Questions and answers: the war in Ukraine, China... and Fedorov

Questions and answers.

Well… a lot of questions anyway. As for the answers, I’ll do my best—but over the next few posts, as some of the questions I have received leave a lot to unwrap.

Which  means…

Greetings and salutations!

And consider this the first call-and-response post I’ve done in probably more than a year, but it’s time, as readers, fans (and some rather sharp critics) have written in to the blog or to me personally through private accounts, through email and what not, and it’s about time that Yours Truly faced the music. So in today’s post, expect a rather wide variety of topics, and while I will try to keep the responses short, succinct and otherwise to the point…

Well, don’t bet on it.

I’m confused about the war in Ukraine. A few months ago the news was negative. Now I keep seeing that Russia has lost the war. Who is right? –AR, Poland

Good question (and a recent question, which is relevant). As you probably know, I have been watching the war and posting “primers” for quite some time. And lately I have likely been as confused as you are. So here is my three-layered take: First, Ukraine’s long-distance drone and missile operations have been not only unexpected but also unexpectedly effective. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently noted, there is likely not a major Russian oil refinery that has not suffered damage from Ukrainian attacks. And it does seem that literally nothing is out of reach, and that anything energy related is on the table (hence the equally shocking and effective strikes on Russian oil tankers and the “shadow fleet.”

Likewise, there has also been the Crimea drone offensive, which has starved Crimea of fuel, panicked the Russian population (and tourists) there and greatly hindered Russian military supply to Zaporizhzhia and beyond.

And finally, there is not only a combo of technological innovation, including even armed robot ground drones, a counter-offensive that, while limited in scope, does seem to have made headway—and finally an ongoing lesson to Europe (and the United States) that US President Donald Trump was wrong. In other words, Ukraine did have cards to play, and an astounding level of Russian casualties has proven this.

So is Russia losing the war? In terms of a failed “Special Military Operation,” likely more than 1.5 mln casualties, a severely damaged economy and even the undermining of the Putin regime’s hold on the country… it has already lost. But in terms of whether the war will continue or whether Russia can still damage Ukraine through abhorrent levels of airstrikes—and whether or not Ukraine could still lose significant territory?

No. It’s not over yet. Not by a long shot.

This was proven by a war crime that took place the night of July 18-19 when Russia used a ballistic missile assault on all parts of Kyiv in yet one more attempt to intimidate the population through wanton destruction. There is no quip, no metaphor to describe this. This is simply another page of ongoing genocide—the word that so many were (and some continue to be) afraid to use. And here there is almost nothing else to say.

So let’s turn to the war on the ground. For months there have been reports of Ukrainian net gains. And yes, if we count the current counteroffensive Zaporizhzhia (Berezove/Turnovate area), as well as the de-facto isolation of Crimea, there is an argument there. But upon closer inspection, the situation is far less optimistic.

As I’ve stated in the past (and this will fly in the face of the zillion talking heads out there trying to force-feed us expertise from the West), Russia is in fact making gains. The Pokrovsk to Kupiansk line has long-since been shortened to the Kostiantynivka-Kupiansk line, and while Kostiantynivka has become yet another death trap for Russians (much as did Pokrovsk), it is if not lost, in complete ruins and will not remain disputed for long. Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are closer to Russian lines than ever before, Russian forces are creeping down the Oskil toward Borova and the Kupiansk pocket is shrinking daily even if that fortress city (once lost and then retaken) is holding out.

Meanwhile, Russia is not only using ballistic missiles on civilian areas, but it has increased glide bomb attacks while also reverting to the standard rumblings that it could always use nukes. Its own drone game has improved dramatically, and Russian teams designated with locating and killing Ukrainian drone operators have become worryingly adept.

Likewise, Ukrainian morale is hard to gauge (and this is not including the “Fedorov protests,” which I will address momentarily). I have had sources tell me only the past few days that Ukraine is more determined than ever, but that strikes on civilian areas (with this year’s civilian death toll at more than 1,400) also psychologically battering an already weary population. Also, the manpower crisis is real and incidents that see military… types grabbing men off the street to throw them into training and then literally the fire do happen. Reports of abused against new “recruits” have surfaced and again… (and this cannot be repeated enough) the misery and stress inflicted on civilians by nightly Russian air attacks is near beyond belief.

Which all means…

There is no clear picture.

But it’s not over until it’s over. I do believe (as predicted) that Russia is truly beginning to crack. There are more tales of the Russian rich finding creative ways to get money out of the country—especially as even long term buddies to Russian President Vladmir Putin (such as Ilya Traber)—have seen their fortunes “nationalized.” Likewise, there are rumours of still sharper conflicts between the Russian military and FSB.

So yes, Russia could fall. But here is the kicker: I do not believe that anyone is capable of predicting just what happens if it does.

