and then actually gains what is effectively a bridgehead--which can be behind Ukrainian lines--Russia attempts to push into such a sector with larger forces.

Syrskyi also added that attempts to advance at Sumy and Kharkiv, capture Pokrovsk and the entire Donetsk region "had failed."

Finally, he noted that Russian troops had fallen into a trap at Dobropillia. Readers will remember this being the general location of the Russian breakthrough north of Pokrovsk. We'll address this shortly.

Even though Syrskyi's comments were limited, there is much to take in at this point. First, the Ukrainian armed forces rarely make positive statements when the outlook is uncertain--which in some respects backs up my personal belief, not to mention that of my sources, that due to extremely high losses since the spring of this year Russia is running out of personnel (although a buildup beyond Pokrovsk is a very real danger yet to come). Yet it is fair to remain skeptical and to note the very particular language used by Syrskyi in that he did not say the Russian offensive has failed, but that it has been "disrupted."

Which, to put it mildly, is reason to worry.

The good...

Before we dig deeper, first a bit more positive news: as anyone who follows the war and international politics knows, US President Donald Trump--forever wild card that he may be--has again flipped the script, revealing his frustrations with Russia.. and stating that Ukraine can eventually take back all of the land it has lost. Apart from calling Russia a "paper tiger," Trump's exact statement was as follows:

“After getting to know and fully understand the Ukraine/Russia Military and Economic situation and, after seeing the Economic trouble it is causing Russia, I think Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form."

Note that in that statement Trump highlighted not US support, but the support of the EU, which mirrors a previous statement that he is ready to levy tough sanctions on Russia once every country in the EU stops buying Russian gas and oil. That, at first glance (and second) appears to be a no go as there is little to no chance that Hungary and Slovakia, for example, would agree and join EU sanctions. That said, if not beginning with the drone incident over Poland, the 1) violations of EU airspace 2) continued carnage in Ukraine (not to mention reports of Russian atrocities there) 3) presence of a Russian naval vessel off the coast of Denmark (with transponders switched off) and 4) clear Russian belligerence at all diplomatic levels appears to have finally caused the EU to close ranks.

There is, however, a worrying caveat here. At the end of the cited statement Trump added the following: "In any event, I wish both countries well."

Which may mean that he actually intends to step out of the mess entirely and just let Ukraine and Russia duke it out.

Yet there are signs that this is not (quite) the case. Following Russian drone flights into Poland and jet incursions into Estonia, US Ambassador Mike Waltz did notably tell the UN General Assembly that "the United States stands by our Nato allies in the face of these airspace violations, and I want to take this first opportunity to repeat and to emphasize the United States and our allies will defend every inch of Nato territory" and that "Russia must urgently stop dangerous behaviour."

No, Ukraine is not part of Nato, but considering the increased support for Ukraine by European Nato members, the statement was at least a shot across the bow.

Moreover, there are further signs somewhat below the average Joe's radar. The new(ish) deal that allows the EU to buy US weapons and have them delivered to Ukraine appears to be rushing forward, and Trump did meet this week with Hungarian President Viktor Orban (with the latter crying that weaning itself off of Russian energy would collapse the Hungarian economy). Additionally, downed Russian fighter-bomber in Zaporizhzhia has spurred rumors of a new Patriot anti-aircraft system in the area.

Finally, Ukraine continues to not just launch long-distance drones at symbolic targets--i.e. at Moscow last week even though most were shot down--but it has continued to effectively hammer Russia's oil industry, with rumors of long lines at petrol stations now ringing absolutely true with a new decree on the part of the government that bans... the export of fuel until the end of the year.

Now before we go even one step further, think about this.

For it is without precedence. A small country that was predicted to lose a war against Russia in three weeks has managed to effectively cripple fuel production and exports--Russia's key money-earner-- without any semblance of a long-range bomber fleet.

Yes, Ukraine has done this with home-grown rockets and long-distance drones, not to mention a remarkably effective intelligence network that never ceases to amaze.

The bad and the ugly...

But now let's take a look at Syrskyi's wording. Yes, "disrupt" is better than nothing, but it does not mean that Ukraine has stopped the Russians in their tracks.

In fact, this seems far from the case.

Which means... Syrskyi may be the one guy out there actually telling the truth.

I'm stating this primarily because the constant noise (and I do mean CONSTANT NOISE) from bloggers, pundits, former military (on various sides) and politicians continues to be extremely misleading. Russian-backed bloggers are beyond biased. US-based experts who have taken a certain anti-Ukrainian stance have been wrong since the get-go. These include a hoard of overly skeptical or even anti-Ukraine ex-US military. But there were also US vloggers who excited pushed the obviously ill-fated (let's just say doomed) Zaporizhzhia counteroffensive that helped Ukraine wind up where it is today--while also costing Ukraine Gen. Valerii Fedorovych Zaluzhnyi, who, despite his brilliance prior to a counteroffensive he did not want, was banished to ambassador at exactly the wrong time in the war.

[Ed. note--here I should state obviously not all US ex-military have been off-base, and I have met some who were flabbergasted by the Zaporizhzhia decision, as well as others who have worked ever since to support Ukraine behind the scenes and also through NGOs to supply everything from heating units to ambulances.]

Finally, there are the politically-backed liars--those who have jumped upon Trump's statement that Ukraine can take back all land lost and who are now predicting the imminent, absolute collapse of Russia.

