War in Ukraine Update (Nov. 29, 2024)

No apologies today. This will be a dramatically bleak update.

Some may feel it is long in coming, and in fact Yours Truly has been short on posting not only due to travel and work, but also due to the simple fact that the current reality is dark. And grim.

And ugly.

Lest there be doubts, I'm hardly the only writer/blogger to feel this way. A truly frightening article (made even more frightening as this is coming through filter of a major news network, which are often tame, behind on a story and falsely optimistic) can be found here: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/27/europe/ukraine-drones-russian-advances-pokrovsk-intl/index.html

And honestly--and not to sound defeatist--it may still somehow be overly optimistic.

Which begs the question: Has Ukraine lost the war? Or, if you would rather hold off on a current assessment: Is it possible that Ukraine will lose the war?

If I were to answer the first question, I would say "not yet." Not quite yet anyway. And we'll dig into that answer in the sections below. But it's close. And in hindsight--if Ukraine does lose the war--historians may well go back to the ill-fated counteroffensive in the summer of 2023 in Zaporizhzhia (and yes, they would probably be right). But to the second question, I would say quite objectively: Absolutely. Any who believe otherwise need only to eye the history of Finland. Or Germany for that matter, Nazis they happened to be.

For the truth is that innocent and not-so-innocent nations alike do lose wars. And losing usually comes down to shortages in manpower, resources, weapons and foreign support. Which is a scary sum of all fears. So before we compare lines of engagement to our last Ukrainian War Update, allow me to run through current developments and fears with brief, honest and (at times painfully) assessments thrown in for good measure. In fact, here are my personal top 10.

1) The Joe Biden administration may have pumped in billions, but arguably it has not done Ukraine any favors. The time to act came way back in February 2022. The US knew the invasion was coming (even if nobody else believed this), and that was the moment to a) ramp up supplies b) face the Russians with an immediate no fly zone and basically call Russia's bluff. For at that time, much of this was still bluff. Then, miraculously (and this due to the mettle of the Ukrainians themselves) there was a great and tremendous second chance. Ukraine hot the Russians on the run--and at that time the Ukrainian general staff was considering further strikes--but not in Zaporizhzhia. Yet the US under the Biden administration pushed for a counter in Zaporizhzhia despite mine fields six miles deep; despite the lack of air cover; despite the lack of Leopard tanks (and not only), which mean the summer drive was doomed from the start. Meanwhile, Ukraine saw its top general, Valerii Zhaluznyi pushed out.

And by the fall... Ukraine was in trouble.

2) Donald Trump remains a wild card, but any promises of ending the war in a day--if they were even a hair beyond a shade of fantasy--are hopeless out of date. Trump first said this in May 2023--at a time when Ukraine was well beyond the dramatic success of it's 2022 Kherson and Kharkhiv counteroffensives (and after a year of jokes about Russia not only NOT having the best army in the world, but about it having the second-best army in Ukraine). Likewise, the May statement came prior to the ill-fated Zaporizhzhia offensive, cracks in the front through the fall and end of 2023 and through what has been a dismal 2024. At this point even Trump-backing senators are walking back his promises to stop the war and with good reason. Russia is winning. It is gaining daily on all fronts and no country or alliance has yet shown the resolve to make it stop.

3) Trump is... wilder than a wild card. Case in point--his direct call to Putin to stop escalation (which was followed by Putin unleashing missiles on Ukraine) has been followed with direct calls to other world leaders, and none of this has been coordinated with the US Department of State. Yes, Trump distrusts the "Deep State," and maybe he does believe he has been burned in the future, but US State Department coordination is there for a reason, this being to avoid confusion. For at the moment there is an outgoing (and many believe exhausted if not somewhat senile) lame duck president, but he is still president--and he is making moves (which will be discussed in a moment). And there is Trump, who most definitely has a mandate from US voters. And neither are on the same page. And as even a junior college professor of international relations will tell you: in politics confusion is dangerous. Confusion creates conflicts. Conflicts that could otherwise be avoided. Such as the First World War.

4) Biden is... also wilder than a wild card. A decision to allow Ukraine to use long-distance missiles (such as ATACMS) might very well have been lauded as projecting strength back in 2022--and they could certainly have been justified at the time that HIMARS  became the norm in 2023--yet the timing is... now. Now is very late, very awkward, quite dangerous, and despite their use being entirely justified, this decision has come from said lame-duck president whose party (and this was very much a referendum on Biden and foreign policy) was soundly defeated. The knee-jerk reaction of Trump and Republicans come January may now be a complete cutoff of aid. Which means this very well could be a case of too little, too late... or much, much worse.