[Paraphrased] Do you have confirmation of the collapse of Russian-Chinese Siberian pipeline talks? Is China done with Russia?—JW, France/Poland, MS, Czech Republic

Yes, I do—in the sense that I’ve read the same reports you have likely seen (The Wall Street Journal scoop that China has told Russia that the Siberia 2 gas pipeline is just not going to happen). And actually, there are many more publications out there that have gone into depth on this, which are worth a scan, as reading between the lines may actually bring a chuckle.

The crux of the situation appears to be that China is all for the pipeline if it can buy gas at the same rate… paid by Russian households (roughly USD 50,000 per thousand cubic meters of gas). Russia cannot possibly afford this—the rate is insanely low for Russian households simply because Russian households have been left behind basically not since the early 1990s but since the dawn of Russian pre-history. Sending gas at large volumes to China at this rate would be economic suicide.

But China simply does not care. In fact, the word is that it sent a message to Russian negotiators to… stay home. For times have changed. For decades Russia was able to charge high prices for gas exports to the West, but the West has now pivoted away. That is thanks to Putin’s “Special Military Operation.” But what Russia did not bank on (and indeed the West has failed to pay attention as well) is that China has not remained the China we are used to seeing. It is modernizing fast—to the point that in many respects (electric vehicles, for example) it is leaving the West behind. And it has options. If the Russians do not want to sell it gas at extraordinarily cheap prices, China is fine with that.

Moreover, China has sent other rather blunt and direct messages (for China) in that it is not providing technology and propulsion systems for Russian icebreakers; that it has consistently refused military aid to Russia ( well, apart from technology, training Russian forces from time to time, intelligence sharing, etc.) and that it is not happy with the bombardment of Kyiv.

Now I’m no China expert, but let’s just say that the relationship has never been particularly warm—it’s not like these guys trust each other—and it appears more transactional than ever. And Russia is increasingly too poor to make a deal.

Why did [Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy] fire his minister of defense [Mykhailo Fedorov]? Should he have not fire [Gen. Oleksandr] Syrskyi? –JH, Poland

Now this is a can of worms. Regarding the firing, Zelenskyy has come out to state that Syrskyi and Fedorov simply could not get along. Which is apparently true. Put this down to a generational gap or to a culture gap (Syrskyi is well known as having been born in Russia and a “Russian-style” general when it comes to his approach on fighting the war. Fedorov has meanwhile been credited with turning the war around, with turning the military around, with coming up with the current drone strategy that has punished Russia and, reportedly, now means that Russian infantry survive less than 30 minutes on the battlefield (according, apparently, to the CIA).

But delving deeper into all of the above—and keep in mind that I have been sitting on top of the war in Ukraine for quite a long time—I’m going to call partial BS on everything.

First, despite Ukraine’s non-stop (and highly successful) propaganda, there have been a great number of costly missteps. This firing is not the first—and it actually may not be the most consequential in terms of real facts (although perception abroad and at home may be something different indeed).

The Zaporizhzhia counteroffensive…

The greatest misstep to this day (in my humble opinion) was the infamous 2023 failed Zaporizhzhia counteroffensive forced upon then Chief of Staff Gen. Valerri Zhaluzny by not only Zelenskyy but also by the US. That this was coming was probably the worst-kept secret in the history of war, and it was further doomed by a lack of air cover (where were those F-16s and why not Warthogs) and tanks (Germany was quite laggard here after big promises).

And the end result? High casualties, mistrust of the US, a failed offensive--and Zhaluzny wound up taking a diplomatic post in the UK where he has basically waited out the war while apparently planning an eventual presidential bid.

This heralded the arrival of Syrskyi, who inherited desperate times, as drone defense was not yet a thing and the Russians were still pushing forward (Bakhmut—one of the bloodiest battles of the war was technically lost in May 2023, prior to the Zaporizhzhia counteroffensive).

And there were… mistakes. A bungled troop rotation resulted in a major Russian advance beyond Bakhmut. The later Kursk offensive will always be questioned—on the one hand it did force Russia to use troops that would have otherwise at the time focused on the fortress city of Pokrovsk, but on the other, even if the US Donald Trump administration had not effectively blinded Ukrainian special forces in Kursk, the value of said territory and the long-term possibility of holding the Kursk salient was always a question.

And Ukraine did take a bludgeoning even while making Russia pay in what at times appeared to be a series of smaller Verduns across a wide, wide front.

So it’s no surprise that now Syrskyi is under fire, with protests (fueled not only by Fedorov and his allies, but also by Ukrainian 20-somethings) are demanding not only the reinstatement of Fedorov, but also Syrskyi’s removal.

Fedorov and more Fedorov…

There is little question that  Fedorov has gained the support of a key generation in Ukraine—i.e. those in their 20s—at a time when manpower issues are well beyond critical. He is young, dynamic and he has a modern approach to war that has been proven in the field with the mind-boggling successes that have 1) cost Russians likely as many as 35,000 men a month 2) seen Elon Musk talked into turning off Starlink for Russia 3) crippled Russia’s energy infrastructure 4) isolated Crimea 5) punished the shadow fleet and the Russian Navy and 6) actually shaken not only the Russian economy but also possibly cracked Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power.

Which is a lot.