Now...

My opinion.

Let's cut the BS. Yes, I do see light at the end of the tunnel. Yes, I do see a silver lining. Yes, I'm sticking by my prediction that this third year is going to break (and is breaking) Russia in a fashion not so far different from what took place during the First World War.

But do I expect a sharp reversal over this winter and in the spring? A reversal that sees Ukraine somehow take back all of Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea?

No. No I don't.

Those making such predictions are at best beyond overly optimistic and at worst just part of a pro-Ukraine propaganda machine. And while this may be necessary to counter non-stop Russian lies, propaganda is propaganda, and we are going to try to get past that here.

Summing up, Ukraine has played the long game. It has made Russia pay, and it has in practice already caused Russia to strategically at least lose this war in terms of international relations, losses to the military and a growing economic meltdown. But a massive counteroffensive to take back all lands lost?

That is setting up Ukraine--not to mention Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy--to miserably fail.

And sometimes when I consider the various statements and antics of the Trump administration, not to mention Europe's long-term passive take on Russia (and ridiculous drip feed of sanctions and weapons that did last for the past three years)... I do wonder if that is not the point.

But back to the reality on the ground: let's make this simple. First, both sides have slugged it out since 2022 and both sides have suffered tremendous losses. This may be exactly why Putin's No. 1 (and somewhat tottering) cheerleader, Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenko went to the press to emphasize that a Russian peace plan is on the table (with the warning that Ukrainians should accept it now or face an offensive that dwarfs the original drive on Kyiv). And it may be why Zelenskyy has begun to speak of stepping down after the war ends. On the one hand, Ukraine may well have already cost Russia 20 percent of total oil production, cost the Russians well more than one million men on the battlefield and pushed the domestic scene into an economic crisis highlighted by petrol lines seen even in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Likewise, Putin is on the edge of being forced to call for yet another mobilization at home, as signing bonuses (even though increased) are barely feeding the machine.

Yet Zelenskyy's fate is also extreme. Russian drone strikes on civilian targets are not ending, and infrastructure strikes and attempts to freeze Ukraine yet once again this winter are a given. Moreover, troop shortage or not, an estimated 150,000 Russian troops, complete with tanks and vehicles for an old fashioned Russo-krieg at Pokrovsk are believed to be sitting (for the most part) out drone range in Donetsk. Considering swarms of Ukrainian drones and the concentration of Ukrainian forces at Pokrovsk and behind Pokrovsk, this seems all but suicidal, but Ukrainian forces are also depleted and exhausted.

Which means the threat is very real.

Additionally, there is the "rolling threat." Have a look at the map below and note the area filled in with blue dots. This is territory at great risk whether due to direct pressure taking place as I write this blog or under indirect pressure due to Russian attack points. Or in other words, this is everything east of what was once (and I'm speaking generally here) an intact logistics and defense line running from Pokrovsk to Kupiansk.

Now, yes, I have fixated on this, worried about this and generally fretted night after night all the way back since noting a buildup in Kupiansk and vis-a-vis Borova actually back at the end of 2023.  At the time, this may have seemed like melodrama, and even as late as November 2024 the relative mapping appeared as below (these are taken from previous blogs when I noted the said Pokrovsk to Kupiansk line, but bear with me here, as I realize the closeups are difficult to compare to the map above). Note just how much space Ukrainians still had between Russian positions and that thin blue line.

Kupiansk-Borova 2024:

Borova to Pokrovsk in November 2024: 

In the maps above, it is easy to see that this line at that time remained uncut. Now let's shift back to the current reality and back to the previously mentioned, current map.  In short, the logistics and supply line mentioned above has long been--to use Syrskyi's phrasing--disrupted. And once again, for emphasis, everything shaded with blue dots on the map below is now at serious risk (The blue "P" is Pokrovsk and the blue "K" is Kostiantynivka:

Essentially, what we now have are multiple pockets, some of which will be nearly impossible to defend. Moreover, while any shot at a major, quick Russian counteroffensive has been "disrupted," the Russian grind forward and expansion of the front lines to somewhere between 770 and 800 miles has stretched Ukraine to the limit.

But let's examine the key pockets and see what is at stake:

Kupiansk...

The Ukrainians have long defended Kupiansk (and Synkivka) despite repeated Russian efforts to take the northern-most hub of the said line. Threatened way back in 2023, key Russian forces meant to advance there were diverted to Robotyne and Staromajorske during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia that summer, which may be the only positive development to come out of that moment in the war.

Remarkable was the defense of Synkivka--a tiny, absolutely erased village of no real importance until the Ukrainians decided they would simply not give it up--and this delayed serious advances for close to two years. Now, however, the Kupiansk map is as seen below (as of Sept. 26, 2025):

A closer look at this pocket reveals mini-pockets that are of extreme concern. Chiefly, I am referring to that at Synkivka, but also to disputed territory already northwest of Kupiansk, which these dangers heightened by Russian drives into the city. Note below that I have marked the key supply roads in blue, and circled the critical hub in Kupiansk itself, which has essentially already been compromised. Also note the waterways south of the city. What this means is that the forces within the pocket(s) to the East have extremely difficult roads to extraction out of this zone. I would not put anything past the valor of Ukrainian forces, but with the Russians also pressing on Pischane at the bottom right of the map, it can be said that holding this pocket is both critical, but also highly doubtful.