In Biden's defense, the addition of North Koreans to the mix was the final straw. That said... this defense is actually quite weak. What was the drive toward Kyiv to begin with? What was Bucha (and so many other atrocities across the country)? What was the deportation of thousands upon thousands of children? The panicked flight of millions of Ukrainians West? The destruction of infrastructure in Ukraine last winter (and this is once again ongoing? Espionage, attempted assassinations and outright bombings perpetrated by GRU for years?

There were plenty of straws. Apparently, none of those straws were enough.

5) Russia's use of a ballistic missile has shaken up NATO, allies, probably the US included, BUT it is not the first time that Russia has used a missile that could be a delivery system for nukes. Iskanders can deliver nukes, as can other Russian weapons systems. A bit of sobriety is needed here.

6) According to polls, a slim majority of Ukrainians truly just wants the war to end. Meanwhile, the military remains understaffed--and as was noted by the article above--on many fronts drone teams are carrying the load. This is not sustainable. Now the US is pushing for the Ukrainian government to draft 18-and-ups. This will be... difficult. And heartbreaking. Forcing youth into the army is difficult in the best of times. Forcing a battered, traumatized and arguably frightened youth into harrowing front lines? Expect mothers and grandmothers to resist. True, most of us when we were 18 thought we were grown and could rule the world. Now that I've hit middle age, it's easy to see 18-year-old boys for what they are: children. True, Ukraine may no longer have a choice, as Russia does not seem bent on a win and a peace deal, but on the utter dominance and destruction of Ukraine. Heartbreaking. But I already said that.

7) And we'll say it again--based on every shred of evidence from this war, the history of Ukraine and wars past, a peace deal with Russia will be no deal at all. This is a classic case of damned if you do, damned if you don't.

8) Russia is also running short of men. True, Russia keeps sending men to the front, but they keep dying at a rate of 1,200 a day. The country is also running short of armor, equipment, and neither North Koreans nor recruiting from... Yemen has proven successful. Yet. On the other hand, this is Russia--whose leaders traditionally use the citizenry like lemmings. Which means expect more of the same.

9) The Russian economy is finally shot. This may well be true. Maybe. But Russian leaders traditionally... use the citizenry like lemmings. And long-distance Ukrainian strikes, while effective from a purely military standpoint, may well galvanize said lemmings (who were hardly eating cake to begin with).

10) Neither the citizens nor the warriors of Ukraine deserve this war. I have met countless Ukrainians. They continue to impress. Despite horrible loss, hardship and dwindling hope, the Ukrainians I have befriended remain shockingly brave, artistic, creative and... hopeful. I have known Ukrainians who have gone to the front--and they have not come back. I have known aid workers... who tirelessly have served their people... and they have not come back. And yet the survivors somehow manage a grim smile.

Leadership is leadership, but this is a beautiful nation that deserves so much better.

And call me what you will, but the same cannot truly be said of Russia, as massacres (like at Bucha), the bombing of citizens and the killing of soldiers have hardly been kept secret from the populace. And it does appear that much of that populace still wants war.

Yet again... there is blame to be shared. For the mantra of old men sending young men to war comes to mind. There is obviously Russian President Vladimr Putin. There are the leaders of nations who belong to NATO who dithered and debated and who drip-fed sanction moves when it was clear that attempted genocide was well under way. There is Biden (yes, pushing Ukraine to launch the counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia counts). And now... we'll see about Trump.

But finally, remarkably, there is Ukraine's current top general, Oleksandr Syrskyi, has stated that victory will only be possible with a new counteroffensive (see the article here: https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-top-commander-wants-counteroffensive-013237723.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAG6Ld2sLZgpeFuFpRGhZLLbeIwFlZnBeL6H3RzTQeOY_wdd4jA8W9PVSqmsZl_JxGZ_LLksnjDk9nqwm7oJST0dhrfC7qulEcV-Mt9kuJF3lHX-7WX67fkUSBWUiNKOPQEGByVphseipV85ZlUrz8cEEjQ3z_byoiU_dL3SiLv-MO]P

And that may also be true. But reality and sobriety may well mean it's time to just somehow hold the fort (if indeed Ukraine can). For even if victory demands a counter akin to a greater Kursk (which even if the Russians did not entirely bite, was still likely a stroke of genius) from where will Syrskyi get the men?

Again, the under-26 crowd does remain to be tapped in Ukraine, but...

And at any rate, Syrskyi is Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's man (as Zhaluznyi was not).

Which means not only the defense, but now the survival of Ukraine, even as we know know it...

Is on Zelenskyy.

But then again... this is a war with Russia we are talking about.

Which means, success or failure, Zelenskyy has been carrying the weight from the start.

The front lines... and the Trump factor to come

Now to the front lines, starting with Kursk. But before we compare maps, let's start with missiles. And drones. And Trump.

In November not only did Russia use, demonstrate, test the Oreshnik ballistic missile at Dnipro last week--theater that US insiders still believe is just that (i.e. nuclear apocalypse is not yet upon us), but equally or more importantly, Russia has once again hit Ukraine with an all-out missile and drone attack hell bent on destroying infrastructure for the coming winter.

In other words, if you can't beat them, make them miserable. And unlivable.

Which again brings home the point: this is genocide, friends. It was from the beginning. That said, ATACMS used at long range are making an impact. They have taken out (at least partially) S-400 systems in Kursk; they have hit the Russian Khalimo airbase (Kursk theater) and Belbek in Crimea. And Russia has retaliated--setting "records" with drone and missile strikes. This includes a 10-plus hour attack three days ago that included Kalibrs, Iskanders, Kh cruise missiles and various drones--and it also includes a massive attack underway today even as I write this blog.

But what of the ATACMS. The problem is that they are late on the scene (as have been tanks, armor, ammo, etc. for... years), but a greater problem is that there simply are not enough of them. And if you would like to read the skeptic's take, check out this article in Foreign Policy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/21/ukraine-russia-war-atacms-missiles-strategy/

So back to our original question: Is all of this suffering for naught? Is Ukraine destined to lose the war?

Not yet. Not quite yet.

First, it is true that Russia is very much gaining ground. And there are risks that a breakthrough could turn into a limited route in various fronts. That said, Russia has long since run through its best men. And vehicles. And armor. Yes, it can grind out kilometers, but little points to the potential of an immediate breakthrough at any front that could suddenly mean yet another drive on Kyiv.

Second, Russian has long since run through its adequate men. True, the cannon fodder never stops, and yes it is also true that Russian's psychopathic willingness to sacrifice thousands is wearing Ukraine down to the nub, but a Russian drive for the win simply does not look possible at this point. Moreover, the 100,000 North Koreans set to flood Ukraine--and yes, even if this number was based on solid intel--was in reality never going to happen. The deal may have been in place, but paying for the deal... that is another story. Meanwhile, North Koreans have come face to face with a war far more brutal than anything they could have prepared for--and Russian officers have clearly faced immense difficulties with regard to coordination or even basic communication on the front.

As Mike Tyson once said: "Everybody has a plan until you get punched in the face."

Third, the current realities are likely to simply be too stark for Trump and co. to ignore. Also, one thing you can say about Trump is that he is not patient. He will definitely attempt to force a cease fire and get both sides to negotiate. The odds of Russia bending to his wishes are all but zero... which means that US aid may be delayed, but it is unlikely to stop

Finally, Ukraine may have just lasted long enough to buy itself time. In short, the terrain is getting wetter, more miserable. True--much more rain is needed, but the temperature is generally still above freezing which means eventual muck. Russia is making progress, but each kilometer is coming at an absurd cost, and this cost will increase with the mud. Prayers for more mud.

A month of Russian gains...

Now to the maps. And a quick caveat: as this is very, very long blog post, we will keep the descriptions short and sweet, relying primarily on comparisons. That said, the gains, while adding up, combine to "only" mean land equal to about half the size of London (according to Reuters reports). Ukraine is... much bigger than that.

First, just to get oriented, below is the entire theater of war as of 26, 2024.

Now let's compare maps. The first (below) is Kursk and Russian counters as of Oct. 28, 2024.

Notice even at that time that Russia was no longer "simply putting up with Kursk." Likewise, Ukraine was still pushing north. This was in line with Ukraine's original plans to draw troops from Pokrovsk, and, although belatedly, there have been at least some positive results, as although disrupted, Pokrovsk is still holding (as will be seen below).

Kursk as of Oct. 28, 2024

Next is a Deepstate UA map as of Nov. 13, 2024. Here Russian counters are becoming more severe, and more isolated Ukrainian ground is looking vulnerable. Likewise, Russian attacks on the southeast of the front are gaining in ferocity.

Kursk as of Nov. 13, 2024

Flash to this week. Isolated holdings are gone, and Russian attempts to take back land on the western side of the incursion are now better organized, and they appear to be more effective. Russian blogger reports that Ukrainian troops have broken in that sector are likely quite exaggerated, but there is a reason why ATACMS are being used in this sector--this being to slow down said attacks. That said, even the quite conservative ISW has noted Russian advances (which roughly match those noted from The Corners sources and highlighted on the map below saying: "Reportedly elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division), advanced east of Nizhny Klin (southeast of Korenevo) during a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Darino (immediately southwest of Nizhny Klin." [ISW report Nov. 27].

To the east there are sporadic reports of "ferocious fighting," but what is clear is that Zelenskyy wants to hold onto Kursk. Theoretically, this will be a bargaining chip (a very symbolic chip) should peace negotiations actually begin.

Kursk as of Nov. 26, 2024

The Kupiansk front...

Russian forces have targeted Kupiansk and the Svatove fronts for more than two years, but fighting past and through Synkivka has been bitter and slow (Synkivka being essentially a village in the middle of nowhere that a year ago was a bloody footnote for repeatedly changing hands.

This picture appears to be worryingly changing. But first the wider background. Below is a mapy of the Kupiansk to what we will still call the Pischane front as of Oct. 28, 2024. At tat time Russian forces had already reached the Oskil river at the Pischane front, but they had not driven north nor south at the Oskil. In the north Kupiansk was still holding off a renewed Russian assault.

As of Nov. 13 the scene was changing with Russian forces driving down for Kupiansk and beginning attacks Dvorichna further north. As can be seen, this was already raising questions about the potential of entrapment for Ukrainian forces in the gap between both points (or at least of supplying said forces (noted by the blue question mark).

Kupiansk to Pischane as of Nov. 27, 2024, seen below, poses more dramatic questions. Ukrainian counter attacks have been sharp, but Russian infantry, if not mechanized units, appear to be making gains.

This can be seen in the map below. Russian bloggers have claimed that infantry has crossed the Oskil just north of Kupiansk (where it is relatively a trickle compared to the south), and more concentrated efforts are making gains at Dvorichna. Likewise, Russian forces are already in the outskirts of Kupiansk itself, and vicious fighting is ongoing.

Equally troubling are Russian gains at Pischane as of Nov. 27, 2024. Russian forces have been moving both north and south along the Oskil, and have taken most of Kolishnikyvka, although they have reportedly been temporarily halted at Zahryzove. That said, reports of elements of Russian units (possibly special forces) crossing the Oskil in the north abound.

Moving south--Borova to Sloviansk...

Taking the above into account, the Kupiansk to Borova to Sloviansk logistics line (it is difficult to call this a defensive line) as of Nov. 27, 2024 is very much under threat. Already disrupted, the vulnerability of the line and the forces that would otherwise be supplied by that line makes it easy to see the potential of a significant territorial grab by Russian forces, possibly within a month if the tide is not turned.

Likewise, in the second map, the Borova to Pokrovsk line is shown. This territory is not seen as vulnerable, in part due to stiff Ukrainian defenses at Konstiantynivka and Pokrovsk (which, it should be said, would hold no matter what, according to key sources for The Corners, who said as month in the summer).

Borova to Pokrovsk as of November 27, 2024...

The Pokrovsk story...

And indeed Pokrovsk has held, as can be seen in the next two maps.

Pokrovsk as of Oct. 28, 2024

Pokrovsk as of Nov. 27, 2024

That said, as can be seen in the the maps both above and below (with these screen shots made on Nov. 27), Russian forces have not been content to simply stop south of the Pokrovsk and Mynohrad logistics lines. Further south (below Shevchenko) Russian troops have advanced almost at a rate of a kilometer a day, and Ukrainians have long since been forced to pull out of the Hrnyk cauldron, which was so evident approximately one month ago. (This is explained in the ensuing maps).

The Hrnyk-Kurakivka-Kurakhove retreat can been seen as follows. Below is the situation south of Pokrovsk on Oct. 28, 2024.

The fight has now left Hrnyk far behind, with Ukrainian forces attempting to stop Russian advances north and south of Kurakhove as of Nov. 27, 2024. At this point it is estimated that half of Kurakhove is in Russian hands, but Russian advances have slowed.

That said, the situation is dynamic. Further south Russian forces have reportedly been attempting to drive north toward Rozlyv and Konstiantynopil, which would theoretically cut supply lines to all Ukrainian positions south of Kurakhove and put Ukrainian forces east of Sukhi Yaly in danger of eventually being cut off. This drive toward Rozlyv, however, has been reportedly halted (and halted hard), which may be the best news of this update. Here the Ukrainians still have the advantage of being near supply lines and settlements, with Russian forces cursed to drive north across terrain with extreme vulnerability to drones.

Now some may ask, what goes on still further south. In short, Russian forces are attempting to push north in Zaporizhzhia and even through the river-island-swamps in Kherson near Kozachi Laheri. Yet the the situation remains mostly static, and in summary the fronts noted above are seen as currently the most critical. Which again means the current situation is indeed bleak. All is not lost, but Ukraine remains forever on the edge. Predictions at this point time are worth a grain of salt, but the next two months through the end of January may well determine the country's, if not the region's and the world's future.

Here's hoping it ain't so.

God bless and Slava Ukrainii.

Preston Smith is a licensed investigator based in Gdansk, Poland. He can be reached at query@cddi.pl.

Maps courtesy of Deepstate UA.

Destruction in Odessa, following a Russian missile attack in mid-November. Photo courtesy of Dsns.gov.ua, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons.