The arrest of Ilya Traber--irrelevant or harbinger of Russian collapse?

What a difference a week makes.

While we do not want to take this too far, evidence that Russia is cracking appeared to be widespread over the past seven days, with Ukraine upping the ante that has led to Crimea being increasingly cut off; with Russian bloggers and even television personalities stating (well, often implying) that Russia is losing the war and all of this capped off by a massive drone attack on Moscow not only exposed a shortage of critical air defense capabilities, but also again crippled oil production on a scale that that has left Russians stranded in petrol lines and airports both.

Whew.

But there is more. And maybe it’s the most important more.

He Russian secret services (strictly speaking, the Federal Border Service of Russia/FSB) have not only ramped up the arrests of oligarchs in order to blackmail them into handing over cash and assets, but they have gone after the muscle behind the scenes that once held it altogether.

Specifically, I’m referring to oligarch and alleged member of the Tambovskaya crime gang, Ilya Traber.

Some will shrug. Others will say (by now)… yeah, we’ve heard that.

Ok, but again…

This is a big deal. Perhaps it is the one thing that has convinced Yours Truly that the cracking sound heard across the continent is real; that Putin’s days are (finally) numbered.

The thing is that organized crime is… important. Not that we want it, but go back to in history (and often not very far) and its presence often has a far greater influence than the history books will have us believe. From the pirates and smugglers that in paradoxical fashion helped lay the groundwork for the US Declaration of Independence to  Tammany Hall the slum-lord basis for much of Europe’s aristocracy (and thuggish enforcement against the peasants and later the “working class” to various booms of historic (and sometimes modern) office developments in major US and European cities, wise guy networks have left their collective mark.

And then you have Russia. And the man who effectively become the boss of all bosses, Russian President Vladimir Putin. (Apologies to Semion Mogilevich—for the moment anyway).

Now there may be some who have heard of Traber, but if not, it can be assumed that most readers will have heard of Putin’s alleged mafia links. And possibly, Dear Reader, you have read of how Putin is wont to divide and conquer, to play thugs off of each other and also reward others with key monopolies, which essentially long meant an oligarchy on a leash if not a captured oligarchy from the tart.

Traber (not to mention his recent arrest) is something different—which is why he can be considered indicative.

Making money in the ‘90s…

Ilya Ilyich Traber has a wide and varied background. A graduate of Russia’s Higher Naval School, he once served as a lieutenant on a submarine. By 1991 he controlled the trade in antiques in Saint Petersburg (and yes, there are wider connotations here), became for that time wildly rich and became close to politicians and Putin himself.

He also, allegedly, ran the books for the Tambovskaya, which de facto (allegedly) was backed by the then mayor of Saint Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak. Whether or not this was true would by the end of the decade become immaterial, as Sobchak and two of his aides all dropped dead suddenly and practically simultaneously of heart attacks.

Traber, however, appears to have been quite material indeed, with the ability to appoint a Putin protégé, Alexei Miller, to control the port of Saint Petersburg (and thus the smuggling of narcotics), and perhaps in a tit-for-tat, Putin, as head of foreign trade for the city, gave the Tambovskaya to import petroleum products not only through the port, but through the Pulkovo Airport.

Somewhere along the way, Traber moved to Spain. That said, he was considered not only a key member of the Tambovskaya, but also one of Putin’s few (and closest) friends. In the fashion of what would be considered standard for a mafia accountant--and although he appears as a mere footnote to the Spanish investigation--he allegedly set up a vast network of shell companies throughout western Europe while also buying up real estate, reportedly for Putin, Putin’s cronies and other members of the mafia.

At this point, mafia historians will hearken back to a few key points in Traber’s history. First, the Tambovskaya were not just smugglers: they were bloody.  By 1995 it was believed they had committed at least 13 murders of note. By 2004, that number had tripled. Early murders included key oil executives and by the mid-1990s the group had taken over local petroleum product imports and exports and created (thanks to the help of Putin and Sobchak) and created port fuel trader PTK .

Second, the business side was not just a limited fight over a port. By 2001 the political winds (or whims) had changed, and the Tambovskaya were aid to have taken over some 100 companies in Saint Petersburg through violence and intimidation, not to mention the ports of Kaliningrad, Murmarsk and Arkhangelsk. By 2007 gang members were actually being prosecuted or investigated in Russia for having taken over 13 state enterprises).