Of success…

To take credit for.

Which is an issue. There is no doubt about the Musk issue—which is a big deal. There is also little doubt about Fedorov backing and pushing for the currently wildly successful mid-range drone and missile strikes. But.. he was also only minister of defense for six months.

Let’s just say this is likely more nuanced than it appears. In fact, much of Fedorov’s influence began while he was minister of digitalization, not while he was minister of defense. Such nuance includes generational and cultural difference, both negative and positive, that actually need to be appreciated—as quite possibly he was better suited (and more influential to this day as minster of digitalization than as an outsider attempting to come in as minister of defense where he would essentially have to shake up the entire military… as an outsider).

For there is a reality that also needs to be taken under consideration: someone did have to make sure the lines held long enough for Ukraine to come up with a plan. This credit—the fortress line and beyond (for it was Syrskyi who made sure Ukraine continued to dig in and prepare fall back lines)—cannot be attributed to Fedorov. Yes, it has been brutal—stories you hear of young Ukrainians grabbed off the street are real—and not only has Russia also upped its drone game, but it has long punished Ukrainians on or near the front line with artillery, drones and glide bombs. Which means that the 30-minute mortality number for front-line Russians likely at least somewhat has gone both ways.

But also drone advances and especially mid-range targeting of Russian was under development long before January 2026. Fedorov deserves a huge amount of credit for this… but perhaps more as minister of digitalization than as a tech expert attempting to become a military strategist from the outside.

Which brings us to the youth issue. Let’s call it Ukrainian Generation Z. For there appears to be a certain portion of Generation Z in Ukraine (and no, I'm not counting the many brave young men and women who actually are at the front, often as highly talented drone operators), who want to hear the following: drones and robots will handle the problem—if young people need to go to the front, they do not need to go to the actual front line. And Fedorov will reorganize the military in such fashion.

Ok, I get it. Even grizzled Ukrainian warriors I know get it. The front is by all accounts becoming ever more frightening, as Russia has now formed special and effective teams to hunt out not only infantry, but also drone operators with increasing success. And honestly, stories of remarkable heroism where two or three heroes held positions against Russians for months and months on end--with the subliminal message being "forget about sensible rotations"--have only bolstered Fedorov’s popularity among the young (as have the street grabs).

That said, Fedorov’s propaganda—which is also what this is—is misleading in and of itself. Drones and robots are not enough. Grizzled veterans—those who began in 2022 and who are still alive and with their limbs—are rare (and a shocking number with whom I have spoken have been wounded multiple times, but still they keep fighting), but men who have fought on the ground for the past two years are not. And even those who hate Syrskyi (and these are also not lacking) will tell you that rotations are necessary (not a traditional Syrskyi strong point), but that ground has to be held and often retaken by actual humans. From such statements (at least as I’ve understood them), Fedorov has his points, and yes, the military needs better organization and more modernization, but when it comes to what are actually vulnerable 20-somethings, his points… have rung like pipe dreams.

Which has to make you wonder. Fedorov refused an “advisory position” (and he is clearly good at this and could continue propagating his strategies not that unlike how he did as minister of digitalization) then he went on the offensive with a presentation of endless such points that he claimed are needed to turn around the Ukrainian defense. Not that he is necessarily wrong, but… this was not a great look. For when does protest become dangerously divisive? And when does change and reform actually derail the train of defense that is indeed a war of life and death.

Especially when you appear to be simply ready to pick up your ball and go home.

And then throw in barbs such as how he recommended to Zelenskyy that the Ukrainian president remove Syrskyi as well.

Not exactly a message of unity, friend.

Or put it this way: since Fedorov was removed (but also in the wake of Fedorov’s decision not to work as an advisor combined with his talking points) this is the first time in years I have heard Ukrainians--including those involved in the actual fighting--say they believe now that they could actually lose the war. And this is on the heels of the drone successes and counteroffensive battles that only weeks ago had the Western press saying Russia should call it a day.

Maybe Fedorov should have taken that advisory position after all. Maybe he should have worked from the inside.

Maybe this is exactly the wrong mess at the wrong time for Ukraine.

Unfortunately, the answer is probably yes to all of the above.

[…] You have written a lot about the narcotics trade and about meth in Europe and Central Europe. I do not really see this as pervasive or a threat. I think there are more important things to write about. –MS, UK

Not really a question, and possibly your perspective would change if you were located in my part of the woods, but here goes: I personally view cocaine trafficking (and meth labs) as a real threat—to everyone. I was recently in the US and I was struck by meth and tranq (Xylazine) heads literally walking like zombies through the parking lot of my favorite barbecue joint back home. You have to see this to believe it, but if you also think that cocaine is not an in issue in Central European cities (and high schools), well, you are living an illusion.

[To be continued in Part 2…]

Preston Smith is a licensed investigator based in Gdansk, Poland. He can be reached at query@cddi.pl.

[Photo credit: Russia has targeted Kyiv residential buildings, with these increasing in June and July of this year. National Police of Ukraine, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons.]