The war in Ukraine prediction results--i.e. the tables have turned in Kupyansk... and, yes, the cracks are showing in Russia

Greetings, salutations, Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!

As it has been more than a month since my last post, a round-up is in order, and today's blog is actually one that I have been looking forward to writing for quite some time--primarily because a key prediction on my part has been proven wrong.

Well, actually, not exactly wrong. Let's just say that a right has now been superseded by a wrong, which is on track to truly make things right. But before this gets truly confusing, let's dive into past forecasts--some which I have repeated for months--and see where the score stands. With the aid of more than a few maps.

Prediction No. 1: Pokrovsk to Kupyansk

As some of you will remember (and if not, you have not been reading), I began pointing to the focus on the Pokrovsk-to-Kupyansk logistics/fortress line some 18 months ago, noting that Russia would hit both ends hard, which could potentially shake up the middle and cost Ukraine hundreds upon hundreds of kilometers of precious ground.

This has largely proven true, as the Russian war machine has indeed focused on both cities/towns--losing hundreds of thousands of men in the process. As a quick reference, below is the overall map from August 2023, followed by the map of the same line as of Dec. 26, 2025, with a blue "P" denoting Pokrovsk.

August 2023:

Dec. 26, 2025:

Here, the unfortunately truth is that we must give the Russians credit. As insane as it sounds (and the numbers are far more insane than what is often depicted in press), they have remained focused on their goal, despite intolerable (outside of Russia) casualty rates and the fact that by the time they take a village, town or city there is typically nothing left to occupy. What should also be noted here is that this has nothing to do with Ukrainian scorched earth tactics. Apart from the odd manoeuvre or surprise tactic (such as resorting to sending two-to-four-man teams to slip through Ukrainian lines in order to "build up" pockets in the rear or using sewer tunnels or mining tunnels to insert troops into similar pockets), Russia has primarily resorted to various forms of meat waves, typically preceded by larger and larger glide bombs.

That said, the cost is steep, which we will get to shortly.

Prediction 2a: cutting satellite coverage to Kursk would cost the Ukrainians Pokrovsk and Kupiansk, and eventually the territory held in between...

This one was admittedly written in part out of anger (or shock or complete disbelief), but the facts are as follows: Just after the infamous press conference that saw both US President Donald Trump and US Vice President J.D. Vance berate and belittle beleaguered Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on national TV, "someone made a decision (in early March 2025) that saw the US essentially "turn out the lights" on Ukrainian operations in Kursk.

True, satellite feeds and intel were cut only for a matter of days (just how many is a matter for discussion), but for Ukrainian special forces on the ground in Kursk, who were hitting Russian forces hard, then retreating, regrouping only to hit them again, the blackout was critical. For these troops were not dug into positions that could be held against overwhelming forces, and they were also facing the fact that Russian intel was catching up fast--as was drone escalation, which would change the war diametrically for both sides over only a few months.

And let's just say, Kursk went bad fast.

Now a quick digression: When the history of the war in Ukraine is written, Kursk will likely remain controversial, as Gen. Oleksander Syrskyi--who perhaps is known more for going toe-to-toe with the Russians "Soviet style"--appears to have gambled on Kursk without the real goal of holding what was deemed immediately as strategically irrelevant territory. That said, the Kursk diversion did (if only out of embarrassment for Vladimir Putin) force an answer from Russian forces, which also at least delayed the use of troops ready to be deployed in Pokrovsk.

And as a quick review, below are maps of the front prior to Kursk and Kursk before and after the lights-out incident:

The Pokrovsk-Kupiansk line as of March 2025: 

The Kursk salient in January 2025 (with Ukrainian forces still on the move): 

Kursk by mid-March 2025:

Within literally weeks, the blue noted above had all but evaporated, with various sides estimating a large number of Ukrainian "write-offs" in terms of equipment left behind. That said the total losses were severe. Estimates had put 10,000-15,000 Ukrainian personnel had been operating in the salient, and at least somewhat credible casualty estimates put Ukrainian losses at 3,349 killed, 11,220 missing and 313 noted as prisoners of war.

Worse, Russia was then able to concentrate on Pokrovsk and later Kupyansk, not to mention a number of points in between.

Pokrovsk...