Meanwhile, there was the real money, with the Tambovskaya accused of having laundered vast sums of money for Putin and his cronies through Parex Bank in Latvia (not to mention through affiliates in other countries, including in Germany). Then there was the Bulgarian Optima Ca investigation—within which Bulgarian authorities claimed the Tambovskaya had laundered up to EUR 1 bln (and not that’s not a misprint), which had been made primarily through narcotics, prostitution and protection rackets.

And now for the third point—this being the Spanish. As longtime readers may remember, Spanish authorities are simply not afraid to prosecute Russian mobsters (although they have not always been successful). In fact (and in part due to star witness, the late Alexander Litvinenko) it was the Spanish who highlighted the Parex Bank links, claiming that this was money laundered for Putin himself. The Spanish also investigated Russian politicians, such as United Russia MP Vladislav Reznik, as well as Ural Mining and Metallurgical Company, owned at that time by the Russian oligarchs Oleg Derispaska and Iskander Makmudov.

And then the fourth point: the Spanish case against Reznik, Traber and 15 others accused of racketeering and laundering millions… failed. In 2018 all were acquitted, as the judge in the case ruled that there simply was not enough clear evidence to prove the origins of monies—despite the court also stating that the money flows were "strange, uneconomic or unconventional,” as cited by the BBC. This despite cash seizures, real estate seizures, luxury car seizures, bank accounts frozen and arrests made that at least had us believing that narcotics trafficking were behind the wealth listed above.

And let’s just say that no matter where you looked, the Tambovskaya (and, as the Spanish would imply, Traber) seemed always in mix.

A rough life and now… the end?

But let’s get back to the mafia doing mafia things. And Putin doing Putin things. First, there was a time when the Tambovskaya may well have been doing dirty work for the KGB, with an old church on the island of Vasiyevsky used for “interrogation,” and the two key leaders of the mob, Vladimir Kumarin and Gennady Petrov, rumoured to have long having been tight with the KGB.

But the 1990s and 2000s were tough. The Tambovskaya went to war with the Malyshevskaya gang over narcotics. They also went to war with the Muslim Kazan mob over fuel imports/exports in Saint Petersburg. And the Tambovskaya managed to go to war with their other arch enemies… the Tambovskaya.

But hey, nobody said being in the mob was simple.

Somewhere along the way Kumarin lost an arm. And a kidney.  And he changed his name to Barsukov, tried to go legitimate and, despite having created, taken over or backed casinos and strip clubs, became a patron of the arts.

It didn’t make any difference. In 2007 he was arrested by an army of anti-organized crime police. Then in 2019 he was sentenced to 24 years in prison for organizing hits and racketeering.

Which means that somewhere along the way—at  least when it came to Putin--he had either grown too irritating or too powerful or both.

Now Traber. The man who seemed to be able to survive anything—and also one of the richest men in Russia—appeared to understand which way the winds were blowing long ago. In fact, had the Spanish police not become interested, he likely would have remained in Spain… forever. Instead, he wound up… let’s say… “exiled back” to Russia where he further understood the climate and wholeheartedly supported the special military operation in Ukraine.

Where he for years just kept making, reportedly, ridiculous amounts of money.

Until, as mentioned, Traber was arrested five days ago in in Saint Petersburg by the FSB.

Traber jailed, but what does it mean?

Even since the beginning of the special military operation Russia has remained a complicated place. The analysts and pundits who have routinely swayed to extremes when making predictions—often based on singular events—are proof of this. Which means that one cannot  just assume “event x” means “y.”

So we will not make one assumption, but run through a possible list of assumptions… some of which could very well mean that Russia is cracking… faster than assumed.

Now you may have seen what I just did there, but bear with me for a few moments more,  and let’s run through the possibilities.

• Traber is old. He and his mafia bratva are from another time—which means none of this means anything, as this is simply Putin seizing assets and monies needed for the war. This is quite possible. Even quite likely. The FSB have upped the ante on oligarchs—even making accusations an jailing a key drone entrepreneur—with seemingly the expressed will to blackmail said oligarchs into handing over far more than an open check. Yet… Traber was a longtime personal friend. He also, it would be assumed, still has quite a keys to various treasure chests or even maps, as his spider web of offshores was known to be complex indeed. So could it be a one-off? Could Putin have turned his back on a long-time accountant and ally out of a desperate need to finance the war? Maybe. But we’ll get back to that.
• Traber’s past foul play was just too ugly to ignore. Allegations tying Traber at least indirectly to paid hits are clearly nothing new. The Tambovskaya were the Tambovskaya, and while he has always denied membership and guilt—and while he has never before been accused of such—it’s possible (and the rumour is that he will be facing something of the kind). So could such prosecution or even a frame up come in handy. Well, yes—it would enable point 1. But we’ll get back to that too.
• Perhaps Traber was quietly disquieted and speaking with others in his various trades about deposing Putin. This is not that hard to believe. Men in his position tend to have their ears to the ground, and harder to believe is that Traber would think himself untouchable. This is guy that has already seen everything Russia has to offer—good and bad—and he’s lived it and survived it and prospered. So maybe the FSB got him before Traber or others could move. Hmm. Yes. Possible, but at his age and considering his apparent stability prior to the arrest, this one is also hard to believe.
• Maybe Putin was just being Putin. Maybe he ordered the FSB to move simply as an extension of tradition. Whether we are talking Stalin or Beria or Putin—or just the rough and tumble world of the mafia—purges of all kinds have always been the norm. You serve at the pleasure of the boss. Until he arrests you, sends you to a Gulag or simply has your thrown out a top-floor window.
• Or maybe there was a back-door set of negotiations that simply broke down. There have been rumours in the past of Putin and Traber butting heads over percentages. Considering the state of the Russian oil industry, the issues with Ukrainian long-range attacks, shadow fleet harassment by NATO and the general economic downturn faced by Russia in a variety of sectors, maybe Traber refused a new deal. Or maybe he simply could not pay the expected cut. And considering that many believe that Putin has for years received “colorized” versions of the reality of the war in Ukraine… this one seems likely.

But I’m here to tell you that none of the above matter as much as the fact that Traber was actually arrested. For the ripple effect will be greater than the arrest of other oligarchs. This one sends the final message that quite possibly many oligarchs (and many have been assumed to be in practice Putin appointees from the start) will understand that no matter their current relationship, they could be next.

But more than that, it van be assumed that Traber’s fingers (or at least those of his still existing minions, whether they claim to still be Tambovskaya or not) have suddenly awoken to a power vacuum across a number of sectors, legitimate or otherwise. And in Russia this has traditionally led to vicious infighting.

Or look at it this way, the Wild East of the 1990s, which saw non-stop and incredibly bloody mafia wars, took place during the immediate vacuum caused by the fall of the Soviet Union. Even so,  those were actually in a sense very positive times. Russia was on the edge of a boom that came with opening up to the West—and in fact this did happen. The fighting over privatizations, over mineral wealth, hotels, restaurants, open-air bazaars and even street corners was unreal, but it was also based no positioning for the future (however and immediate future that happened to be). And there were outlets for ill-gotten wealth (London, for example).

Now is a different story. Now there are organized crime groups, the remnants of organized crimes groups, disaffected minorities (and their crime groups—such as the never-say-die Chechens), the army, the security services, the oligarchs still standing… and their own often quite developed empires and security services, not to mention their allies.

Then there are… the mayors all across Russia, literally in cities and towns of all sizes.

The Sobchaks of our time—and yes, some of these apples are too long on the ground and rotten.

Finally, there are the cops, the returned soldiers (less than might even be believed) and, yes, even the vory, whom these days are primarily from the ‘Stans—and even if they have been under pressure since the mid-2000s, they… persist.

Which means…

Infighting.
Infighting that will once again become a bloody plague.

And  yes, this is Russia. Somewhere out there in that vast and desperate land there will be a rival to Putin. Maybe a politician. Maybe another former chef. Maybe an FSB agent who realizes he does not want to go down with the ship.

Maybe just some port gang leader who suddenly realizes that if the purges are going to hit his people, the time to do something is now.

It does make you wonder, eh?

About the now and what comes after it.

And about the decision making process up top—as reckless as it may be.

Even if Ukraine’s endless long-range strikes are helping it along.

Preston Smith is a licensed investigator based in Gdansk, Poland. He can be reached at query@cddi.pl.

Photo credit--in Russia memories of the gulags are never that far away. Public domain, courtesy of Wikimedia commons.