War in Ukraine update: More and more cracks appearing in Russia as May 9 "victory celebrations" approach

Building on last month’s post (yes, it’s been more than a month), the ante continues to be upped with regard general world chaos—with the only consistency resting deep within the flood of narcotics continuing to flow to Western Europe.

But there are twists out there, which means that the priority will instead be the briefest War-in-Ukraine rundown in the history of The Corners. Ok, maybe not so brief. But let’s at least start this with bullet points:

• Russia is cracking (as predicted). My own sources are reporting that (finally) the Russian citizenry has finally grown sick of the Special Military Operation that exceeded Russia’s fight against Nazi Germany during World War II in length… back in January. The combo of a shoddy economy, high losses that cannot be ignored, lost jobs—and burning oil refineries that can no longer be ignored—has also resulted in outright public criticism on the part of Russians… kind of. The most high profile barb (if it can be called that) came in late April from the now 81-year-old former presidential candidate, Gennady Zyuganov, a hard core communist who during his glory days was about as fiery as they come. His words were careful, but pointed, stating essentially that if the status quo remains (or worsens), Russia awaits a 1917 moment by this fall.
• This week rumours abounded (and no, these have not been substantiated) that there was an assassination attempt on Russian President Vladimir Putin himself. Whether or not such rumours are true, upped security surrounding Putin, prompted allegedly by both Ukrainian drone strikes and also hits on Russian military figures—as well as a leaked intel report-- actually prompted coverage by a major (and not exactly risk-taking) news service in the form of CNN [Ed. note: check out the article here-- https://edition.cnn.com/2026/05/04/europe/putin-russia-security-intelligence-intl ] which highlighted the fact that Putin apparently spends “weeks at a time in upgraded bunkers, often in Krasnodar, a coastal region bordering the Black Sea hours away from Moscow,” with CNN citing an unrevealed source at an intelligence service.
• Interesting is that the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) also cited the same report, which noted the risk of a coup (although the ISW stated that it had not seen signs of this), and that “Putin amended Federal Protective Service (FSO) regulations to provide security to 10 high-ranking generals after a December 2025 meeting of security officials in which the officials shifted blame onto each other for the December 22 assassination of Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, the chief of the Russian General Staff’s Operational Training Department, in Moscow City.” But most interesting is that this same report seemed to link such a coup attempt to none other than the former Putin crony/supporter, former Russian Defense Minister and current Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu. Could it be true?

Well, yeah. Maybe.

• Then there is the stress and potential low-water mark of the May 9 Victory Day celebration—traditionally a moment for the military to crow its successes and show of a wide array of tank, rocket launchers and high stepping military elite. It has already been reported that this will be scaled back, and internet access is already being scaled back as well. Already.
• Now think about this—May 9 is still days away, but internet access is being restricted in Moscow and St. Petersburg. So imagine you are still one of those Russian with business to do, but you can’t make bank transfers. Now imagine you are one of the millions of Russians who are sharp enough to turn to VPNs. Which means more reality (as well as some admitted propaganda from Ukraine and the West) will slip through. And more not-so-sharp Russians will also find their way to VPNs because, hey, the internet cannot be denied. As far as Putin goes, none of this bodes well.
• And there are questions regarding just what the military would have available (or in the age of Ukrainian drone strikes would want to put on display), but the real question is perhaps: Will Putin actually attend? And assuming so… will he manage to recharge his nation or will this simply be a moment where reality humiliates an increasingly beleaguered old man?

We will soon see.

True, much of the above (if not all) is debatable. Likewise, it could be argued that Russia is not cracking at all—it is simply grinding forward in the same, ugly, ponderous and costly fashion that Russia does. Which is at least partially true.

Which brings us to the grey that sometimes threatens to overwhelm the silver lining. Despite Russian counter offensives, which have arguably taken the steam out of Russia’s plans for the spring, Ukraine has lost ground of late. While in February and March Ukraine actually regained more ground than Russia managed to take, there have been worrying developments since, a couple of which I will highlight below.

The big picture…

First the obligatory big picture. From a distance it might see that not much has changed. Now even if this were true, Russia continues to lose some 30,000 men a month (and take hits to oil infrastructure seemingly on a daily basis).