Somewhat ironically, Pokrovsk is still referred to in the Western press as a key logistics hub, which it has arguably not been for more than a year. Somewhat truthfully, it has more recently been referred to as a trap or at least a black hole for Russian troops. More truthfully, the fighting has been bitter, and although Russian tales of encirclement were indeed exaggerated, Syrskyi has been criticized for leaving troops too long in the southeastern pocket, as well as in Mynohrad, which The Corners' sources have painted as absolutely hellish for months.

In fact, the situation Pokrovsk has been more fluid than often described. The city was "arguably" occupied by end-October (which was arguably and almost certainly not true), with the Ukrainians fighting for every street through November. That said, by the end of November Ukrainian resistance could only be painted to be solid on the outskirts of the city, although fighting within the city itself flared through the entire month. This left Mynohrad and whatever remnants of Ukrainian forces south east of the town effectively cut off.

The recent story of the Pokrovsk pocket can essentially be seen in the maps below:

Pokrovsk as of Oct. 30: 

Pokrovsk as of Nov.28:

[Note that the grey area still represents disputed territory, although Russia is at least more in control of the actual city ruins. Likewise, Mynohrad and the southern pocket were operationally cut off-- even if the blue lines did represent very tenuous roads in and out of the town still served (under tremendous drone and artillery pressure) as supply lines and evacuation routes (although these were only barely realistic) for the wounded.]

Pokrovsk as of Dec. 16: 

By this time operational encirclement of Mynohrad was claimed by Russia, but sources who spoke to The Corners stated otherwise, claiming that battles on the ground were still ranging, with these likely consisting of hundreds of soldiers desperately fighting on both sides, with drone cover limiting reinforcements for all.

Pokrovsk as of Dec. 26: 

Remarkably, while the city could be said to be operationally lost... battles continue, with Dec. 25 reports (also noted by Russian observers) highlighting Ukrainian counters in the northwest of the city. Likewise, battles are reportedly still ongoing within Mynohrad, and Ukrainian sources continue to claim that while the battles are desperate, true operational encirclement of remaining forces has not taken place. Likewise, almost unbelievably, the no-man's land southeast of Mynohrad remains somehow disputed, with any true movement there stifled by drones on both sides. That said, on deadline there were reports that the Ukrainians somehow, against all odds, evacuated troops from Mynohrad with losses limited to wounded soldiers who could not physically get out. Likewise, there are reports that soldiers left behind were killed by Russian forces. More atrocities, which should remind any and all as to why Ukraine will not give in. That said, based on The Corners sources, as well as blogs from both sides, the picture on the ground was as follows as of Dec. 26, 2025.

Or also as follows (maybe):

Again, the maps above will have changed with the abandonment of Mynohrad. But the point is that while Pokrovsk has been technically lost, but then again... technically speaking may  not be reality. And Ukrainian counterattacks in the west and to the north in Rodynske are clearly a reality. And the troops in Mynohrad--and, almost impossibly, even in Novoekonomichne, held on far longer than expected.

Which brings us to casualties. Some estimates have claimed that Russian-to-Ukrainian casualties are in the 5-1 region. This is likely high--or more accurately, Ukrainian forces have faced more-than-reported casualties, and neither side can quickly or effectively evacuate wounded.  That said, Russian casualties have certainly been horrendous, with conservative estimates placing them in the 10,000 to 15,000 range per month... since January 2025. And yes, these could be conservative estimates, as recent (and highly primitive) Russian estimates to pump troops into the Pokrovsk-Mynohrad pocket may have well resulted in some 2,000 casualties a day.

Kupyansk...

If the news from Pokrovsk can be viewed with a grim optimism (after all, the battles still rage), the news from Kupyansk should be celebrated, as yes, at first the predictions of Yours Truly did also come true in that Russian forces took or at least operationally completely blocked the center of Kupyansk and Ukrainian troops east of Kupyansk and the Oskil were in serious trouble. In fact, this was the situation almost two months ago (at a time when the Russians and even Vladimir Putin himself had announced that the battle for Kupyansk was over.

Kupyansk Nov. 2, 2025: 

Here the situation was indeed dire, and much was made of the fact that Ukrainians in the Kupyansk pocket to the east of the Oskil were essentially going to be cut off--and the two "x's" marked on the map were bridges known to be destroyed or at least repeatedly hit by the Russians.

While indeed it looked bad for the Ukrainians, the Russians were gambling, as that drive west of the Oskil exposed a long and vulnerable flank, especially as the Ukrainian pocket east of the Oskil still held. Kupyansk Dec. 5. Note the long blue "squiggly" mark I have inserted below to highlight the Oskil waterway.

Kupyansk Dec. 25, 2025: 

Over the last two weeks the Ukrainians have hit that exposed flank hard, punishing the Russians to the point that what had seemed a complete victory has become a disaster that has not gone unnoticed by Russian sources. Those two "x's" in Kupiansk are at this time the only confirmed Russian concentrations, although there are holdouts throughout the ruins. That said, they were known to be cut off, short of ammunition and possibly starving and lacking water. But what should also be emphasized is the determination of the Ukrainians on the East side of the Oskil, as Russian forces were not able to capitalize on the ground gained in November, as gains in the pocket were minimal. In fact... miraculously, Synkivka, which has been fought over for two years, still remains a hump the Russians have not been able to cross.

Final prediction--Russia is beginning to crack...

If the above predictions seemed gloomy and controversial, none elicited more response than the comparison of Yours Truly of the war in Ukraine to the Russian collapse in the First World War. Yes, I compared the time-line and stated that this would be the year that Russia cracks.

Call it what you will, but I will hold to the obvious in that the cracks are beginning to show. That said, I will also admit, that Russia obviously has not collapsed, Putin is still in power, and the pressure on Ukraine continues to mount. Which means that first, let's talk about the bad and the ugly.

Ukraine is indeed losing ground. Despite the fact that Pokrovsk is still a battleground and the fact that Kupyansk is at least for now a surprise turnaround that at least in some sense could be called a victory, Russia has recently made gains along almost the entire front. This can be seen in the three snapshots below--one from early November 2024, one from November 2025 and one from Dec. 25:

November 1, 2024: 

November 5, 2025:

Current fortress line (Dec. 25, 2025): 

In short, while Ukraine has repeatedly shown the ability regroup and counterattack (not only in Kupyansk, but also in Sumy), the grind is wearing it down. What I have not focused on is the Russian drive in Zaporizhzhia (in general toward Pokrovskie), and in the November through December period Ukraine saw an assortment of towns that are relatively unknown in the West, such as Zelenyi Hai, Vesele, Vysoke, Rivnopillia, and Solodke lost which led to Huliaipole, which has recently been semi-lost, then semi-gained with counter attacks, but by the time this is published, it will likely be lost. Russian strategy here has been endless glide bombs. Likewise, back in the Pokrovsk to Kupyansk section of the front, Siversk has been lost, and the Russian focus (as predicted a year ago) will gradually morph toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, assuming it can deal with fierce battles in Kostiantynivka.

That said... Russia is beginning to crack. It has fought to stabilize the oil sector, despite sanctions and Ukrainian deep strikes, but the combo of outsized defense spending to the tune of 40 percent of the budget has exceeded revenue possibilities, especially from oil. The country is facing a shortage in labor, rising crime, rising inflation, a population that is actually sick of the war and a grim reality that is setting in with regard to "war wages" and the fact that this war is a one-way ticket where you even have to pay for your own combat gear. 

Then there is the economic realities for the Russian still back in Russia. Manufacturing is collapsing. This includes old stand-byes, such as tractor and bulldozer production (more than 50 percent drops), wood and furniture (in the 7 percent range) and even slight drops in chemical production. Metal production, which would include military has also fallen (although only slightly), and Russia seems to have hit its ceiling with regard to producing motorized armour for the war.

Does this mean Russia will collapse tomorrow. Unfortunately no. But the specter of another round of mobilization (and Putin is attempting to secretly bleed society with new laws that effectively will mean quiet mass conscription) will not go well.

So yes, the cracks are showing. According to UK Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, Luke Pollard, the "special military operation" has cost Russia more than one million casualties for a 1 percent gain in Ukrainian territory since the front lines stabilized in 2022.

This may indeed be playing with stats, but the essence of the above is true. What is also true is that Ukraine is also cracking in terms of manpower, political stability and access to cash and weapons. Still, even if my final prediction was over-optimistic--and even if it could be argued that Ukraine is currently losing the war...

Russia is certainly not winning. Not by a long shot. This war will haunt Russia or decades to come. And if 2025 was hard on Russia, Russian generals (who keep getting assassinated) and Vladimir Putin (and yes, we do believe it was), 2026 is going to be a nightmare indeed.