Now once again the “fortress belt” that was once intact from Pokrovsk up to Kupiansk. Note the map from the past that showed my original prediction, following the Kursk “lights out” incident that took place in the spring of 2025. At that point I noted that the area dotted blue would eventually fall to the Russian machine. The series of maps below will note the "danger zone" that I worried could be lost, followed by the same zones today.

March 2025 Pokrovsk to Sloviansk...

Pokrovsk to Sloviansk as of May 5, 2026...

Kramatorsk to Kupiansk as of May 5, 2026...

Yes, it has taken longer than predicted—and yes, Russia’s push forward cannot be constituted as “winning,” but the difference cannot be denied.

Kupiansk (i.e. Synkivka)...

Many of the above Russian gains came prior to February 2026. But while Ukraine has been exacting a heavy toll, some gains are recent, and here we will turn to a couple of key points on the front—a few that may have been missed. We are going to go negative here so I am not going to highlight the current Ukrainian counters in Sumy or Ukraine’s impressive pre-emptive drives to stump the Russian plan to drive toward Zaporizhzhia.

Again, as painful as it may be, for once, let’s go grey instead of the silver lining.

Yours Truly has highlighted the Russian mistakes at Kupiansk, which included a mistaken drive down the west side of the Oskil that set up those troops to be essentially slaughtered—and then the remarkable Ukrainian counter to push Russia out of Kupiansk itself. And during that time (and I do consider this key to buying the Ukrainians time in Kupiansk) somehow the Ukrainians held the long-embattled village of Synkivka.

Those days are over. Once again Russian forces are slowly grinding forward, which is going to put tremendous pressure on Ukrainian defenders in the remainder of that pocket. There will need to be decisions made in order to pull soldiers out simply because the Oskil, while a natural barrier for Ukraine is also an impediment to escape. We’ve seen this once before—and it have gone badly, but Kupiansk was retaken. The Ukrainians brain trust has proven flexible and fast, but this spells trouble.

And here the difference can be seen just since mid-April. Not that Synkivka was still holding out--but that the Russians were already driving.

Fast forward to the same map as of May 5, 2026 (seen below), and Russian progress is unfortunately evident. But the true risk lies in how Ukrainian forces will escape a pocket that is forming south of Kivsharivka. This is difficult, at times marshy ground, and the Russians also are adept at hitting soldiers with drones. Trying to cross the Oskil may be possible, but it's not easy, and as noted (perhaps exaggerated) troops from both the north and south of the pockets east of Kupiansk will likely need to make their way to Kupiansk itself if forced to retreat or risk getting their backs to the Oskil and then getting throttled--not unlike how the Russians were punished once they had had advanced west, but had their backs against the Oskil on the west side. [Note--the blue lines are just showing theoretical escape routes, and there is no evidence that retreats are ongoing].

Kostiantynivka...

A second potential lowlight is the current Russian attack on Kostiantynivka. This is not to say that Ukraine is not putting up a vicious defense there, and there is much debate as to what is being held, what has been actually taken or retaken by Ukraine. According to the ISW, a long list of Russian battalions, regiments and brigades are active there, including "the Russian 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian positions and vehicles in northern and eastern Kostyantynivka.[50] KVN drone operators of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment"

And a host of others. It should be highlighted that despite Ukrainian counters, including to the south of the city, the pressure here is real (as it still remains further north of the Kostiantynivka-Kramatorsk-Sloviansk belt (chiefly at Lyman) and Sviatohirsk. To get an idea of what is happening here, see the maps below, with the second and third noting Russian progress at Kostiantynivka since mid-April. However, note the village of Mykolaivka in both of the Kostiantynivka maps.

Kostiatynivka mid-April 2026...

Kostiantynivka May5, 2026...

While the picture does not appear dramatically different on the surface, Russia is going all in, especially to the north of the city. (But again note Mykolaivka, as we well get back to that).

At first glance it may seem that Russian forces are still on the very outskirts. A satellite map reveals this is not quite the case.

A few things to note above:

• First, Russia again seems hell bent on absolutely flattening yet another Ukrainian city. Which again raises the question: What good does it do Russia to "seize" completely flattened cities that are so destroyed that they even become impossible to hold should there be a counter attack? And the mines, left over ordinance, unexploded bombs, lack of water supply, sewage, electricity and general all around health hazards even to troops raise questions of how Russia could possibly pay to revive such cities even if they remained forever part of a 'greater motherland." In other words, it's clear that the whole point of this war (the distorted, twisted point that is Putin's view) simply makes no sense.
• Second, Russia appears determined to walk right into another Pokrovsk--and how many soldiers did it lose there? Simple question, simple answer--nobody knows. Probably between 125,-175,000.
• Much like at Pokrovsk there was a holdout village that complicated Russian matters to no end in the form of Mynohrad. The Kostiantynivka variant of this appears to be Mykolaivka (or this could be Synkivka if we were to compare it to Kupiansk). Reports at press time appeared to indicate that Ukrainian counters may have run the Russians back out of that city. And at any rate, the defenders there long stumped Russian efforts to get beyond Chasiv Yar. So essentially, expect Russian losses to be heavy.
• Which brings us to the last point, Putin is still all in (even if that means his forces are all in while he hides in some undisclosed bunker), but Ukraine FPV drones, especially, are racking up Russian casualties at faster and faster rates, which the current benchmark of 30,000 per month probably higher than what Russia can manage in terms of new recruits.

Which means that the silver lining is still there, despite the endless grey.

But a few more negatives before we end this. Belarussian movements on the border are indeed causing worry for Ukraine, as has noted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Could this be a set up for a Belarussian offensive? Yes, although it's a bit hard to believe that Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenko would truly be willing to commit to a war that would certainly not be popular at home; which would demand a push through difficult territory against a truly seasoned defender; which would result in still more sanctions and which might once again tip his fortunes in Belarus itself. But yes, the risk is there.

Then there is the risk that Ukraine will simply run out of fuel. In late April Zelenskyy stated that the armed forces have what they need, but rationing is ongoing, and the price of fuel has definitely jumped. Meanwhile, the US Donald Trump administration just seems to be doubling down against Ukraine (even in the face of stiff questions even from Republicans) and it faces a constant and grueling shortage of manpower.

But (finally) back to the silver lining. The dirty little secret here is that Russia's situation may... actually be worse. Ukraine's "sanctions," which have meant the targeting of fuel infrastructure has somewhat negated the jump in oil prices that followed the beginning of the US war with Iran. That jump may have quite literally saved Putin's skin, but... it now appears, according to sources cited by TVP World that these gains may be short lived indeed. While the Hormuz conflict may have prevented an economic meltdown that seemed imminent in February, the news outlet cited the Russian think tank TsMAKP, noted as being close to the Kremlin, stating that "high global oil prices are unlikely to significantly boost Russia’s economic growth this year, as Ukrainian drone attacks and Western sanctions weigh on production and exports."

Meanwhile, Russia's reaction to Hormuz has been telling. While some may have expected a Slavic sigh of relief, instead Putin's cronies, led by the always difficult Sergey Lavrov, have hammered at the US, criticizing the war and world-wide fuel disruption. Why? Likely, they are getting pushed by their neighbour China, as Hormuz has hit Asian markets hard, but the simple story is that while Ukraine has been under siege for years, it does have the backing of Europe (and most other countries in the West not named the United States). Sure, Russia has China, North Korea and... Iran, but the reality is more and more that it just has itself.  And the combo of Ukrainian "sanctions" and the bump in Russian old prices do not help matters at home.

Which means: watch this space. Or better yet, watch what happens on May 9. Putin will need to make an appearance... somewhere. He will spout Putin-esqe propaganda, but analysts like Yours Truly will be gauging reaction with a microscope. For Russia moves slow, lives in the past, and as even Zyuganov pointed out...

The revolution of 1917 just is never that far away.

Preston Smith is a licensed investigator based in Gdansk, Poland. He can be reached at query@cddi.pl.

Photo credit: An 16-storey residential building in Sumy after Russian drone strike in the night on 4 April 2026. 11 people were injured in the building. Source: Dsns.gov.ua, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons.